LIBRARY 

UNIVERSITY  OP 
CALIFORNIA 

SAN  DIEGO 


3  1822  01229  4419 


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presented  to  the 
UNIVERSITY  LIBRARY 
UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 
SAN  DIEGO 

by 

Mrs.  Joseph  Weisman 
in  memory  of  Leo  Perla 


WHAT  IS  ''NATIONAL  HONOR"? 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

UKW  YORK  •    BOSTON   -    CHICAGO  •    DALLAS 
ATLANTA  •    SAN  FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN  &  CO.,  Limitkd 

LONDON  •    BOMBAY  •    CALCUTTA 
MELBOURNB 

THE  MACMILLAN  CO.  OF  CANADA,  Ltd. 

TORONTO 


WHAT  IS 
"NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

The  Challenge  of  the  Reconstruction 


BY 

LEO  PERLA 


WITH 

A  SPECIAL  INTRODUCTION  BY 

NORMAN  ANGELL 


"What  is  called  National  Honor  is  at  pres- 
ent altogether  too  much  a  matter  of  capricious, 
private,  and  often  merely  personal  judgment 
simply  because  the  nations  are  not  as  yet  self- 
conscious     moral    beings." — Josiah    Royce. 


Nm»  1  nrk 

THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

1918 

All  rights  reserved. 


Copyright,  1918 
By  the   MACMILLAN  COMPANY 


Set  up  and  printed.     Published,  April,   1918. 


TO 
MY  WIFE  AND  COLLABORATOR 

REBECCA  CUSHMAN  PERLA 

WHOSE  INSPIRATION  AND  STRENGTH 
MADE  THIS  WORK  POSSIBLE 


"To  argue  that  a  nation's  Honor  must  be  defended  by 
the  blood  of  its  citizens,  if  need  be,  is  quite  meaningless,  for 
any  nation,  though  profoundly  right  in  its  contention,  might 
be  defeated  at  the  hands  of  a  superior  force  exerted  on 
behalf  of  an  unjust  and  unrighteous  cause.  What  becomes 
of  national  Honor  then?" — Nicholas  Murray  Butler, 
President  of  Columbia  University. 


INTRODUCTION 

It  is  a  hopeful  sign  that  this  book  which  at- 
tempts to  furnish  a  reply  to  the  question,  "What 
is  National  Honor?"  should  be  the  work  of  a 
young  man  at  the  outset  of  his  writing  career; 
that  it  should  be  prompted,  not  by  the  cynicism 
of  an  elderly  observer  wearied  with  seeing  na- 
tional honor  invoked  time  after  time  on  behalf 
of  shamefully  dishonest  causes,  but  by  the  sin- 
cere desire  of  a  youthful  and  flexible  mind  really 
to  know  what  underlies  the  potent  magic  of  the 
word. 

It  is  hopeful,  because  we  have  for  some  years 
been  demonstrating  to  one  another  that  the  old 
ideals  governing  national  conduct  are  somewhere 
defective.  Our  declared  aim  in  fighting  the  pres- 
ent war  is  to  destroy  certain  ideas  which  have 
taken  possession  of  the  minds  of  some  hundred  or 
more  million  folk;  and  if  the  aggression  which 
those  ideas  have  prompted  is  dangerous,  it  is  be- 
cause certain  other  ideas — including  our  feeling 
for  "national  honor" — which  have  governed  the 
relations  of  the  western  democracies,  have  stood 


X  INTRODUCTION 

in  the  way  of  a  unification  sufficient  even  to  enable 
those  democracies  promptly  to  present  a  cormuon 
front  to  a  common  danger.  Had  the  western 
world  been  really  unified  in  our  generation,  its 
power  would  never  have  been  challenged. 

If  we  are  to  do  better  in  the  future,  certain 
fundamental  ideas  of  international  relationship 
must  be  changed,  and  change  of  that  character 
must  be  the  work  of  minds  having  the  flexibility 
of  youth.  It  is  upon  the  young  men — as  many 
of  them  as  will  be  left  alive — that  will  fall  the 
task  of  rebuilding  the  house  which  the  elder  gen- 
eration has  pulled  about  their  ears.  If  the  new 
is  to  be  sounder  than  the  old  the  moral  founda- 
tions will  have  to  be  thoroughly  and  ruthlessly 
examined. 

Perhaps  the  author  of  this  book  will  talk  to  a 
world  a  little  more  disposed  to  tolerate  that  prob- 
ing, than  was  the  world  to  which  some  of  us 
talked  in  that  past  age  which  ended  in  1914. 
Perhaps  he  would  say  that — he  does  indeed  imply 
as  much  in  this  book — our  failure  was  due  in  some 
measure  to  the  fact  that  we  attempted  to  work 
through  ideas  rather  than  through  feelings,  that 
we  addressed  ourselves  to  the  head,  rather  than 
to  the  heart. 

Yet  this  very  criticism  of  his  shows  how  this 
discussion    of    the    international    problem    has 


INTRODUCTION  xi 

shifted  in  the  last  fifteen  or  twenty  years.  It  is 
ahnost  certain  that  if  he  had  been  writing  this 
book  a  generation  ago,  he  would  have  turned  his 
criticism  the  other  way  about.  This  notion  of 
looking  upon  the  internationalist,  or  peace  advo- 
cate, mainly  as  an  "intellectual,"  an  over-ration- 
alized person,  belongs  to  the  last  few  years.  For 
a  long  time  previous  to  that  he  was  looked  upon 
as  an  over-emotionalized  idealist  refusing  to  face 
with  the  calm  ej^es  of  reason  the  sordid  facts  of 
the  physical  world,  especially  certain  "biological 
laws"  concerning  the  struggle  for  life  and  the 
survival  of  the  fit  among  nations,  which  a  mis- 
reading of  Darwin  has  made  enormously  popu- 
lar. He  was  an  "amiable  and  well  meaning 
soul"  with  his  heart  in  the  right  place  but  with 
a  weak  head.  It  is  perfectly  true  that  if  we  go 
farther  back  still — to  the  period  of  Tennyson's 
Claude,  with  its  defense  of  the  War  fought  for 
the  maintenance  of  Turkish  Power,  we  find  an 
attitude  towards  the  Pacifism  of  Cobden  and 
Bright  not  dissimilar  to  that  which  now  marks 
the  attitude  of  the  man  in  the  streets  towards  in- 
ternationalism. As  those  very  practical  business 
men  could  hardly  be  represented  as  dreamers  and 
idealists  they  were  of  course  sordid  bagmen. 

We  sometimes  indeed  find  the  same  person  re- 
vealing this  swing  between  two  mutually  exclu- 


xii  INTRODUCTION 

sive  appraisements  of  the  motives  which  push 
men  to  war.  Even  so  able  and  honest  a  mind  as 
that  of  the  late  Admiral  Mahan  revealed  it  in 
striking  fashion.  In  1908,  in  his  "The  Interest 
of  America  in  International  Conditions"  he 
wrote : 

"It  is  as  true  now  as  when  Washington  penned  the  words, 
and  will  always  be  true,  that  it  is  vain  to  expect  nations 
to  act  consistently  from  any  motive  other  than  that  of 
interest.  That,  under  the  name  of  Realism,  is  the  frankly 
avowed  motive  of  German  statecraft.  It  follows  from  this 
directly  that  the  study  of  interests — international  interest — 
is  the  one  basis  of  sound,  provident  policy  for  statesmen. 
.  .  .  Governments  are  corporations  and  corporations  have 
no  souls  .  ,  .  must  put  first  the  interests  of  their  own 
wards  .  .  .  their  own  people." 

Yet  a  j^ear  or  two  later,  in  criticism  of  a  book 
of  my  own,  which  he  conceived  to  be  based  on 
just  the  assumption  of  underlying  forces  in  inter- 
national affairs  which  he  had  thus  outlined,  he 
wrote  as  follows: 

"The  purpose  of  armaments  in  the  minds  of  those  main- 
taining them  is  not  primarily  an  economical  advantage  in 
the  sense  of  depriving  a  neighboring  State  of  its  own  or 
fear  of  such  consequences  to  itself  through  the  deliberate 
aggression  of  a  rival  having  that  particular  end  in  view. 
.  .  .  The  fundamental  proposition  of  the  book  is  a  mistake. 
Nations  are  under  no  illusion  as  to  the  unprofitableness  of 
war  in  itself.  .  .  .  The  entire  conception  of  the  work  is 
itself  an   illusion,   based   upon   a   profound  misreading  of 


INTRODUCTION  xiii 

human  action.  To  regard  the  world  as  governed  by  self- 
interest  only  is  to  live  in  a  non-existent  world,  an  ideal 
world,  a  world  possessed  by  an  idea  much  less  worthy  than 
those  which  mankind,  to  do  it  bare  justice,  persistently 
entertains."  ^ 

The  writer  of  this  introduction  has  a  rather 
special  experience  of  the  changes  of  attitude  just 
indicated.  His  first  book  on  international  af- 
fairs, wi'itten  on  the  morrow  of  the  Boer  war, 
and  the  American  conquest  of  the  Philippines, 
and  towards  the  end  of  the  Dreyfus  affair,  was 
an  attempt  to  analyze  the  nature  of  patriotism. 
It  leaned  strongly  to  the  view  that  that  impulse 
did  not  derive  its  force  so  much  from  any  ration- 
alized idea  of  interest  as  from  the  desire  to  sat- 
isfy hungry  emotions  of  domination  and  pride. 
More  constructively,  it  was  a  plea  for  the  intro- 
duction into  national  ideals  as  well  as  into  na- 
tional conduct,  of  the  standards  of  private  inter- 
course, where  vainglorious  pride  in  power  and 
possessions  would  send  a  man  to  Coventry.  The 
book  fell  entirely  flat  so  far  as  the  public  were 
concerned:  had  no  sale  whatever.  By  the  critics 
it  was  treated  as  an  interesting  example  of  the 
extent  to  which  a  sentimental  idealism  could  lead 
a  student's  gaze  away  from  the  real  necessities  of 
the  hard  and  work-a-day  world  in  which  we  live. 

1  North  American  Review,  March,  1912. 


xiv  INTRODUCTION 

Fifteen  years  later  the  book  was  followed  by 
a  second  one,  in  which  an  attempt  was  made  to 
examine  critically  the  assumptions  upon  which 
those  criticisms  had  been  made.  How  far  could 
war  be  regarded  as  part  of  the  inevitable  struggle 
of  men  for  sustenance?  It  took  very  definitely 
the  view  that  in  the  last  analysis  the  wars  of  great 
modern  states  were  irrelevant  to  that  struggle, 
that  they  had  no  basis  in  biological  necessity  or 
advance,  and  that  their  "inevitability"  was  not 
rooted  in  material  need  or  advantage.  The  au- 
thor, this  time,  became  for  his  critics  a  sordidly 
minded  person  who  supposed  that  mankind  went 
to  war  because  it  "paid." 

My  only  excuse  for  recalling  this  little  bit  of 
personal  experience  is  that  it  does  bear  rather 
pertinently  on  the  questions  which  this  book 
raises:  the  real  springs  of  human  action  in  such 
things  as  international  conflict.  And  human  mo- 
tives are  never  simple  even  in  individual  action. 
The  capacity  for  self-deception  in  the  interpre- 
tation of  our  own  motives  even  seems  illimitable. 
We  may  honestly  convince  ourselves  that  our 
motive  in  a  given  course  is  of  one  kind  when  it 
may  well  be  of  quite  another.  The  parent  who, 
maddened  by  the  annoyance  of  a  petulant  child, 
finally  lets  himself  go  may  honestly  beheve  that 
the  terrifying  thrashing  which  he  administers  is 


INTRODUCTION  xv 

given  simply  and  purely  because  it  is  best  for  the 
child,  "and  hurts  me  much  more  than  it  hurts 
you,"  when,  in  fact,  it  is  merely  the  much  needed 
relief  to  a  long-restrained  irritability  that  has  be- 
come at  last  uncontrollable. 

Two  or  three  things  seem  pretty  clear  in  this 
elusive  research.  One  is  that  however  remote 
may  be  the  "sense  of  self-interest,"  it  almost  cer- 
tainly has  its  place  in  the  feelings  which  move 
men  in  the  mass ;  another  is  that  we  are  able  by  a 
psychological  alchemy  to  transmute  the  motive  of 
interest  into  an  idealistic  one.  We  can  say  pretty 
definitely,  for  instance,  that  the  institution  of 
domestic  slavery  had  something  at  least  to  do 
with  the  North  and  South  war;  that  in  a  sense 
the  South  fought  for  it  and  the  North  against 
it.  Yet  it  would  not  do  to  say  that  all  the 
idealism  was  on  the  side  of  the  North  and  that 
the  Southerners  went  to  war  merely  for  the 
profits  on  slave  labor.  They  fought  for  their 
"rights,"  for  their  country,  the  South,  for  their 
honor.  Yet  all  those  things  had  formed  them- 
selves about  an  institution  that  had  economic 
roots,  and  two  rival  ideals  and  systems  were  in 
truth  involved.  On  the  one  side  was  the  slave 
system  which  seemed  to  many  Southerners  to  of- 
fer, in  a  yet  undeveloped  country,  the  building  up 
of  a  civilization  that  should  be  stable  and  secure. 


xvi  INTRODUCTION 

promising  to  the  white  race  on  this  continent  op- 
portunities for  an  ordered  intellectual  and  politi- 
cal development,  a  culture  touched  with  refine- 
ment and  distinction  not  possible  otherwise,  and 
promising  to  a  still  savage  people  a  discipline  and 
gradual  civilization  not  possible  otherwise.     A 
great  deal  could  be  said — and  was  said — for  the 
idea,  though  the  Southern  slave-holders  were  not 
perhaps  in  the  best  position  to  be  impartial  judges 
of  the  merits  of  a  system  which  made  of  them  a 
privileged  aristocracy,  the  masters  of  a  servile 
people.     Yet  genuine  loyalties  formed  about  it, 
and  many  a  gallant  gentleman  gave  his  life  freely 
and  nobly  for  an  unselfish  ideal   (after  all  one 
cannot  well  die  for  "profit"  unless  one  is  very 
sure  indeed  of  one's  mansion  in  the  next  world) . 
But  the  ideal,  however  unselfishly  supported,  was 
one  which,  not  only  had  arisen  in  very  definite 
economic    causes,    but    which    millions    in    the 
North  were  giving  their  lives  to  destroy  believing 
it  to  be  evil.     Here  on  one  side  of  a  hne  were 
seven  or  eight  million  folk  passionately  convinced 
that  they  had  moral  right  in  their  favor;  and  on 
the  other  side  of  the  line  more  millions  as  pas- 
sionately convinced  that  the  contrary  cause  was 
right.     Did  the  planter's  economic  relation  to 
slavery  play  no  part  in  the  universal  opinion  of 
the  South,  or  was  the  division  of  opinion  a  mere 


INTRODUCTION  xvii 

miraculous  coincidence?  It  is  no  slur  upon  the 
memory  of  very  gallant  men  to  say  that  but 
for  certain  economic  factors  that  particular  moral 
conflict  would  never  have  arisen. 

A  generation  before  the  Southern  rebellion  the 
British  Empire  had  faced  a  slavery  problem  in 
certain  of  its  possessions.  It  approached  its  solu- 
tion from  the  economic  standpoint  and  provided 
for  fair  compensation  for  manumission — thanks 
largely  to  the  efforts  of  Quakers,  who  however 
"sordidly  commercial"  they  might  have  been  were 
able  at  least  to  combine  intense  feeling  on  the 
slavery  question  with  a  capacity  to  see  the  point 
of  view  of  the  planter.  If  at  that  time — during 
the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century — the  eco- 
nomic aspect  of  the  Southern  problem  had  been 
fairly  faced  by  the  country  as  a  whole,  and  the 
necessity  of  expending,  as  an  act  of  economic 
justice,  an  amount  equivalent  say  to  about  one- 
twentieth  of  what  was  finally  spent  upon  the  war, 
the  conflict  might  have  been  forestalled,  the  posi- 
tion of  the  negro  in  America  would  be  a  good 
deal  better  than  it  is ;  lynching  as  unknown  as  it  is 
in  Jamaica,  and  the  white  race  of  the  South  and 
North  alike  richer  in  its  original  elements,  by 
some  millions  of  Anglo-Saxon  stock  of  the  best 
strain — the  children  of  the  men  who  would  have 
been  their  fathers  if  the  war  had  not  taken  them. 


xviii  INTRODUCTION 

Yet  it  is  the  North  and  South  war  which  is  usually 
cited  as  the  typical  instance  of  the  irrelevance  of 
economic  issues  to  the  great  wars  of  history. 

I  had  almost  written  "economic  motive" — and 
should  have  had  to  qualify  it  by  saying  that  the 
motives  were  not  immediately  economic,  but  were 
motives  arising  out  of  economic  issues — and  being 
marvelously  changed  in  the  process.  For  in  our 
psychological  analyses  we  are  apt  to  speak  as 
though  a  given  motive  preserved  its  distinct 
character  when  it  became  associated  with  others. 
But  the  combination  with  others  may  absolutely 
transform  it,  as  certain  materials  in  combination 
with  others  undergo  wonderful  chemical  trans- 
formations. Nitrogen,  in  many  of  its  com- 
pounds, is  a  harmless  and  inert  stuff  much  used 
by  the  agriculturist ;  but  this  same  stuff  may 
become  the  deadliest  explosive  known  if  combined 
in  certain  proportions  with  other  equally  harm- 
less elements.  Nitro-glycerine  is  a  great  deal 
more  than  the  sum  of  two  perfectly  harmless 
materials.  The  combination  has  changed  the 
character  of  both.  It  would  be  untrue  to  say 
that  nitrogen  caused  the  Halifax  explosion  or 
that  glycerine  did;  for  if  either  could  have  been 
withdrawn,  or  the  two  could  have  been  detached 
and  carried  separately,  there  would  have  been 
no  explosion.     To  detach  the  economic  element 


INTRODUCTION  xix 

from  the  sum  of  those  motives  which  make  war, 
may  do  a  great  deal  more  than  merely  "take  away 
one  of  the  motives  leading  to  war."  It  may  de- 
prive all  the  others  of  their  explosive  power. 

Thus  it  may  be  true  that  German  aggression 
cannot  be  explained  purely  in  terms  of  economics, 
and  yet  it  may  be  equally  true  to  say  that  the 
diversion  of  the  economic  motive — a  different 
conception  of  their  interests  on  the  part  of  the 
people  as  a  whole — would  have  neutralized  the 
danger  of  Teutonic  power  in  the  world.  And  it 
would  be  a  very  bold  man  indeed  who  would 
say  that  economic  motives,  ideas  as  to  the  material 
advantage  to  be  derived  from  the  political  control 
of  territory,  will  not  play  a  very  large  part  in  the 
problems  of  the  future — in  the  destiny  of  Russia 
to-morrow  perhaps  the  new  sick  man  of  Europe 
and  the  spoil  of  rival  imperialisms — in  the  de- 
velopment of  Mitteleuropa,  in  the  relations  of 
Japan  to  Siberia  and  China,  and  those  of  the 
United  States  to  Mexico  and  South  America. 

To  recognize  that  in  the  vast  economic  interests 
centering  around  the  settlement  of  some  of  these 
territorial  problems  there  are  the  elements  of  ex- 
plosion is  not  to  put  forward  the  proposition 
that  men  fight  out  of  a  "finely  calculated  eco- 
nomic hedonism  or  out  of  the  intellectual  per- 
suasion of  the  advantages  of  war."     It  may  be 


XX  INTRODUCTION 

perfectly  true  that  the  explosion  when  it  comes 
will  be  precipitated  by  some  moral  question,  and 
yet  equally  true  that  if  we  could  have  kept  the 
nitrogen  of  economic  interest  apart  from  the 
glycerine  of  moral  indignation,  the  explosion 
would  not  have  occurred. 

Despite  these  reservations,  however,  I  think 
that  Mr.  Perla  is  on  the  right  lines  in  his  insistence 
upon  the  need  of  providing  an  emotional  equiv- 
alent for  war  as  the  best  general  method  of  ap- 
proach to  successful  internationalism.  Yet  the 
very  act  of  calling  attention  to  the  new  object- 
ive for  our  emotions,  involves  an  appeal  to  the 
intellectual  perceptions.  It  is  not  so  much  a 
matter  of  appealing  to  the  heart  instead  of  the 
head,  as  of  appealing  to  the  heart  through  the 
head.  The  heart  represents  the  motive  force  of 
our  emotions,  the  head  the  direction  that  the 
force  shall  take. 

I  have  attempted  to  illustrate  the  matter 
thus:  "On  the  other  side  of  the  street  you  catch 
a  glimpse  of  a  man  wanted  by  the  police  for  the 
revolting  murder  of  a  little  girl.  At  once  your 
sentiment  is  excited  to  an  intense  degree ;  it  blazes 
up  in  wild  clamor  and  you  give  the  hue  and  cry, 
and  the  crowd  catch  the  man.  And  then  you 
seee  that  on  his  left  hand  he  has  five  fingers :  the 
murderer   had   only   two.     Now,   because   your 


INTRODUCTION  xxi 

mind  is  capable  of  certain  purely  logical  processes 
— and  thanks  only  to  that — the  wild  current  of 
your  sentiment  is  immediately  changed,  and  you 
are  now  mainly  concerned  to  see  that  an  innocent 
man  does  not  suffer  a  threatened  lynching.  You 
are  just  as  'sentimental'  as  before;  the  engine 
of  your  heart  is  beating  as  vigorously,  the  emo- 
tional power  is  just  as  great  but  it  happens  (to 
state  the  thing  in  mechanical  terms)  to  be  turning 
the  wheels  of  action  in  an  opposite  direction  be- 
cause certain  levers,  which  are  your  mental  per- 
ceptions, have  been  shifted  by  contact  with  cer- 
tain facts.  A  common  counsel  is:  'The  engine 
alone  is  what  matters;  provided  only  that  that 
has  plenty  of  power  you  can  throw  away  your 
steering  gear  as  an  encumbrance,  and  the  driver 
can  shut  his  eyes.'  Well,  it  is  because  mankind 
has  often  been  guided  by  that  idea  that  history  is 
so  largely  a  record  of  bad  accidents. 

"For  note  this:  in  an  age  of  simpler  enthusi- 
asms the  steering  gear  in  this  case  might  not  have 
worked  so  well.  In  an  age  when  most  men  be- 
lieved that  any  ordinary  murderer  would  not  hesi- 
tate to  call  in  the  ever-convenient  witch  to  remedy 
so  trifling  a  matter  as  a  missing  finger,  the  simple 
logical  mechanism  by  which  you  recognized  the 
man's  innocence  might  not  have  worked;  you 
would  have  wanted  to  see  whether  God  indicated 


xxu  INTRODUCTION 

the  man's  innocence  by  allowing  his  arms  to  be 
boiled  for  half  an  hour  without  injury.  And 
goodness  of  heart,  the  affection  of  the  crowd  for 
their  own  children,  their  detestation  of  so  abom- 
inable a  crime  as  child  murder,  would  have  cost 
an  innocent  man  his  life  and  fair  name." 

When  the  little  group  of  Dreyfusards  in  the 
closing  years  of  the  19th  Century  determined  to 
save  France  from  a  militarism  which  expressed 
itself  in  identifying  the  "honor  of  the  army"  with 
the  maintenance  of  an  injustice,  and  in  elevating 
the  irresponsibility  of  a  military  court  above  the 
honor  of  justice,  they  could  only  in  the  first  in- 
stance appeal  to  intelligence.  And  if  the  French 
had  not  been  an  intelligent  and  an  intellectual,  as 
well  as  an  emotional  people,  the  Dreyfusard 
cause  would  have  been  hopeless.  Before  the 
Dreyfusards  could  divert  the  flow  of  emotion 
from  one  objective — an  erroneous  and  mistaken 
sentiment  of  patriotism — to  another — the  deter- 
mination that  the  honor  of  France  should  not 
be  rooted  in  injustice — they  had  to  show  first  the 
nature  of  the  thing  to  which  France  was  com- 
mitted, and  the  nature  of  that  to  which  the  re- 
visionists desired  her  to  be  committed.  The 
transfer  of  emotion  involved  a  judgment,  a  dis- 
crimination, comparison,  a  balancing — an  intel- 
lectual process.     And  it  is  worth  noting  that  "in- 


INTRODUCTION  xxiii 

tellectual"  as  a  term  of  contempt  was  first  used 
so  far  as  I  know  by  the  anti-Dreyfusards  who 
resisted  the  revision  of  the  Dreyfus  trial.  Cer- 
tain it  is  that  that  historical  re-trial  was  made 
inevitable  by  the  work  of  "intellectuals"  who  ral- 
lied to  the  defense  of  Dreyfus.  The  association 
between  "intellectualism"  and  Dreyfusism  in  that 
affair  was  unmistakable,  and  did  not  escape  the 
notice  of  the  defenders  of  "the  honor  of  the 
army."  The  truth  was,  of  course,  that  the  "in- 
tellectuals" were  moved  by  an  emotion  as  intense 
as  that  of  the  military  party;  but  it  was  an  emo- 
tion excited  by  a  vision  beyond  the  range  of  the 
normal  mental  eyesight  of  militarists.  It  comes 
down  perhaps  to  this,  that  as  civilization  rests  in 
the  last  resort  upon  the  intelligent  cooperation  of 
men  for  the  purposes  of  fighting  the  forces  of 
nature,  our  salvation  depends  upon  discovering 
with  our  minds  the  things  that  matter,  and  then 
giving  our  emotions  free  rein.  Once  having  de- 
cided with  our  heads  the  right  course,  the  more 
that  our  hearts  can  hold  us  upon  it  and  give  our 
efforts  driving  force,  the  better. 

But  without  that  intellectual  discrimination  the 
choice  which  is  made  between  two  emotional  im- 
pulses will  simply  be  determined  by  the  relative 
strength  of  the  two  competing  emotions — and  the 
strength  of  an  emotional  impulse  has  no  relation 


xxiv  INTRODUCTION 

whatever  to  its  social  utility.  In  society  even  the 
instinct  of  self-preservation  is  no  guide  as  to  its 
value  in  self-preservation,  as  the  results  of  the  in- 
stinct which  prompts  five  thousand  people  all  to 
rush  for  the  doors  of  a  building  which  some  one 
has  falsely  declared  to  be  on  fire,  abundantly 
proves. 

Why  is  it  worth  emphasizing  all  this?  Be- 
cause the  very  proper  protest  of  modern  psy- 
chologists against  the  over-intellectualizations  of 
human  motive  of  which  their  predecessors  were 
guilty,  is  being  used  in  our  time  to  justify  the 
disparagement  of  reason,  to  put  forward  the 
dangerous  doctrine  that  judgments  which  are 
the  outcome  of  passion  are  of  greater  moral  worth 
than  those  which  we  reach  by  emotional  discipline 
and  intellectual  rectitude.  A  whole  group  of 
interests  seem  now  to  be  pandering  to  emotional 
appetites  which  can  only  be  satisfied  at  immense 
social  cost. 

It  is  well  to  know  that  so  vast  a  field  of  our 
conduct  is  not  rationally  motived,  that  reason 
plays  so  small  a  part  therein.  The  knowledge 
should  be  a  warning  to  increase  the  part  of  rea- 
son, to  put  us  on  our  guard  against  unrealized 
forces  that  may  destroy  us  as  readily  as  serve  us. 
The  glorification  of  emotion  and  impulse  in  poli- 
tics  has   come  near  to  wrecking  the  unity   of 


INTRODUCTION  xxv 

western  democracies  and  rendering  them  in- 
capable of  that  degree  of  integration  which  is  so 
necessary  if  we  are  to  meet  such  unity  and  disci- 
pline as  autocracy  manages  to  impose.  Such  "in- 
stincts" as  nationalism,  undisciplined  and  uncon- 
trolled by  an  intelligent  foresight  of  conse- 
quences, are  so  disruptive  a  force  in  any  associa- 
tion of  states  as  to  make  any  voluntary  unifica- 
tion of  our  scattered  democracies  impossible. 
And  if  that  should  prove  the  case,  the  last  word 
will  be  with  autocracy,  whatever  individual  mili- 
tary power  each  one  of  our  nations  might  achieve. 
Cooperation  between  the  democracies — which  in 
fact  means  a  democratic  internationalism — is  the 
onty  means  by  which  we  can  make  effective  use  of 
our  collective  power  against  a  common  danger. 
And  that  cooperation  will  run  counter  to  many 
a  "natural"  impulse. 

Norman  Angell. 


AUTHOR'S  PREFACE 

As  the  molten  steel  is  drawn  from  the  crucible 
at  white  heat  and  poured  into  forms,  so  public 
opinion  must  be  directed  in  the  heat  and  passion 
of  war,  if  it  is  to  harden  into  definite  ideals  of  re- 
construction. The  purpose  of  the  present  work 
is  to  aid  in  the  formation  of  such  a  public  opinion. 
An  untimely  discussion  of  peace  may  weaken  the 
morale  of  a  country  at  war ;  but  an  inquiry  into  a 
technique  of  reconstruction,  when  such  inquiry  is 
designed  to  help  in  the  carrying  out  of  the 
avowed  object  of  the  war,  can  only  add  strength 
and  purpose  to  its  prosecution. 

National  Honor  has  been  the  cause  of  almost 
every  war  of  history.  Yet  the  two  Hague  Con- 
ferences omitted  it  from  their  jurisdiction.  The 
League  to  Enforce  Peace  disposes  of  the  prob- 
lem by  excluding  "non- justiciable"  questions 
(i.e.,  honor)  from  the  field  of  its  endeavor. 
Even  the  Inter- Allied  Labor  Conference  fell  a 
victim  to  the  masked  phrase  and  in  its  proposal 
of  a  court  of  arbitration  to  insure  the  future  peace 


xxviii  AUTHOR'S  PREFACE 

of  the  world,  it  excluded  all  questions  of  "honor." 
National  Honor  is  the  fundamental  casus  belli 
and  the  challenge  of  the  reconstruction.  To  de- 
fine it  is  to  lay  the  corner-stone  for  universal,  all- 
inclusive  arbitration  without  which  the  peace  of 
the  future  must  rest  as  a  house  built  upon  sands. 
My  purpose  in  this  work  is  not  to  put  the  ques- 
tion "What  is  National  Honor?"  in  a  spirit  of 
cynicism.  In  view  of  the  elastic  way  in  which 
the  term  has  been  used  to  characterize  a  vague 
sum-total  of  national  obligations  dimly  inarticu- 
late, the  question  is  certainly  justified.  Only 
when  public  opinion  has  become  informed  of  the 
perversions  and  misapplications  of  national 
honor,  will  it  feel  ready  to  re-christen  this  popu- 
lar war-slogan,  and  to  invest  it  with  genuine  prin- 
ciples of  right  and  justice. 

When  the  Roman  Catholic  monk  takes  the 
three  vows  of  chastity,  poverty  and  obedience,  we 
know  exactly  what  these  ideals  are,  for  which  he 
might  be  willing  to  give  his  life.  When  a  physi- 
cian speaks  of  "professional  honor,"  we  are  no 
less  clear  as  to  the  specific,  ethical  prohibitions 
that  he  has  in  mind.  But  when  a  nation  declares 
that  "national  honor"  is  the  sublime  ideal  for 
which  it  is  ever  ready  to  suffer  annihilation  if 
necessary,  that  it  is  the  one  thing  which  it  can 
never  consent  to  arbitrate,  we  know  almost  noth- 


AUTHOR'S  PREFACE  xxix 

ing  about  the  implications  which  the  phrase  com- 
prises. 

If  we  are  to  meet  adequately  the  problems  of 
reconstruction,  we  must  resolutely  leave  behind 
us  the  blinding  passions  and  small  quibblings  of 
the  passing  age,  and  challenge  with  a  ruthless 
sincerity  the  values  that  claim  a  right  to  be  incor- 
porated into  the  new  and  clean  fabric  which  is  be- 
ing put  upon  the  loom. 

If  the  present  work  succeeds  in  attracting 
minds  that  are  capable  of  considering  this  prob- 
lem in  the  light  of  international  law,  and  further, 
if  it  makes  clear  the  dire  necessity  for  a  political 
analysis  of  "honor"  with  the  view  of  arriving  at 
a  clearly  articulated  definition  of  its  more  essen- 
tial imperatives,  the  object  of  the  author  will  have 
been  attained.  The  greatest  security  of  the 
peace  of  the  world  will  rest  upon  a  definition  and 
a  codification  of  the  principles  involved  in  the 
evasive  phrase  which  the  two  Hague  Conferences 
left  in  sentimental  obscurity. 

L.  P. 
New  York  City. 
March  30,  1918. 


FOREWORD 

I  wish  to  thank  sincerely  the  friends  who  have 
helped  me  in  this  work.  To  Frederick  P.  Kep- 
pel.  Assistant  Secretary  of  War,  I  owe  a  debt 
which  I  wish  to  pay  with  warm  gratitude  and  af- 
fection. His  personal  interest  and  effort  have 
been  a  continued  source  of  encouragement.  For 
Prof.  Walter  B.  Pitkin  of  Columbia  University 
I  feel  the  obligation  which  a  young  writer  owes  to 
a  recognized  journalist  for  his  initial  stimulus. 
I  wish  to  thank  Mr.  Walter  Lippmann  for  his 
valuable  suggestions  to  Part  III  and  for  his  read- 
ing of  the  manuscript.  I  am  indebted  to  Prof. 
John  Dewey  and  Prof.  Chas.  A.  Beard  for  sug- 
gestions. Also  I  want  to  acknowledge  my  in- 
debtedness to  Mr.  Malisoff  of  Columbia  Univer- 
sity for  sober  criticism  and  to  Mr.  Yarmolinsky 
of  the  College  of  the  City  of  New  York,  whose 
patient  criticism  and  revision  of  the  proofs  were 
invaluable. 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Introduction  by  Norman  Angell ix 

Preface  by  the  Author xxvii 

Foreword xxxi 

PART  I 
THE  GREAT  CONFUSION 

I.     Public  Opinion  and  Honor 3 

II.     A  New  Technique 11 

III.  Questionnaire — A  Symposium  of  One  Hu'n- 

DRED   AND   ThIRTY-FIVE    PhASES   OF    NATIONAL 

Honor 30 

PART  II 
A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ANALYSIS  OF  HONOR 

IV.  The  Emotional  Basis  of  Honor  ....      83 
V.     Testing  for  Rationality 99 

VI.     Testing  for  an  Emotion 112 

VII.     Dissecting  the  Honor  Complex    ....    133 
VIII.     The  Tyranny  of  a  Phrase 139 


CONTENTS 

PART  III 

THREE  PROGRAMS  FOR  PERMANENT 
PEACE 

PAGE 
IX.      MORALIZATION    OF  NATIONAL  HoNOR A  PROB- 
LEM IN  Ethics 151 

X.     A  Court  of  International  Honor — A  Prob- 
lem IN  Politics 165 

XI.     An    Emotional    Equivalent    for    National 

Honor — A  Problem  in  Psychology      .      .188 


PART  I 
THE  GREAT  CONFUSION 


WHAT  IS    NATIONAL  HONOR '? 

CHAPTER  I 

PUBLIC    OPINION    AND    HONOR 

As  a  heritage  from  the  days  of  dueHng  the 
feeling  is  still  current  that  rational  analysis  of 
matters  of  "honor"  is  incompatible  with  "cour- 
age." It  is  undoubtedly  a  transference  of  this 
instinctive  belief  to  the  realm  of  international 
politics  which  is  responsible  for  the  failure  of  both 
Hague  Conferences  to  define  the  question  of 
"national  honor,"  or  even  consider  it  as  a  proper 
subject  for  definition.  No  better  illustration  of 
this  universally  accepted  political  dogma  can  be 
given  than  the  following  citation  from  Ex-Presi- 
dent Roosevelt  concerning  a  possible  course  of 
calm  deliberation  in  national  disputes  of  honor. 

"It  is  a  preposterous  absurdity  for  a  League 
of  nations  to  attempt  to  restrain  even  for  a  lim- 
ited time  one  of  its  members  from  declaring  war 
upon  another  when  a  question  of  honor  is  raised." 

In  other  words  it  is  generally  accepted  that  the 


4  WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

less  time  that  is  allowed  to  elapse  between  an  in- 
sult to  honor  and  its  vindication,  the  loftier  is  the 
sense  of  honor.  Even  though  the  intervening 
time  may  be  employed  in  a  sincere  effort  to  ascer- 
tain in  fairness  all  possible  phases  of  the  dispute, 
to  the  ardent  champions  of  this  doctrine  of  haste 
the  delay  is  nevertheless  unjustified. 

Added  to  this  instinctive  opposition  to  the  use 
of  reason  in  matters  of  honor,  there  has  undoubt- 
edly been  a  conscious  evasion  of  the  problem  on 
the  part  of  diplomats.  "Diplomacy"  has  found 
in  the  emotional  obscurity  of  honor,  political  cap- 
ital. Holls  in  his  work  on  the  "Peace  Confer- 
ence" writes, 

"The  phrase  national  honor  or  vital  interests 
was  intentionally  made  broad  and  general,  and 
the  Conference  was  well  aware  that  in  so  doing 
not  only  a  proper  degree  of  reserve  but  also  pos- 
sibly a  great  amount  of  guilty  concealment  was 
being  made  possible  and  provided  with  diplo- 
matic safe-guards." 

Public  opinion  after  the  war  will  undoubtedly 
demand  a  square  and  reasonable  facing  of  this 
apparently  elusive  problem.  If  at  the  time  of 
the  Conference  (1907)  there  had  existed  a  public 
mind  alive  to  its  right  and  obligation  to  under- 
stand this  delicate  and  vital  problem,  and  seeking 
to  form  an  enlightened  judgment  as  to  what  the 


PUBLIC  OPINION  AND  HONOR  6 

term  "national  honor"  implied,  such  a  complete 
diplomatic  evasion  as  the  Conference  was  guilty 
of,  would  never  have  been  possible. 

Were  this  public  blindness  to  facts  less  fraught 
with  tragic  consequences,  one  might  find  in  it 
almost  a  grim  humor.  The  Hague  decided  to  ar- 
bitrate everything  "except  matters  of  honor  and 
vital  interests."  The  world  heaved  a  sigh  of  re- 
lief, believing  that  the  possibilities  of  war  had  to 
this  degree  been  removed.  However  no  one 
whispered  to  this  naively  credulous  world  that  in 
so  doing  the  Hague  had  left  still  exposed  to  the 
wrath  of  INIars  the  very  things  and  the  only  things 
for  which  nations  have  ever  fought,  and  had  rele- 
gated to  the  realm  of  "safe"  arbitration,  those 
things  for  which  no  nation  ever  fights.  Did  a 
nation  ever  consciously  go  to  war  for  something 
which  was  incompatible  with  its  "honor"?  Do 
men  give  their  lives  for  the  defense  of  national 
dishonor? 

The  diplomatic  manipulation  of  the  term  na- 
tional honor,  by  which  it  has  been  made  in  di- 
verse ways  to  cover  almost  am^  national  policy, 
has  been  possible  only  for  the  reason  that  na- 
tional honor  has  been  accepted  by  the  people  of 
every  nation  alike  as  an  article  of  faith.  Al- 
though its  implications  are  left  undefined,  no 
patriot  is  expected  to  question  the  validity  of  the 


6  WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

claim  when  it  is  even  semi-officially  declared  to  be 
at  stake.  The  question  "What  is  National 
Honor?"  is  therefore  a  bold  and  dangerous  one 
to  ask.  It  is  true  that  honor,  being  an  emotional 
ideal  rather  than  a  rational  one,  is  not  an  easy 
subject  for  off-hand  definition.  As  a  man  of 
courage  is  not  expected  to  analyze  a  point  of  per- 
sonal honor,  so  a  self-respecting  nation  is  not 
expected  to  descend  to  the  "calculating"  plane 
when  its  honor  is  thought  to  have  been  wounded. 

Fortunately  the  times  seem  to  give  some  indi- 
cation that  this  melodramatic  and  irrational  atti- 
tude is  passing.  The  great  war  is  stimulating  a 
new  interest  in  foreign  politics,  and  diplomatic 
subtleties.  But  deeper  than  this  it  is  purifying 
and  regenerating  our  sense  of  values.  From  the 
suffering  peoples  who  have  been  broken  on  this 
merciless,  gigantic  wheel,  there  will  come  the 
ringing  question,  "What  is  this  national  honor 
which  demands  our  possessions,  our  happiness, 
our  loves  and  our  lives,  and  yet  which  shrinks 
from  arbitration?" 

Secret  diplomacy  on  the  one  hand  and  woeful 
public  indifference  toward  the  problem  on  the 
other,  have  been  the  checks  upon  the  develop- 
ment of  an  enlightened  public  opinion  regarding 
this  most  essential  factor  of  international  politics. 
In  every  emergency,  the  nature  and  "constitu- 


PUBLIC  OPINION  AND  HONOR  7 

tion"  of  honor  have  been  left  for  definition  by 
the  people,  to  diplomats  and  other  "custodians" 
of  the  sacrosanct  sentiment.  The  Man  in  the 
Street  through  laziness  of  thinking  and  indiffer- 
ence of  purpose,  shrinks  from  the  responsibility 
of  a  decision  upon  these  ethical  and  political 
problems.  Because  of  this  situation  we  have 
developed  in  our  democracies  an  aristocracy 
which  is  the  more  despotic  in  its  power  because  of 
the  exclusive  quality  of  the  dogmas  with  which 
it  holds  its  sway.  On  occasion  of  crises,  no  mat- 
ter what  may  be  the  underlying  difficulty  in  the 
dispute,  it  is  given  to  a  few  dominant  personali- 
ties to  sway  the  great  mass;  to  mold  into  a  solid 
body  of  sentiment,  the  fragmentary  and  kaleido- 
scopic public  opinion,  by  the  clarion  appeal  that 
the  "nation's  honor  is  at  stake."  Here  mob  psy- 
chology with  its  geometric  progression  works 
with  the  swiftness  of  magic. 

The  few  at  such  critical  times  are  not  with- 
out an  offensive  weapon  with  which  to  unify  the 
will  of  the  nation.  The  lash  of  intolerance 
forms  the  back-bone  of  the  attack,  followed 
quickly  by  that  weapon  so  easily  used  and  so  in- 
sidious in  its  effects,  the  branding-stick  which 
marks  the  stigma  "coward"  upon  its  victim.  It 
is  far  less  difficult  for  a  man  to  accept  the  al- 
ternative of  floating  on  the  tide  of  public  opin- 


8  WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

ion  and  playing  safe,  than  to  hold  to  a  conviction 
unpopular  with  a  clamorous  minority.  For  this 
reason  the  rank  and  file  can  be  depended  upon  to 
fall  into  line.  There  is  no  experience  fraught 
with  more  expansive  complacency  than  that  which 
comes  from  basking  in  the  glory  of  a  nation's 
honor. 

There  are  two  possible  positions  which  a  man 
may  hold  with  regard  to  a  dispute  of  honor  in 
which  his  nation  is  involved.  He  may  evince  a 
willingness  to  die  in  order  to  defend  what  he 
deems  his  country's  honor  to  be  or  he  may  not 
recognize  that  such  honor  is  at  stake.  If  he  fol- 
low the  first  course  and  prove  his  willingness  to 
die,  though  later  the  ideal  may  prove  to  be  false, 
he  is  respected  for  his  sincerity  and  courage. 
Should  he  take  the  second  course  he  places  him- 
self in  a  position  of  moral  weakness  because,  al- 
though he  may  manifest  a  keener  understanding 
and  a  more  sensitive  appreciation  of  ethical  sub- 
tleties, he  has  not  proved  his  readiness  to  die. 
Although  the  actual  strength  and  courage  needed 
to  defend  his  position  be  far  greater,  it  will  not 
save  him  from  the  suspicion  of  his  fellows  that  he 
is  an  idealist  who  believes  in  safety  first  "with 
special  reference  to  his  own  skin." 

The  opponent  to  a  proposed  war  for  honor,  is 
placed  in  the  imcomfortable  position  of  feeling 


PUBLIC  OPINION  AND  HONOR  9 

that  he  is  a  destructive  influence,  that  he  is  taking 
away  a  sentiment  for  which  he  substitutes  no 
equivalent,  save  a  rational  justification  for  the 
repudiation  of  the  sentiment.  Even  though  a 
majority  hold  this  negative  opinion  their  oppo- 
sition lacks  enthusiasm.  If  another  ideal  were 
supplied  in  such  a  case,  the  crisis  might  be  more 
easily  weathered  for  the  reason  that  pugnacity 
once  aroused,  must  have  some  "ideal"  to  which  to 
fasten.  If  robbed  of  this,  albeit  by  reason,  it 
presents  the  spectacle  suggested  in  our  homely 
phrase,  "a  chicken  with  its  head  cut  off";  a  pas- 
sion of  undirected  energy. 

The  remarkable  thing  has  been  that  in  all  mat- 
ters which  potentially  might  be  said  to  involve 
the  honor  of  nations,  in  their  agreements  and 
foreign  policies,  men  have  taken  little  active  inter- 
est until  friction  actually  arose  and  war  was  im- 
minent. The  citizen  who  allows  his  country  to 
drift  into  dishonorable  or  unjust  agreements,  or 
to  exercise  an  ungenerous  policy  with  regard  to 
another  country  and  does  not  protest  in  time  of 
peace,  can  not  cancel  his  obligation  as  a  citizen 
by  bearing  arms  in  defense  of  his  country's 
"honor"  when  such  a  policy  has  provoked  an  un- 
just war. 

Since  diplomats  and  statesmen  have  failed, 
there  devolves  upon  public  opinion  the  obligation 


10  WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

to  become  interested  and  enlightened,  and  the 
responsibility  of  imposing  order  upon  the  moral 
confusion  into  which  "national  honor"  has  fallen. 
The  men  who  defend  this  honor  must  learn 
to  define  it. 


CHAPTER  II 

A   NEW    TECHNIQUE 

The  economic  case  against  war  has  been  empha- 
sized so  repeatedly  in  pacifist  literature  ever  since 
the  publication  of  Mr.  Norman  Angell's  epoch- 
making  work,  "The  Great  Illusion,"  that  one 
would  be  justified  in  assuming  that  the  supreme 
cause  of  war  has  been  its  supposed  promise  of 
economic  gain,  and  that  once  this  theory  had  been 
permanently  refuted,  war  will  have  lost  its  great- 
est incentive.  President  Nicholas  INIurray  But- 
ler of  Columbia  University  puts  this  universally 
accepted  theory  in  very  effective  language. 

"We  have  now  reached  a  point,"  he  says, 
"where  unparalleled  enthusiasm  having  been 
aroused  for  a  rational  and  orderly  develop- 
ment of  civilization  through  the  coopera- 
tion of  the  various  nations  of  the  earth,  it 
remains  to  clinch  that  enthusiasm  and  to  trans- 
form it  into  established  policy  by  proving  to 
all  men  that  militarism  does  not  pay,  and  that 

PEACE    IS    PROFITABLE.       JUST    SO    LONG    AS    THE 

GREAT  MASS  OF  MANKIND  BELIEVE  THAT  MILITARY 

11 


12  WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

AND  NAVAL  RIVALRY  BETWEEN  CIVILIZED  NATIONS 
CREATES  AND  PROTECTS  TRADE,  DEVELOPS  AND  AS- 
SURES COMMERCE^  AND  GIVES  PRESTIGE  AND  POWER 
TO  PEOPLES  OTHERWISE  WEAK,  JUST  SO  LONG  WILL 
THE  MASS  OF  MANKIND  BE  UNWILLING  TO  COMPEL 
THEIR  GOVERNMENTS  TO  RECEDE  FROM  MILITARIS- 
TIC POLICIES  WHATEVER  MAY  BE  THEIR  VOCAL 
PROFESSIONS  AS  TO  PEACE  AND  ARBITRATION  AND  AS 
TO  GOOD-WILL  AND  FRIENDSHIP  BETWEEN  MEN  OF 
DIFFERENT  TONGUES  AND  OF  DIFFERENT  BLOOD.  .  .  . 
"these  fallacious  BELIEFS  ARE  NOW  THE 
POINT  IN  THE  WALL  OF  OPPOSITION  TO  THE  ESTAB- 
LISHMENT OF  PEACE  THROUGH  JUSTICE  AT  WHICH 
SHARP  AND  CONCENTRATED  ATTACK  SHOULD  BE  DI- 
RECTED. 0\TERTHROW  THESE  AND  THERE  WILL 
NOT  BE  MUCH  OPPOSITION  LEFT  WHICH  IS  NOT 
ESSENTIALLY  EVIL  IN  INTENT."' 

This  insistence  upon  the  economic  incentive  as 
the  cause  of  war  carries  with  it  an  intimation  of  a 
gross  libel  on  human  nature.  While  the  econo- 
mic illusion  has  undoubtedly  held  a  place  in  the 
minds  of  diplomats  and  jingoists,  in  the  hearts 
of  the  men  who  fight  it  has  been  an  irrelevant  cir- 
cumstance. To  stress  this  phase  in  the  hope  that 
a  universal  acceptance  of  it  will  stop  war  is  to 
work  without  a  recognition  of  a  far  more  signifi- 
cant factor  in  human  nature,  the  patriotic  imper- 
ative.    Until  the  ethical  motor-spring  in  nations 


A  NEW  TECHNIQUE  13 

has  been  readjusted,  there  will  still  be  war.  In 
fact  the  more  unprofitable  war  can  be  shown  to 
be,  the  more  keenly  will  men  feel  the  purity  of 
the  ideal  for  which  alone  they  have  always  been 
ready  to  die. 

Besides,  even  with  diplomats  and  statesmen  the 
theory  of  war's  economic  stupidity  is  generally 
accepted.  Who  to-day  would  still  defend  war 
from  the  economic  standpoint  ?  It  would  require 
a  juggling  of  figures  for  the  militarist  to  make 
out  a  case  for  war  on  economic  grounds  by  com- 
paring the  staggering  sums  of  money  that  are 
being  expended  in  the  present  world  war  by 
either  side  with  the  possible  cash  value  of  terri- 
tory or  advantage  that  may  come  out  of  the  con- 
flict. It  may  be  true  that  in  England  before  the 
war  there  were  many  who  labored  under  the  illu- 
sion that  if  Germany  could  be  eliminated  as  a 
commercial  rival,  any  expenditure  incurred  in 
achieving  it  would  be  a  good  investment.  But 
three  years  of  war  have  served  a  great  purpose 
and  have  changed  public  opinion  vitally. 
Whether  or  not  Englishmen  have  come  to  accept 
the  truth  that  the  commercial  prosperity  of  Ger- 
many or  any  other  country  bears  no  relation  to 
military  or  political  power,  no  statesman  in  Eng- 
land to-day  would  admit  that  he  regarded  it  as 
sound  national  business  policy  to  have  expended 


14  WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

$75,000,000,000,  the  cost  of  the  war  to  Eng- 
land up-to-date,  to  cripple  German  prosperity. 
If  diplomats  thought  in  economic  terms 
before  the  present  war,  they  think  in  such 
terms  no  longer.  Wars  to-day  are  waged  on 
such  a  tremendous  scale  and  the  cost  involved 
is  so  stupendous  that  the  economic  case  for  con- 
quest and  annexation  has  become  absurd  and 
any  one  who  advanced  it  would  lack  a  sense  of  hu- 
mor. War  is  outrageously  unprofitable,  even 
when  it  results  in  the  acquisition  of  vast  posses- 
sions, commercial  advantages,  concessions,  and 
spheres  of  influence.  If  this  was  true  even  a 
hundred  years  ago  how  much  more  true  is  it  to- 
day when  war  has  assumed  such  huge  proportions 
that  it  has  become  as  Bloch  prophesied  it  would 
become,  almost  economically  impossible  to  wage 
it.  And  since  the  publication  of  "The  Great 
Illusion"  the  notion  of  the  economy  of  conquest, 
or  the  commercial  advantage  derived  from  suc- 
cessful war  has  become  obsolete.  War  is  to-day 
a  formidable  loss  and  a  stupid  business  venture. 

But  though  this  is  generally  recognized  and 
accepted  it  is  of  no  avail  in  the  interests  of  peace 
to  dwell  upon  this  economic  loss  and  the  burdens 
of  debt  which  the  ordeal  of  battle  rolls  up.  If 
the  recital  of  the  tremendous  cost  of  war  has  any 
effect  at  all  upon  the  common  man  it  is  to  give 


A  NEW  TECHNIQUE  16 

him  a  subtle  psychological  satisfaction  at  being 
associated  in  the  execution  of  so  hugely  expensive 
an  enterprise.  The  very  fact  that  w^ar  is  uneco- 
nomic and  almost  universally  recognized  as  such, 
added  to  the  correlative  circumstance  that  men 
do  fight  nevertheless,  seems  to  be  the  greatest  and 
most  convincing  proof  of  all  that  men  do  not  fight 
for  material  profit.  Human  nature  would  have 
to  have  a  queer  streak  in  it  indeed  to  per- 
sist in  an  enterprise  which  it  recognizes  frankly 
as  unprofitable  in  the  highest  degree.  The 
endless  array  of  figures  that  fill  the  debit  col- 
umn of  the  ledger  of  war  are  not  convincing  pac- 
ifist argument.  They  stagger  the  imagination 
it  is  true,  but  they  do  not  serve  as  preventives 
against  the  recurrence  of  international  conflicts. 
A  man  who  will  cheat  his  competitor  out  of  a 
dollar  in  business,  will  give  up  all  his  substance 
willingly  to  serve  his  country  and  his  convictions. 
The  case  is  very  different  from  what  our  eco- 
nomic determinists  would  have  us  believe.  Men 
do  not  fight  because  of  the  supposed  profit  to  be 
derived  from  war,  from  a  nicely  calculated  eco- 
nomic hedonism,  but  in  spite  of  their  recognition 
of  its  tremendous  unprofitableness. 

But  to  say  that  economic  considerations  in  any 
phase  are  not  the  dynamic  force  behind  war, 
is  not  to  deny  that  economic  factors  enter  very 


16  WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

seriously  into  the  remoter  origins  of  war.  A 
very  important  distinction  suggests  itself  at  this 
point.  While  war  undoubtedly  has  an  economic 
cause,  it  rarely  has  an  economic  motive.  The 
material  of  war  may  grow  out  of  economic  con- 
flicts, and  rivalries.  That  is  very  different,  how- 
ever, from  saying  that  the  motive  which 
prompts  nations  as  nations  to  go  to  war 
is  a  clearly  perceived  and  appreciated  de- 
sire for  economic  gain.  The  difference  can  be 
illustrated  by  an  example  from  every  day  life. 
A  man  might  refuse  to  pay  a  second  fare  on  a 
street  car  and  might  be  willing  to  argue  for  an 
hour  with  the  conductor  though  his  time  is  worth 
infinitely  more  than  the  maximum  gain  to  be 
derived  from  persuading  his  opponent  that  he  has 
paid  his  fare.  The  dispute  unquestionably  has 
an  economic  cause  in  that  it  arose  in  connection 
with  the  payment  of  fare,  but  it  would  be  a  gross 
libel  on  the  sense  of  duty  of  the  conductor  and  the 
self-respect  of  the  passenger  to  accuse  either 
party  to  the  dispute  of  having  an  economic  motive 
in  continuing  it.  The  analogy  will  not  walk  on 
all  fours  but  it  suggests  the  attitude  of  nations  in 
going  to  war.  Just  as  the  man's  time  is  worth 
infinitely  more  than  the  possibility  of  saving  his 
second  fare,  so  a  nation's  material  welfare  in 
every  way  is  much  more  wisely  served  by  avoid- 


A  NEW  TECHNIQUE  17 

ing  war.  France  and  Germany  nearly  came  to 
blows  in  Morocco  over  a  definite  economic  mat- 
ter, the  establishment  of  banks;  but  if  war  had 
not  been  averted  by  the  Algeciras  Conference 
the  motive  of  Germany  would  not  have  been  that 
by  going  to  war  she  would  have  been  able  to  con- 
trol certain  banking  institutions  in  Morocco  and 
that  such  control  would  have  had  a  greater  eco- 
nomic value  than  the  cost  incurred  in  gaining  this 
supposed  advantage.  Wars  are  more  easily 
waged  when  they  have  a  tangible  concrete 
point  of  departure,  but  we  must  not  forget 
that  the  material  consideration  involved  is  the 
point  of  departure  which  once  it  is  left  must, 
by  the  nature  of  modern  war,  defeat  itself  en- 
tirely in  the  carrying  out  of  the  spiritual  issue 
which  arises  from  it  and  which  submerges  it  com- 
pletely. It  is  a  libel  on  human  nature  the  un- 
fairness of  which  has  been  so  repeatedly  demon- 
strated, to  recognize  material  considerations 
either  as  an  actuating  or  restraining  force  toward 
war.  Yet  writers  to-day  would  still  subscribe 
to  the  following  words  of  Lecky, 

"Those  who  will  look  on  the  world  without  il- 
lusion will  be  compelled  to  admit  that  the  chief 
guarantees  for  its  peace  are  to  be  found  much 
less  in  moral  than  in  purely  selfish  motives.  The 
financial  embarrassments  of  the  great  nations, 


18  WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

their  profound  distrust  of  one  another,  the  vast 
cost  of  modern  wars,  the  gigantic  commercial 
disaster  it  inevitably  entails,  the  extreme  uncer- 
tainty of  its  issue,  the  utter  ruin  that  may  follow 
defeat,  these  are  the  real  influences  that  restrain 
the  tiger  passions  and  the  avaricious  cravings  of 
mankind." 

The  economic  case  for  war  may  in  fairness  be 
stated  thus ;  war  may  have  an  economic  cause ;  it 
must  have  an  ethical  motive.  The  war  is  not 
conducted  however  on  the  plane  of  the  cause  but 
on  the  plane  of  the  motive.  This  would  be  true 
even  if  it  were  not  for  the  fact  that  men  do  not 
fight  for  material  advantage  solely.  It  would  be 
true  because  the  motive  and  the  cause  are  per- 
ceived and  adhered  to  by  two  clearly  defined 
classes  of  people  within  the  nation;  the  motive 
by  those  who  do  the  fighting,  the  cause  by  those 
whose  interests  are  involved  and  appear  to  be 
threatened.  Consequently  the  thing  which  actu- 
ates the  men  in  the  trenches  is  not  the  remoter 
economic  cause  with  which  he  has  nothing  to  do, 
but  the  immediate  motive  or  occasion,  and  the 
reason  that  he  is  ready  to  die,  is  that  he  sees  in 
this  motive  an  ethical,  spiritual  value. 

Therefore  the  pacifist  who  insists  that  war 
can  be  stopped  by  removing  the  economic  causes 
overlooks  this  infinitely  more  essential  motive. 


A  NEW  TECHNIQUE  19 

Since,  as  we  have  seen,  war  can  hardly  be  said  to 
have  an  economic  cause  in  the  sense  of  an  eco- 
nomic motive  for  gain,  it  is  unjust  to  credit  solely 
the  economic  factor  with  the  intrinsic  power 
to  make  war.  A  war  for  any  other  cause  would 
be  equally  just  and  popular  provided  only  it  had 
an  ethical  motive,  and  who  would  say  that  nations 
could  find  no  other  reason  to  disagree  except  on 
a  basis  of  economic  advantage?  Religion,  na- 
tionalism, aggressive  ideals,  though  they  have 
often  been  used  as  pretexts  for  economic  gain, 
were  oftener  perhaps,  the  genuine  spiritual  con- 
siderations precipitating  conflict. 

I  believe  that  the  elimination  of  economic 
causes  if  that  were  possible,  would  not  stop 
war;  it  would  merely  shift  the  ground,  be- 
cause the  root  of  war  is  not  external  considera- 
tions or  objective  ends,  but  the  moral  nature 
of  men.  Men  will  fight  not  so  long  as  they  feel 
it  is  profitable,  hut  so  long  as  they  feel  it  is  right. 
This  impulse  to  right,  regardless  of  material  con- 
sequences, is  the  fundamental  cause  of  war.  Mr. 
Bertrand  Russell  puts  it  thus — 

"But  war,  like  all  other  natural  activities,  is 
not  so  much  prompted  by  the  ends  which  it  has 
in  view  as  by  an  impulse  to  the  activity  itself. 
Very  often  men  desire  an  end  not  on  its  own  ac- 
count, but  because  their  nature  demands  the  ac- 


20  WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

tions  which  will  lead  to  the  end.  And  so  it  is  in 
this  case;  the  ends  to  be  achieved  by  war  appear 
far  more  important  in  prospect  than  they  will 
appear  when  they  are  realized,  because  war  itself 
is  a  fulfiUment  of  one  side  of  our  nature,  if 
men's  actions  sprang  indeed  from  desires  for 
what  would  bring  happiness,  the  purely  ra- 
tional arguments  against  war  would  have 
long  ago  put  an  end  to  it.  what  makes  war 
difficult  to  suppress  is  that  it  springs  from 
an  impulse  rather  than  from  a  calculation 
of  the  advantages  to  be  derived  from  war." 

Even  when  a  war  is  clearly  a  commercial  one, 
it  is  necessary  to  give  it  an  ethical  appearance  if 
it  is  to  be  waged  effectively.  JVIr.  Veblen  in  his 
recent  book,  "The  Nature  of  Peace,"  says; 

"These  demands  (economic)  are  put  forward 
with  a  color  of  demanding  something  in  the  way 
of  an  equitable  opportunity  for  the  commonplace 
peaceable  citizen;  but  quite  plainly  they  have 
none  but  a  fanciful  bearing  on  the  fortunes  of 
the  common  man  in  time  of  peace,  and  they  have 
a  meaning  to  the  nation  only  as  a  fighting  unit; 
apart  from  the  prestige  value  these  things  are 
worth  fighting  for  only  as  prospective  means  of 
fighting.  The  like  appeal  to  the  moral  sensibili- 
ties may  again  be  made  in  a  call  to  self-defense, 
under  the  rule  of  live  and  let  live,  etc.     But  in 


A  NEW  TECHNIQUE  21 

one  way  or  another  it  is  necessary  to  set  up  the 
conviction  that  the  promptings  of  patriotic  am- 
bition HAVE  THE  SANCTION  OF  MORAL  NECES- 
SITY." 

Consequently  if  war  is  to  cease  it  will  he  be- 
cause the  moral  validity  of  this  ethical  impulse 
has  been  eccploded  rather  than  because  its  eco- 
nomic futility  has  been  universally  accepted.  It 
will  be  objected  here  that  everybody  admits  war 
to  be  morally  wrong.  This  is  not  so.  If  men 
believed  war  to  be  morally  wrong  it  would  stop  in 
very  short  order.  Men  believe  somewhat  weakly 
that  it  is  wrong  to  kill,  to  take  human  life  un- 
der ORDINARY  CONDITIONS.  But  the  men  in  the 
trenches  to-day  certainly  believe  that  there  are 
times  when  it  is  morally  right  to  take  human  life 
and  a  good  deal  of  it  too.  Peace-at-any-price  is 
not  a  doctrine  that  attracts  very  many  enthusi- 
asts, while  it  has  a  great  many  more  staunch  oppo- 
nents who  see  in  it  the  lowest  depths  of  immoral- 
ity. The  opposition  to  peace-at-any-price  needs 
but  to  be  stated  to  be  accepted  and  yet  pacifists 
labor  under  the  illusion  that  the  moral  stupidity 
of  war  has  been  generally  accepted.  How  fre- 
quently we  hear  people  lament  that  though  war 
is  admittedly  wasteful,  horrible,  immoral,  na- 
tions will  go  to  war  just  the  same.  Such  a  feel- 
ing is  fraught  with  blindness  to  facts.     Ju^t  as 


22  WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

nations  will  go  to  war  in  spite  of  its  economic  fu- 
tility so  they  will  go  to  war  only  because  of  its 
moral  validity.  Nations  admit  that  war  is  hor- 
rible and  wasteful  but  they  do  not  admit  that  it  is 
wrong  in  the  sense  that  when  a  nation  goes  to  war 
for  its  highest  ideals  that  it  is  nevertheless  im- 
moral. A  peace  may,  according  to  the  majority 
opinion  of  writers,  be  a  great  deal  more  immoral 
than  war.  The  following  citation  from  Mr. 
James  Martineau's  speech  at  the  first  Hague 
Conference  still  voices  the  conviction  of  men  to- 
day. 

"The  reverence  for  human  life  is  carried  to  an 
immoral  idolatry  when  it  is  held  more  sacred 
than  justice  and  right  and  when  the  spectacle  of 
blood  becomes  more  horrible  than  the  sight  of 
desolating  tyrannies  and  triumphant  hypocrisies. 
We  have  therefore  no  more  doubt  that  a  war 
may  be  right  than  a  policeman  may  be  a  security 
for  justice,  and  we  object  to  a  fortress  as  little 
as  to  a  handcuff." 

This  identic  attitude  is  expressed  by  Mr. 
Roosevelt  whose  diatribes  against  an  "unright- 
eous peace"  are  almost  classic.     He  says: 

"Peace  is  not  the  end.  Righteousness  is  the  end.  When 
the  Savior  saw  the  money  changers  in  the  temple  he  broke 
the  peace  by  driving  them  out.  At  that  moment  peace  could 
have  been  maintained  readily  enough  by  the  simple  process 


A  NEW  TECHNIQUE  23 

of  keeping  quiet  in  the  presence  of  wrong.  Righteousness 
is  the  end  and  peace  a  means  to  the  end,  and  sometimes  it 
is  not  peace  but  war  which  is  the  proper  means  to  achieve 
the  end."      ("Fear  God  and  Take  Your  Own  Part/'  p.  26.) 

And  the  fact  that  three  quarters  of  the  world 
is  at  war  to-day  because  of  this  preference 
for  a  righteous  war  rather  than  an  ignoble  peace 
indicates  the  weight  of  the  moral  argument  for 
war. 

Now  the  generic  term  for  the  ethical  motives 
of  nations  is  National  Honor.  Under  this 
comprehensive  term  are  included  all  the  moral 
impulses,  the  spiritual  purpose,  the  motive, 
the  reason,  the  occasion  for  war.  National 
Honor  is  the  collective  conscience  that  passes  on 
the  justice  of  all  wars,  and  it  is  inconceivable  that 
a  nation  would  fight  for  anything  which  could 
not  receive  the  sanction  of  this  moral  imperative, 
"This  National  Honor  is  in  the  nature  of  an  in- 
tangible immaterial  asset,  of  course ;  it  is  a  matter 
of  prestige,  a  sportsman-like  conception,  but  that 
fact  must  not  be  taken  to  mean  that  it  is  of  any 
the  less  substantial  effect  for  purposes  of  a  casus 
belli  than  the  material  assets  of  the  community. 
Quite  the  contrary,  'who  steals  my  purse  steals 
trash,'  etc.  In  point  of  fact  it  will  commonly 
happen  that  any  national  grievance  must  first  be 
converted  into  terms  of  this  spiritual  capital  be- 


24  WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

fore  it  is  effectually  turned  to  account  as  a  stimu- 
lus to  warlike  enterprise."      (Veblen,  p.  27.) 

Civilized  men  would  not  suffer  the  hell  of  war 
for  something  incompatible  with  national  honor, 
for  something  admittedly  dishonorable.  The 
point  of  honor  about  which  war  was  waged  at 
times  may  have  been  spurious,  but  that  is  not  im- 
portant or  to  the  point.  It  is  only  necessary  to 
concede  that  patriotically  biassed  minds  sincerely 
regarded  it  as  a  matter  of  national  honor  in  every 
case  when  they  went  to  war.  If  men  sometimes 
came  to  fight  for  points  of  honor  which  outsid- 
ers did  not  regard  as  such,  it  was  because  they 
beheved  the  point  to  be  genuine.  The  process  of 
this  reasoning,  of  course,  is  the  illogical  supposi- 
tion that  because  fighting  for  honor  required  so 
much  sacrifice,  the  point  of  honor  therefore  is 
worth  fighting  for.  There  is  an  axiom  that 
nothing  which  is  worth  while  comes  easy  which 
is  often  reversed  to  read  that  everything  that 
comes  hard  must  be  worth  while.  The  tremen- 
dous sacrifices  lend  but  a  glamor  to  the  ideal  for 
which  the  sacrifices  are  made  and  make  men  fight 
the  harder  In  short,  war  without  an  honor  mo- 
tive as  that  motive  is  conceived  by  each  nation  is 
regarded  as  unthinkable. 

From  the  earliest  times  we  find  the  ideal  of 
honor  as  a  motive  for  war  and  as  the  irresistible 


A  NEW  TECHNIQUE  25 

slogan  that  attracted  patriots  to  give  their  lives 
freely  in  its  defense.  The  ideal  of  group  solidar- 
ity and  the  honor  of  the  gi-oup  was  the  pride  of 
primitive  man.  Even  before  the  nation  arose,  we 
had  family  Honor,  then  group  Honor  and  so  on. 
In  Frazer's  "Golden  Bough"  we  have  mention  of 
Honor  as  the  elevated  ideal  of  primitive  group 
hfe. 

"The  superstitious  fear  of  the  magic  that  may 
be  wrought  on  a  man  through  the  leavings  of  his 
food  has  had  the  beneficial  effect  of  inducing 
many  savages  to  destroy  refuse.  .  .  .  Nor  is  it 
only  the  sanitary  condition  of  the  tribe  which 
has  benefited  by  this  superstition;  curiously 
enough  the  same  baseless  dread,  the  same  false 
notion  of  causation  has  indirectly  strengthened 
the  moral  bonds  of  hospitality,  Honor,  and  good 
faith  among  men  who  entertain  it."  {Vol.  Ill, 
p.  120.) 

We  have  Honor  mentioned  again  and  again 
a  little  later  in  the  historical  development  of 
man,  in  the  Bible.  The  following  from  Revela- 
tion is  one  of  frequent  references  to  it. 

"And  the  nations  shall  walk  amidst  the  light 
thereof;  and  the  kings  of  the  earth  bring  their 
glory  into  it  (Holy  City)  ;  and  the  gates  thereof 
shall  in  no  wise  be  shut  by  day  for  there  shall  be 
no  night  there;  and  they  shall  bring  the  glory 


26  WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

and  the  Honor  of  the  Nations  into  it ;  and  there 
shall  in  no  wise  enter  into  it  anything  unclean  or 
he  that  maketh  an  abomination  or  a  lie"  (21-26) . 

In  Greece  the  ideal  of  Honor  was  sacred  and 
was  regarded  in  much  the  same  way  as  it  is  re- 
garded to-day.  National  Honor  was  the  noble 
and  elevated  motive  for  entering  a  war  and  the 
thing  which  consecrated  it.  In  Demosthenes' 
"Discourse  on  the  Crown"  we  have  the  following 
allusion  to  this  immemorial  slogan  of  war. 

"Even  though  the  overthrow  may  have  been 
a  certainty  it  would  be  necessary  to  brave  it. 
There  is  a  thing  which  Athens  has  always  placed 
above  success  and  that  is  Honor,  the  elevated 
feeling  of  what  she  owes  to  her  traditions  in  the 
past  and  to  her  good  fame  in  the  future.  Form- 
erly at  the  time  of  the  Persian  invasion,  Athens 
sacrificed  all  to  this  heroic  sentiment  of  Honor." 

Again  and  again  in  every  age  and  period  from 
the  dawn  of  civilized  society  down  to  the  present 
day  we  find  continual  reference  to  Honor  as  the 
ideal  in  every  relation  of  life,  for  which  no  sac- 
rifices were  too  great  or  unreasonable.  It  has 
consecrated  wars  of  every  period  and  as  Treits- 
chke  has  so  well  said  of  modern  wars — 

"Modern  wars  are  not  waged  for  the  sake  of 
goods  and  chattels.  What  is  at  stake  is  the  sub- 
lime moral  good  of  national  Honor,  which  has 


A  NEW  TECHNIQUE  27 

something  in  the  nature  of  unconditional  sanctity, 
and  compels  the  individual  to  sacrifice  himself 
for  it."      ("Politik,"  p.  128.) 

Yet  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  this  persistent 
moral  impulse  of  human  nature,  to  which  we 
choose  to  give  the  generic  term  of  National 
Honor,  has  been  the  inveterate  motive  for  war,  it 
has  nevertheless  been  given  a  place  of  secondary- 
importance  in  the  peace  congresses  of  the  past 
and  in  pacifist  propaganda  generally.  It  has 
been  regarded  as  so  incidental  a  cause  of  war  that 
in  peace  literature  we  find  only  casual  references 
to  it.  At  both  Hague  Conferences  the  subject 
of  Honor  was  not  discussed  or  considered  aside 
from  the  fact  that  it  was  excluded  absolutely  from 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  proposed  Court.  When 
the  subject  was  brought  up  one  diplomat  dis- 
missed the  problem  by  saying  that  "any  question 
may  affect  the  Honor  and  vital  interests  of  a 
nation."  And  with  this  vague  generaUty  the 
whole  matter  was  dismissed  from  even  the  field 
of  discussion.  It  is  not  therefore  surprising  that 
in  Holl's  "Record  of  the  Hague  Conference," 
which  is  a  book  of  some  590  pages,  we  have  but  a 
single  reference  to  National  Honor. 

Even  contemporary  writers  mention  Honor  as 
a  cause  of  war  in  what  might  be  called  a  "non- 
chalant" and  casual  way  just  as  if  its  significance 


28  WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

as  the  great  fundamental  "motive"  of  war  were 
not  so  absolutely  conceded.  The  significance  of 
it  is  beginning  to  be  admitted  only  by  the  in- 
tellectual radicals.  National  honor  as  the  great 
irresistible  war-slogan  is  slowly  gaining  recogni- 
tion and  men  are  coming  to  see  that  the  success  of 
the  peace  movement  rests  with  the  enlightened 
sense  of  Honor  which  will  grow  out  of  a  bold  and 
fearless  consideration  of  the  question  at  future 
peace  congresses.  The  following  citation  from 
an  article  on  "Patriotism,"  by  Prof.  James  Har- 
vey Robinson  of  Columbia  University,  represents 
in  a  beautiful  way  the  beginnings  of  the  new  at- 
titude which  will  be  taken  toward  the  question  of 
honor  after  the  present  war.  It  is  the  more  in- 
teresting because  it  contains  in  spite  of  its  frank 
recognition  of  the  importance  of  honor,  the  cool 
nonchalance  which  has  so  characterized  the  atti- 
tude that  is  just  passing. 

"It  is  note-worthy  that  The  Hague  Confer- 
ence did  not  have  the  nerve  to  make  questions  of 
national  honor  matters  subject  to  arbitration. 
Yet  it  is  just  this  particular  kind  of  excuse  for 
war  which  should  be  most  carefully  considered 
before  mobilization." 

What  is  this  national  Honor  which  has  conse- 
crated almost  every  war  of  man  and  yet  which 
shrinks  from  arbitration  and  analysis? 


A  NEW  TECHNIQUE  g^ 

The  consideration  of  this  perplexing  problem 
in  the  hope  of  arriving  at  some  adequate  answer 
and  solution  will  be  the  purpose  of  the  following 
pages. 


CHAPTER  III 

WHAT   IS   NATIONAL    HONOR?      A   SYMPOSIUM 

CONTAINING  ONE  HUNDRED  AND  THIRTY-FIA^E 
CITATIONS  ILLUSTRATING  DIFFERENT  ASPECTS 
AND  VIEWS  OF  NATIONAL  HONOR 

Article  nine  of  the  Report  of  the  Second  Hague 
Conference  (1907)  provided  that, — 

"In  disputes  of  an  international  nature  involving  neither 
Honor  nor  vital  interests  and  arising  from  a  difference  of 
opinion  on  points  of  fact,  the  contracting  powers  deem  it 
expedient  and  desirable  that  the  parties  who  have  not  been 
able  to  come  to  an  agreement  by  means  of  diplomacy  should, 
as  far  as  circumstances  allow,  institute  an  international 
commission  of  inquiry  to  facilitate  a  solution  of  these  dis- 
putes by  elucidating  the  facts  by  means  of  an  impartial 
and  conscientious  investigation." 

In  view  of  the  very  serious  limitation  which 
this  clause  imposes  upon  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
Hague  it  is  very  important  to  know  more  accu- 
rately what  an  exemption  of  disputes  of 
"Honor"  properly  includes.  The  vital  ques- 
tions which  suggest  themselves  in  this  connection 
are:     "What  is  national  honor?"     "Is  there  any 

30 


A  SYMPOSIUM  SI 

consensus  of  opinion  as  to  what  it  implies?"  It 
is  clear  that  at  the  end  of  the  present  war,  the 
statesmen  and  the  people  generally  of  the  bellig- 
erent countries  will  make  a  serious  attempt  to  lift 
the  whole  question  of  national  honor  out  of  its 
emotional  obscurity  in  an  effort  to  define  it  upon 
universal  and  generally  accepted  principles  of 
right  and  justice.  It  is  therefore  opportune  for 
us  to  attempt  to  clear  our  own  minds  on  the  ques- 
tion of  honor  in  order  to  attain  to  a  thoroughly 
rational  and  definite  idea  of  its  implications. 
For  the  purpose  of  arousing  discussion  which 
may  serve  as  a  basis  for  the  consideration  of  the 
question  at  the  Peace  Congress  which  will  meet 
at  the  close  of  the  present  war,  this  symposium 
has  been  prepared. 

DO  THE  QUESTIONS  RAISED  BY  THE  FOLLOWING 
CITATIONS,  IN  YOUR  OPINION,  INVOLVE  "NA- 
TIONAL Honor"? 

NATIONAL  PRIDE 

Punctilios  of  Honor,  National  Self-Assertion, 
National  Courage,  and  Expiation  for  of- 
fenses to  national  honor. 

1.  Insult  to  the  flag  by  an  official  representative 
of  a  foreign  power. 


32  WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

"Any  one  who  even  superficially  attacks  the  Honor  of 
a  state,  challenges  by  his  action  the  very  nature  of  the 
state. —  If  the  flag  of  the  state  is  insulted  it  is  the  duty 
of  the  state  to  demand  satisfaction  and  if  satisfaction  is 
not  forthcoming  to  declare  war  however  trivial  the  occa- 
sion may  appear." — Treitschke,  "Politik,"  p.  125. 

2.  Disregard  of  the  conventional  punctilios  gov- 

erning diplomatic  intercourse. 

"This  National  Honor  is  subject  to  injury  in  divers 
ways,  and  so  may  yield  a  fruitful  grievance  even  apart  from 
offenses  against  the  person  or  property  of  the  nation's  busi- 
ness men;  as  for  example  through  the  neglect  or  disregard 
of  the  conventional  pimctilios  governing  diplomatic  inter- 
course, or  by  disrespect  or  contumelious  speech  touching 
the  flag,  or  the  persons  of  national  officials,  or  again  by  fail- 
ure to  observe  the  ritual  prescribed  for  parading  the  na- 
tional honor  on  stated  occasions." — Thorstein  Veblen, 
"The  Nature  of  Peace,"  p.  29. 

3.  Maintaining  relative  political  prestige. 

"National  Honor  for  the  nation  which  is  considering  it  at 
the  time,  consists  for  her  that  she  should  maintain  herself 
just  as  she  is  in  her  rank  and  place  in  the  hierarchy  of  na- 
tions."— Terraillon,  "L'Honneur,"  p.  255. 

4.  Resisting  the  demands  of  another  country  to 

be  "consulted  in  any  further  exploitation  of 

the  globe." 

Typical  case:  England  disallowed  Ger- 
many's claim  in  this  connection  at  the  time 
of  the  Moroccan  dispute. 


A  SYMPOSIUM  33 

"The  claim  that  Germany  made,  that  no  treaty  should 
be  made  in  any  part  of  the  world  without  the  approval  of 
Germany,  was  not  one  which  a  self-respecting  nation  could 
admit." — Professor  Gilbert  Murray,  cited  in  Bertrand 
Russell,  "Justice  in  Wartime." 

And  at  the  same  time — 

5.  Demanding  this  privilege  "for  one's  own  coun- 

try" to  be  consulted  in  all  treaties  hence- 
forth to  be  made. 

Typical  case:  England  demands  to  be 
consulted  in  all  treaties  concerning  Mo- 
rocco. 

"But  if  a  situation  "were  forced  upon  us  in  which  peace 
could  only  be  preserved  by  the  surrender  of  the  great  and 
beneficent  position  which  Great  Britain  has  won  by  cen- 
turies of  heroism  and  achievement,  by  allowing  England  to 
be  treated  where  her  interests  were  concerned  as  if  she 
were  of  no  account  in  the  cabinet  of  nations,  then  I  say 
emphatically  that  peace  at  that  price  would  be  a  humilia- 
tion INTOLERABLE  FOR  A  GREAT  POWER  LIKE  OURS  TO  EN- 
DURE."— Lloyd  George,  Mansion  House  Speech,  July  21, 
1911. 

6,  Demanding  to  be  consulted  in  any  "further 

exploitation  of  the  globe." 

Typical  case:  Germany  demands  to  be 
consulted  in  the  Moroccan  treaty. 

"Germany  has  risen  to  a  world  power  and  our  Honor 
demands  that  we  be  consulted  in  any  further  exploitation 
of   the  globe. —     When   we   fell   out   with   France   in   the 


34         WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

Moroccan  dispute,  we   had   our   National   Honor  to  de- 
fend."— Von  Bulow,  "Imperial  Germany/'  p.  96. 

7.  Demanding  to  be  consulted  in  any  and  all 

treaties  made  by  other  powers. 

Typical  case:  Germany  in  the  Moroccan 
dispute. 

"Our  Honor  demands  that  no  treaty  should  be  made  in 
any  part  of  the  world  henceforth  without  the  approval  of 
Germany." — Kaiser's  Speeches. 

8.  Resisting  the  command  of  another  power  to 

settle  an  international  question  in  a  certain 

way. 

Typical  case:  President  Cleveland  com- 
pelled England  to  submit  the  Venezuelan 
Boundary  dispute  to  arbitration. 

"Was  not  the  National  Honor  of  Great  Britain  at 
stake  when  Lord  Salisbury  as  representative  of  the  great 
British  Empire  was  told  by  President  Cleveland  that  he 
must  arbitrate  a  controversy  ?  I  do  not  believe  the  gov- 
ernment of  Great  Britain  had  heard  talk  of  that  kind  since 
the  Battle  of  Waterloo." — Fred.  Coudert,  before  the 
Washington  Association  of  New  Jersey,  Feb.  22,  1912. 

9.  Being  compelled  by  threat  from  another  power 

to  modify  a  political  ambition  to  extend  a 
country's  influence  by  royal  intrigues. 
Typical  case:  Germany  desired  to  place 
a  Hohenzollern  on  the  Spanish  throne 


A  SYMPOSIUM  35 

1867;  France  made  Germany  withdraw 
the  candidatm'e. 

"This  impression  of  a  wound  to  our  sense  of  National 
Honor  so  dominated  me  that  I  had  already  decided  to  an- 
nounce my  retirement." — Bismarck,  "Gedanken  und  Er- 
rinerungen,"  p.  94. 

10.  To  show  national  courage  as  a  virtue  in  itself 

regardless  of  the  justice  or  right  of  the 
provocation  that  may  arouse  it ; 

"Nevertheless  we  have  seen  that  when  nations  renowned 
of  old  for  their  valor  have  been  freed  from  all  danger, 
when  they  have  been  forbidden  the  use  of  arms,  when  they 
have  lost  that  standard  of  Honor  which  makes  them  brave 
death,  we  have  seen  them  lose  the  very  strength  which 
sustains  the  domestic  virtues." — Sismondi,  quoted  by  Novi- 
cow  in  "War  and  Its  Alleged  Benefits,"  p.  7. 

11.  To  demand  indemnity  for  violations  suffered 

at  the  hands  of  another  power. 

Typical  case :  An  English  freighter,  the 
Alabama  manned  in  British  waters,  was 
allowed  to  escape  and  prey  upon  Ameri- 
can ships.  We  demanded  indemnity 
for  the  loss  suffered. 

"No  case  in  modern  times  has  afforded  a  better  pretext 
for  the  avoidance  of  submission  to  arbitration  than  the 
Alabama  case.  Here  if  ever  it  might  be  maintained  that 
the  Honor  of  the  two  nations  was  concerned.  Great  Brit- 
ain was  charged  with  evading  the  rules  of  just  international 


36  WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

intercourse  by  allowing  the  Alabama  to  escape  and  prey 
upon  our  commerce. —  This  was  an  imputation  which 
might  well  throw  the  British  Chauvinist  into  a  delirium  of 
patriotic  indignation. —  The  United  States  might  well  on 
its  side  have  regarded  this  as  an  insult  to  its  National 
Honor." — Coudert,  "Anglo-American  Treat}'/'  p.  52. 

12.  To  refuse  the  payment  of  indemnity  claims. 

Typical  case:  England  in  the  Alabama 
controversy. 

"We  will  not  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that  even  in  the  pe- 
cuniary claims,  in  almost  every  case  a  nation  may  refuse 
arbitration  on  the  pretense  that  the  very  advancement  of 
such  claims  is  a  reflection  upon  its  Honor." — Hon.  Jack-* 
SON  Ralston,  "Disputes  and  Arbitration,"  p.  2. 

13.  To  oppose  arbitration  for  the  payment  of  an 

indemnity. 

"That  {Alabama  claims)  is  a  question  of  Honor  which 
we  will  never  arbitrate  for  England's  Honor  can  never 
be  made  the  subject  for  arbitration." — Lord  John  Russell. 

14.  Retreating  from  a  position  taken  in  a  dis- 

pute. 

Typical  case:   President  McKinley  in 
the  Cuban  Controversy. 

"President  McKinley  said:  'In  the  name  of  humanity, 
in  the  name  of  civilization,  in  behalf  of  endangered  Amer- 
ican interests  which  gives  us  the  right  to  speak  and  to  act, 
the  war  in  Cuba  must  stop.'  The  American  people  thus 
stood  committed  to  a  most  serious  business — we  had  taken 


A  SYMPOSIUM  37 

a  position  (war),  from  which  we  cannot  retreat  in  Honor, 
to  be  maintained  if  through  peace  no  less  resolutely  than 
through  war." — "Conscience  of  the  Nation,"  Sermon  on 
the  Liberation  of  Cuba  by  William  Jewett  Tucker,  1898, 
College  Church  Opening. 

15.  Fighting  to  a  finish  after  being  reluctantly 

drawn  in. 

"I  assume  that  there  is  no  one  at  the  present  time  so 
ignorant  of  the  spirit  of  the  American  people  that  he  would 
not  be  willing  to  admit  the  truth  of  the  following  proposi- 
tion— that  if  our  country  is  drawn  into  any  war  although 
against  our  will  and  against  our  desire  we  will  neverthe- 
less fight  to  the  finish  for  our  National  Honor  and  in- 
tegrity."— Pres.  Hibben,  "Higher  Patriotism,"  p.  25. 

16.  To  continue  in  a  war  although  later  evidence 

shows  cause  of  war  to  have  been  unjustly- 
conceived. 

"Whatever  good  reason  there  may  have  been  for  recog- 
nizing that  our  (English)  claims  of  sovereignty  in  the 
Transvaal  rested  on  a  mistaken  view  of  native  sentiment, 
and  however  fairly  such  recognition  might  have  been  al- 
lowed to  affect  the  ultimate  settlement,  the  game  of  war 
once  entered  upon  ought  to  have  been  played  out  until  it 
was  either  lost  or  won.  To  this  the  Honor  of  the  country 
was  fully  pledged." — H.  I.  D.  Ryder  in  Nineteenth  Cen- 
tury, referring  to  Boer  War,  1899. 

17.  To  recede  from  a  position  unjustly  taken. 

"Honor  does  not  forbid  a  nation  to  acknowledge  that  it 


38  WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

is  wrong,  or  to  recede  from  a  step  which  it  has  taken 
through  wrong  motives  or  mistaken  reasons." — Admiral 
Mahan,  "Moral  Aspect  of  War,"  p.  32. 

18.  Refusal  to  render  apology  for  offense. 

"There  will  never  be  a  case  in  which  National  Honor 
is  more  dangerously  and  vitally  affected  than  it  was  in  the 
Dogger  Bank  incident.  The  danger  lay  in  the  fact  that 
the  Honor  of  the  Russian  fleet  was  in  question  when  Lord 
Lansdowne  demanded  apology,  compensation,  and  the 
punishment  of  the  offending  officers." — L.  S.  Wolff,  "In- 
ternational Government,"  p.  49. 

19.  Do    public    lies    or    verbal    threats    wound 

Honor? 

"In  your  letter  you  say  that  your  enemies  by  their  lies 
and  calumnies  are  endeavoring  to  stain  the  Honor  of  Ger- 
many in  her  hard  struggle  for  existence." — S.  W.  Church, 
to  Doctor  Shafer.     Open  Letter. 

20.  Do  Honor  wounds  come  from  without,  or 

within? 

"In  what  one  of  our  ordinary  differences  with  Great 
Britain  has  our  Honor  become  so  delicately  involved  that 
the  delicacy  of  its  constitution  required  a  prompt  and  vig- 
orous regime  of  blood  and  iron.  And  yet  we  have  had  hot 
and  long  disputes  when  honor  might  have  been  called  to 
the  front  by  either  nation  and  made  the  pretense  for  a 
refusal  to  arbitrate.  A  nation's  honor  I  would  venture  to 
say  is  never  compromised  by  temperance  nor  injured  by 
forbearance.     A  nation's  honor  is  not  served  by  rash  coun- 


A  SYMPOSIUM  39 

sels  nor  by  violent  impulses  recklessly  indulged  in.  It  is 
indeed  a  frail  and  delicate  possession  if  it  cannot  live  in  an 
atmosphere  of  peace;  it  is  a  dangerous  one  if  it  is  tar- 
nished by  friendly  discussion  and  a  disposition  to  hearken 
to  the  voice  of  justice.  National  honor  may  perhaps  shine 
all  the  brighter  when  a  great  nation  is  slow  to  admit  that 
her  just  dignity  may  be  imperilled  by  the  act  of  others. 
The  Honor  of  a  nation  is  in  her  keeping  not  in  that 
OF  HER  neighbors:  it  cannot  be  lost  save  by  her  own 
ACT." — CouDERT,  ibid.,  p.  37. 

21.  Same  as  20. 

"Our  country  cannot  be  dishonored  by  any  other  country 
or  by  all  the  powers  combined.  It  is  impossible.  All 
Honor  wounds  are  self-inflicted.  We  alone  can  dis- 
honor ourselves  or  our  country." — Andrew  Carnegie. 

22.  Must  National  Honor  have  "pecuniary  vin- 

dication"? 

"It  is  true  that  where  the  point  of  grievance  out  of  which 
a  question  of  the  National  Honor  arises  is  a  pecuniary 
discrepancy,  the  national  honor  cannot  be  satisfied  without 
a  pecuniary  accounting." — Veblen,  "Nature  of  Peace,"  p. 
29. 

23.  Can  Honor  wounds  be  Healed  by  "words"? 

"When  duly  violated  the  National  Honor  may  be  made 
whole  again  by  similarly  immaterial  instrumentalities ;  as 
e.g.,  by  recital  of  an  appropriate  formula  of  words,  by 
formal  consumption  of  a  stated  quantity  of  ammunition  in 
the  way  of  a  "salute";  by  "dipping"  an  ensign  and  the  like 
procedure  which  can  of  course  have  none  but  a  magical 
efficacy." — Veblen,  ibid.,  p.  29. 


40  WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS 

Imperialism,  "Spheres  of  Influence,"  National 
Aggrandizement,  Boundaries,  Protection  of 
Citizens,  Sovereignty. 

24.  To  build  up  a  great  Empire  reluctantly. 

"Britain  like  Rome  before  her  built  up  her  Empire  piece- 
meal; for  the  most  part  reluctantly,  always  reckoning  up 
the  cost,  labor  and  burden  of  it;  hating  the  responsibility 
of  expansion,  and  shouldering  it  only  when  there  seemed 
to  be  no  other  course  open  to  her  in  Honor  and  safety." — 
F.  S.  Oliver,  "Ordeal  of  Battle." 

25.  To  keep  in  subjection  people  of  a  lower  civ- 

ilization. 

"When  you  talk  of  conquest  you  mean  England  in  Egypt, 
yes,  you  do,  and  you  refuse  to  see  that  we  have  to  hold 
high  the  Honor  of  our  country  and  to  protect  our  do- 
minions in  the  East." — Hall  Caine,  "White  Prophet,"  p. 
62. 

26.  To  conquer  other  people  out  of  a  recognition 

of  the  law  of  "survival." 

"Success  in  the  struggle  for  survival  is  followed  by  the 
second  degree  of  militancy,  that  of  conquest,  in  which  mili- 
tancy becomes  a  positive  instead  of  a  negative  factor.  It 
is  in  this  metamorphosis,  out  of  the  red  chrysalis  that  the 
race  rises  upward  on  the  pinions  of  an  eagle. —  Commer- 
cialism grows  as  militancy  deteriorates  since  it  is  in  itself 
a  form  of  strife  but  without  Honor  or  heroism." — General 
Homer  Lea,  U.  S.  A.,  "Valor  of  Ignorance,"  p.  45. 


A  SYMPOSIUM  41 

27.  To  seize  and  dominate  alien  country. 

Typical  case:  Germany  invades  Belgium. 

"We  will  remain  in  the  Belgian  Netherlands  to  which 
we  will  add  the  narrow  strips  of  coast  as  far  as  Calais. — 
After  having  vindicated  our  Honor  we  will  return  to  the 
joys  of  work  and  only  take  up  the  sword  again  if  you  try 
to  force  from  our  grasp  what  our  blood  has  won  for  us." — 
Maximilian  Hardin,  in  a  resume,  London  Daily  Chronicle. 

28.  To  expand  at  the  expense  of  neighboring 

country  for  the  sake  of  power,  or  prestige. 
Typical  case:  Frederick  the  Great  de- 
sired to  expand  into  a  great  power. 

"It  has  become  essential  to  enlarge  the  territory  of  the 
state  and  corriger  la  figure  de  la  Prusse,  if  Prussia  wished 
to  be  independent  and  to  bear  with  Honor  the  great  name 
of  Kingdom." — Treitschke,  "Deutsche  Geshichte/'  V.  1, 
p.  51. 

29.  To  maintain  a  sphere  of  influence  in  an  un- 

exploited  territorj^  unhampered. 
Typical  case:  France  in  Morocco. 

"He  (M.  Delcasse)  declared  that  France  could  not  go  to 
the  proposed  international  Conference  (i.e.,  Algeciras  that 
was  to  be),  without  dishonoring  herself." — Paris  Corre- 
spondent to  the  London  Times,  Oct.  9,  1905. 

30.  For  another  growing  power  to  try  to  force 

an  entrance  into  such  a  "sphere  of  influ- 
ence." 


42  WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

Typical  case:  Germany  in  Morocco. 

"When  we  fell  out  with  France  in  the  Moroccan  ques- 
tion, we  had  weighty  interests  of  our  own  and  our  National 
Honor  to  defend." — Von  Bulow,  "Imperial  Germany," 
p.  56. 

31.  To  resist  the  cession  of  one  country  to  an- 

other of  an  adjoining  strip  of  territory 
which  might  destroy  the  "balance  of 
power." 

Typical  case:  Prince  of  Orange  in  1866 
wished  to  cede  Luxemburg  to  Napoleon. 

"We  must  show  our  confidence  in  the  energetic  Prussian 
policy  by  our  unflincliing  firmness. —  We  will  not  seek  to 
avoid  war  when  we  are  in  danger  of  being  wronged.  If 
we  allow  this  (cession  of  Luxemburg  to  France)  to  pass  in 
silence  and  without  opposition — how  indelible  a  blot  will 
stain  the  Honor  of  Germany."— Herr  Von  Bennigsen, 
Leader  of  the  National  Liberals  in  the  Reichstag,  April  1, 
1866. 

32.  To  maintain  supremacy  in  any  part  of  the 

globe. 

Typical  case:  Japan  in  the  East. 

"An  attempt  to  disallow  the  Japanese  claim  to  predom- 
inance in  the  Eastern  part  of  Asia,  and  to  the  domination 
of  the  Asiatic  Seas,  would  violate  their  conception  of  Na- 
tional Honor." — Von  Bernhardi,  "Britain  as  Germany's 
Vassal,"  p.  124. 

33.  To  insist  upon  a  boundary  line. 


A  SYMPOSIUM  4S 

Typical  case:  "54-40  or  fight." 

"Irritating  questions  have  undoubtedly  arisen  and  the 
war-like  element  has  sometimes  asserted  itself,  as  when  it 
declared  it  was  a  question  between  54—40  or  fight;  but  our 
practical  good  sense  overcame  the  ultra-patriotic  men  who 
were  burning  to  immolate  themselves  on  the  altar  of  the 
country's  Honor." — Fred.  Coudert,  "Anglo-American  Ar- 
bitration Treaty,"  p.  51. 

34.  To  hold  foreign  territory  the  ownership  of 

which  is  in  dispute. 

Typical  case:  The  boundary  dispute  be- 
tween Italy  and  Switzerland  over  the 
district  of  Peschiaro. 

"For  many  years  there  had  been  a  dispute  between 
Switzerland  and  Italy  on  a  question  of  boundary  respect- 
ing the  frontier  near  Peschiaro.  It  was  just  one  of  the 
questions  that  formerly  would  have  led  to  war  for  it  has 
been  held  among  nations  as  a  scrupulous  point  of  Honor 
not  to  surrender  one  inch  of  territory  except  at  the  edge 
of  the  sword." — Mr.  Henry  Richard  at  the  Peace  Con- 
ference at  Cologne,  1881. 

35.  Forcible  dispossession  of  other  nations. 

"With  some  gift  for  casuistry  one  may  at  least  conceiv- 
ably hold  that  the  felt  need  of  Imperial  self-aggrandize- 
ment may  become  so  urgent  as  to  justify  or  at  least  to 
condone  forcible  dispossession  of  weaker  nationalities.  This 
might,  indeed  it  has,  become  a  sufficiently  perplexing  ques- 
tion of  casuistry  both  as  touches  the  punctilios  of  Na- 
tional  Honor   and  as   regards   an  equitable  division  be- 


44  WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

tween  rival  powers  in  respect  of  the  material  means  of  mas- 
tery."— Veblen,  "Nature  of  Peace,"  p.  80. 

36.  The  question  of  citizenship. 

"This  tribunal  would  lay  down  the  rule  that  the  terri- 
torial integrity  of  each  nation  was  inviolate,  that  it  was  to 
be  guaranteed  absolutely  its  sovereign  rights  in  certain 
particulars  including  for  instance  the  right  to  decide  the 
terms  on  which  immigrants  should  be  admitted  to  its  bor- 
ders for  purposes  of  residence,  citizenship  or  business;  in 
short  all  its  rights  in  matters  affecting  its  Honor." — 
Theodore  Roosevelt,  "America  and  the  World  War,"  p. 
237. 

37.  The  protection  of  citizens  residing  or  so- 

journing in  foreign  country. 

"Solidarity  is  also  in  a  uniform  and  permanent  manner  an 
integral  part  of  National  Honor.  No  state  permits  an- 
other to  oppress  her  subjects,  to  outrage  them,  to  treat  them 
in  a  fashion  which  would  not  conform  to  international  con- 
ventions, the  rights  of  man  or  to  human  dignity.  What 
would  be  in  truth  a  nation  which  would  not  be  able  or 
above  all  would  not  wish  any  longer  to  protect  her  sub- 
jects."— Terraillon,  "L'Honneur,"  p.  262. 

38.  To  oppose  "Capitulations." 

"It  is  an  awakening  of  National  Honor  which  has  af- 
fected in  regenerated  Turkey  a  public  movement  for  the 
suppression  of  "capitulations"  which  allows  Christian  gov- 
ernments to  exercise  over  their  subjects  in  Turkey  their 
exclusive  jurisdiction,  through  their  middle  men,  their  am- 
bassadors and  consuls." — Terraillon,  "L'Honneur,"  p. 
261. 


A  SYMPOSIUM  45 

39.  The  question  of  political  independence  or  sov- 

ereignty. 

"There  is  a  national  Honor  which  is  fixed  and  perma- 
nent.—  Every  nation  claims  at  first  its  political  independ- 
ence."— Tkrraillon,  "L'Honneur,"  p.  260. 

40.  Discrimination  against  citizens  residing  in  a 

foreign  country. 

Typical  case:  In  1913  California  passed 
legislation  prohibiting  Japanese  from 
holding  land  in  that  state. 

"How  long  are  we  to  bear  the  disgrace  and  humiliation 
which  seems  to  grow  worse  every  year. —  How  can  we 
expect  our  countrymen  to  be  respected  in  America  when 
our  foreign  office  does  not  even  strive  to  uphold  our  Na- 
tional Honor?" — Editorial  in  Osaki  Mainichi,  May  3, 
1913. 

41.  The  matter  of  National  Culture  and  sover- 

eignty. 

"German  majesty  and  Honor  falls  not  with  the  Prince's 

crown; 
When  amid  the  flames  of  war,  German  Empire  crashes 

down. 
German  greatness  stands  unscathed." — Schiller,  1797. 


46  WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

INTERNATIONAL  LAW 

Treaties,    Alliances,    Neutral   Rights,    Interna- 
tional Guarantees. 

42.  To  hold  a  treaty  when  economically  unprofit- 

able. 

Typical  case:  Congress  revoked  the  dis- 
criminating clause  against  British  ship- 
ping in  the  Panama  Canal  controversy. 

"We  certainly  are  not  at  liberty  to  discriminate  against 
British  ships  using  the  Panama  Canal  because  it  is  a  vio- 
lation of  the  rule  of  equality  which  we  have  solemnly  ac- 
cepted and  adopted,  asserted  and  reasserted,  and  to  which 
we  are  bound  by  every  consideration  of  Honor  and  good 
faith." — Elihu  Root,  Independent,  Feb.  6,  1913. 

43.  To  break  a  treaty  when  economically  unprof- 

itable to  keep  it. 

"A  state  recovers  more  easily  from  material  losses  than 
from  attacks  upon  its  Honor.  .  .  .  When  a  state  realizes 
that  existing  treaties  no  longer  express  the  actual  relations 
between  the  powers,  then  if  it  cannot  bring  the  other  state 
to  acquiesce  by  friendly  negotiations,  the  only  other  course 
is  to  declare  war." — Trkitschke,  "Politik,"  p.  546. 

44.  To  keep  and  break  the  same  treaty. 

"They  (pacifists)  have  advocated  the  silly  and  wicked 
peace  commission  treaties  which  have  actually  been  adopted 
by  our  government  during  recent  years ;  treaties  which  in 
any  serious  crisis  this  nation  would  certainly  break;  treaties 


A  SYMPOSIUM  47 

which  it  would  be  dishonorable  to  break,  and  far  more 
DISHONORABLE  in  aiiv  crisis  to  keep." — Theo.  Roosevelt, 
Metropolitan,  February,  1917. 

45.  To  respect  treaties  of  alliance. 

Typical  case :  Japan's  alliance  with  Eng- 
land in  the  present  war. 

"Every  sense  of  loyalty  and  Honor  oblige  Japan  to  co- 
operate with  Great  Britain  to  clear  from  these  waters  the 
enemies  who  in  the  past,  present  and  future  menace  her 
best  interests  and  her  people's  lives." — Japanese  Premier 
on  Japan's  entrance  into  the  war. 

46.  To  break  treaties  of  alliance. 

Typical  case:  Italy  and  the  Central 
powers  in  the  present  war. 

"Blessed  are  the  young  men  who  hunger  and  thirst  after 
Honor  for  their  desire  shall  be  fulfilled." — D'Annunzio 
writing  about  Italy's  entrance  into  present  war. 

47.  To  respect  international  guarantees. 

Typical  case :  England  entering  the  war 
in  defense  of  Belgium  because  she  was  a 
signatory  to  the  treaty  which  guaran- 
teed Belgian  neutrality. 

"If  I  am  asked  what  we  are  fighting  for  I  reply  in  two 
sentences.  In  the  first  place  to  fulfill  a  solemn  interna- 
tional obligation  which  if  it  had  been  entered  into  between 
private  persons  in  the  ordinary  concerns  of  life  would 
have  been  regarded  not  only  as  an  obligation  of  law,  but 
of   Honor   which   no   self-respecting  man   could   have   re- 


48  WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

pudiated." — Hon,  H.  H.  Asquith  in  House  of  Commons, 
Aug.  6,  1914. 

48.  To  break  any  provisions  of  international  law. 

"The  Honor  of  no  country  can  be  concerned  in  breaking 
the  terms  of  a  treaty  or  recognized  principles  of  interna- 
tional law." — Lowes  Dickenson,  "Foundations  of  a  League 
of  Peace,"  p.  10. 

49.  To  oppose  privateering. 

"When  the  Alabama,  fitted  in  a  British  port,  swept  our 
commerce  from  the  ocean,  was  not  our  National  Honor 
at  stake.''" — Coudert,  ibid. 

50.  To  seize  ships  because  of  a  difference  of  opin- 

ion as  to  the  rights  of  those  ships  to  fish  in 
certain  waters. 

Typical  case :  British  ships  were  seized  in 

Bering  Sea. 

"We  seized  British  ships  in  the  Bering  Sea  and  con- 
demned them  in  our  ports,  a  most  grievous  insult  according 
to  the  sensitive  and  self-constituted  custodians  of  British 
Honor;  but  Great  Britain  adopted  peaceful  counsels  and  a 
wise  court  heard,  examined  and  decided  the  case  without 
any  apparent  injury  to  British  Honor." — Coudert,  ibid., 
p.  40. 

51.  The  swaying  of  a  nation  from  neutral  posi- 

tion. 

"Even  among  a  people  with  so  single  an  eye  to  the  main 
chance  as  the  American  community  it  will  be  found  true  on 
experiment  or  on  review  of  the  historical  evidence,  that  an 


A  SYMPOSIUM  49 

offense  against  the  National  Honor  commands  a  pro- 
founder  and  more  unreserved  resentment  than  any  infrac- 
tion of  the  rights  of  persons  or  property  simply.  This  has 
latterly  been  well  shown  in  connection  with  the  maneuvers 
of  the  several  European  belligerents  designed  to  bend 
American  neutrality  to  the  service  of  one  side  or  another. 
Both  parties  have  aimed  to  intimidate  or  cajole." — Veblen, 
"Nature  of  Peace,"  p.  28. 

52.  To  maintain  neutrality  according  to  inter- 

national convention. 

"Nations  like  Switzerland  or  Belgium  would  make  it  a 
point  of  Honor  to  guard  inviolate  the  neutrality  granted 
them  by  treaties." — Terraillon,  "L'Honneur,"  p.  256. 

53.  Rights  of  neutral  ships  in  time  of  war. 

"But  surely  the  Dogger  Bank's  Fisheries  case  was  a 
question  of  Honor. —  The  action  of  Admiral  Rozhdes- 
tiensky  in  firing  on  the  trawlers,  sinking  the  Crane,  wound- 
ing six  fishermen  and  killing  two,  was  described  as  an  un- 
speakable and  unparalleled  and  cruel  outrage." — Gold- 
smith, "League  to  Enforce  Peace,"  p.  100. 

54.  To  insist  on  an  exclusive  right  to  fish  in  cer- 

tain seas. 

"When  in  1891  Canadian  vessels  engaged  in  seal  hunt- 
ing were  seized  in  Bering  Sea  by  our  revenue  cutters  there 
was  talk  of  National  Honor  on  both  sides  of  the  ocean. — 
COUDERT,  ibid. 

55.  To  reject  judicial  investigation  for  the  de- 

termination of  points  of  fact. 

Typical  case:  There  was  question  as  to 


50  WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

whether  the  assassins  of  the  late  Arch- 
duke of  Austria  were  Serbs  or  not,  but 
Austria  refused  to  accept  judicial  pro- 
cedure. 

"The  question  for  example  of  the  alleged  duplicity  of 
the  Servian  government  in  the  Serajevo  assassination  af- 
fecting as  it  undoubtedly  did  both  Honor  and  vital  inter- 
ests was  eminently  suitable  for  arbitral  decision." — J.  Hob- 
house,  "Toward  International  Government,"  p.  37. 

56.  The  interpretation  of  contracts  or  treaties. 

"The  board  (International  Insurance)  according  to  the 
scheme  proposed  a  minimum  of  judicial  powers.  These 
judicial  powers  would  never  refer  to  questions  which  could 
be  called  questions  of  national  Honor.  The  judicial  prob- 
lems of  the  board  would  be  limited  to  questions  referring 
to  the  actual  interpretation  of  certain  contracts." — Josiah 
RoYCE,  "War  and  International  Insurance." 

57.  The  breaking  of  pledges. 

"It  is  admitted  by  all  honest  men  that  the  German  gov- 
ernment has  from  the  violation  of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium 
all  through  the  war  repeatedly  broken  her  solemn  pledges, 
resorted  to  every  trick,  device,  falsehood  and  dishonest 
method  to  gain  her  ends,  sacrificing  the  last  remaining 
shreds  of  National  Honor  and  culminating  her  national 
shame  by  deliberately  breaking  her  promise  to  this  coun- 
try."— Frederick  Boyd  Stevenson,  "Showing  Up  the 
Shame  of  Socialism,"  Brooklyn  Daily  Eagle,  June  10,  1917. 

58.  Carrying  out  obligations  with  revolutionary 

government  that  were  concluded  with  pre- 
revolutionary  government. 


A  SYMPOSIUM  51 

Typical  case:   England's  treaties  with 
Czar  and  the  Revolution  in  Russia. 

"Treaties  concluded  with  Russia  before  the  Revolution 
were  still  binding,"  Lord  Robert  Cecil  explained  in  the 
House.  "Until  the  new  Russian  government  released  the 
allies  Great  Britain  was  bound  in  Honor  to  carry  out  her 
engagements." — Lord  Robert  Cecil,  in  Commons,  May 
16,  1917.     New  York  Tribune  report. 

INTERNAL  POLICY 

Revolution,    Sedition,    Strengthening    Political 
Faction,  Carrying  out  domestic  policy. 

59.  To  resist  any  interference  from  without  with 

a  domestic  policy. 

Typical  case:  British  authorities  in  1841 
permitted  the  Creole  to  go  free  though 
it  carried  a  slave  cargo. 

"Bitter  indeed  was  the  feeling  and  loud  the  clamor  of 
those  who  look  upon  force  as  the  vindicator  of  Honor  when 
the  British  authorities  at  Nassau  in  1841  permitted  the 
slave  cargo  of  the  famous  ship  Creole  to  go  free. —  The 
case  was  submitted  to  arbitration,  a  judgment  rendering 
adequate  compensation  to  the  owners  of  the  vessels  was 
obtained  and  the  United  States  without  cost  or  treasure 
found  its  contention  vindicated  and  its  National  Honor 
satisfied." — Coudert  before  Washington  Association  of 
New  Jersey,  Feb.  22,  1912. 

60.  To  keep  out  emigrants. 


62  WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

"The  two  treaties  submitted  remove  the  exceptions  made 
in  their  predecessors  as  to  questions  affecting  National 
Honor  and  substitute  a  statement  of  the  scope  of  arbitra- 
tion which  is  designed  by  its  terms  to  exclude  all  questions 
not  properly  arbitrable. —  One  of  the  first  of  sovereign 
rights  is  the  power  to  determine  who  shall  come  into  the 
country  and  under  what  conditions." — Report  of  Com.  on 
Foreign  Affairs,  U.  S.  Senate,  Aug.  15,  1911. 

61.  To  carry  out  or  strengthen  a  domestic  policy. 

Typical  case :  Bismarck  desired  the  uni- 
fication of  Germany  and  felt  that  a  war 
with  France  would  consummate  it. 

"Our  national  sense  of  Honor  compelled  us  in  my  opin- 
ion to  go  to  war  and  if  we  did  not  act  in  accordance  with 
the  demands  of  that  feeling  we  should  lose  when  on  the 
way  to  its  completion  the  entire  impetus  toward  our  na- 
tional development  won  in  1866." — Bismarck,  "Gedanken 
und  Errinerungen,"  p.  140. 

62.  For  a  section  of  a  country  to  demand  inde- 

pendence. 

Typical  case :  The  South  asked  for  inde- 
pendence in  1860. 

"In  our  judgment  the  Republicans  are  resolute  in  their 
purpose  to  grant  nothing  that  will  or  ought  to  satisfy  the 
South;  we  are  satisfied  the  Honor,  safety  and  independ- 
ence of  the  Southern  people  require  the  organization  of  a 
Southern  Confederacy." — "Southern  Manifesto,"  Dec.  14, 
1860. 


A  SYMPOSIUM  63 

63.  For  a  country  about  to  be  disintegrated  to 

resist  such  demands. 

Typical  case:  The  North  in  the  Civil 
War. 

"That  to  the  Union  of  the  States  this  nation  owes  its  un- 
precedented increase  in  population,  its  Honor  abroad  and 
the  "Platform  of  National  Honor"  by  Nicolay  and  Hay: 
union  as  denying  the  vital  principles  of  a  free  government 
and  as  an  avowal  of  contemptible  treason  which  it  is  the 
imperative  duty  of  an  indignant  people  to  rebuke  and  for- 
ever to  silence,  etc." — From  the  Platform  of  the  Republi- 
can National  Convention,  May  16,  1860,  characterized  as 
the  "Platform  of  National  Honor"  by  Nicolay  and  Hay: 
"Lincoln."     Complete  Works. 

64.  Cases  62  and  63  together. 

Typical  case:  Norway  and  Sweden  sep- 
arate in  1905. 

"Who  does  not  remember  the  waves  of  nationalism  that 
swept  the  country  in  1905.  .  .  .  One  spoke  in  Sweden  then 
just  as  one  speaks  in  the  warring  countries  now  of  Na- 
tional Honor,  national  safety  and  national  existence." — 
Ellen  Key,  "War,  Peace  and  the  Future,"  p.  11. 

65.  To  disregard  the  wills  of  subjects  in  the  mat- 

ter of  governing  them  after  they  have  been 
torn  away  from  their  mother  country  as 
a  result  of  a  victorious  war. 

Typical  case :  Germany  seized  Alsace  in 
1870  and  governed  them  against  their 
will. 


54  WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

"The  world  will  recognize  that  in  disregarding  the  will 
of  the  Alsatians  of  to-day  we  are  only  fulfilling  an  injunc- 
tion imposed  by  our  National  Honor." — Treitschkk, 
"Politik,"  p.  56. 

66.  Removing  an  undesirable  official. 

"If  the  great  inert  mass  of  German  descent  has  any 
conscience  will  it  accept  the  barbarous  doctrines  of  Mr. 
Morgan's  partner  without  uniting  in  a  protest  to  the  Presi- 
dent and  declare  its  refusal  to  contribute  to  the  Red  Cross 
until  this  person  has  been  removed  from  the  dominant  posi- 
tion he  holds  in  its  Councils.'*  Or  will  it  silently  acquiesce 
and  suffer  this  stain  on  American  Humanity  to  defile  our 
National  Honor?" — Editorial,  "Issues  and  Events,"  June 
SO,  1917. 

67.  Pacifist  agitation  within  a  country  not  yet  at 

war. 

"The  agitation  of  the  League  to  Enforce  Peace  at  this 
time"  (after  Belgium  was  invaded  but  before  we  declared 
war)  "is  therefore  a  move  against  international  morality, 
against  our  own  National  Honor  and  vital  interests  and  in 
the  interests  of  international  immorality." — Theo.  Roose- 
velt, Metropolitan,  February,  1917- 

68.  To  show  united  front  in  time  of  war  to  for- 

eign country. 

"It  is  to  be  hoped  that  President  Wilson  in  his  Confer- 
ences with  Mr.  Dent  and  the  other  recalcitrant  members  of 
the  committee  has  not  spared  the  rod.  For  the  President 
must  appreciate  more  keenly  than  any  other  American  that 
the  United  States  cannot  afford  to  create  the  appearance 


A  SYMPOSIUM  55 

even  of  a  desire  to  mark  time  till  the  allies  win  the  war. 
To  leave  an  opening  for  such  a  charge  against  this  country 
would  be  to  deal  American  prestige  a  blow  from  wliich  it 
could  never  recover.  The  dark  influences  in  Congress  which 
have  BESMIRCHED  OUR  GOOD  NAME  amoug  the  nations  al- 
ready must  not  be  permitted  to  add  this  crowning  shame." 
— Editorial,  Evening  Sun,  April  10,  1917. 

69.  To  subscribe  to  war  loans. 

"We  urge  upon  every  reader  of  the  New  York  Times  the 
necessity  of  immediate  investment  in  the  Liberty  Loan. 
The  subscriptions  must  close  next  Friday. —  It  would  be 
a  DISHONOR  in  which  the  whole  nation  would  share  if  the 
total  amount  were  not  subscribed  for  by  June  15." — New 
York  Times,  June  11,  1917. 

70.  As  a  cause  of  sedition. 

"It  is  equally  easy  to  discover  the  effect  of  Honor  and 
the  sense  in  which  it  is  a  cause  of  sedition.  Sedition  is 
produced  by  the  sense  of  dishonor  done  to  ourselves  and 
by  the  sight  of  the  Honor  enjoyed  by  others.  But  the 
case  is  one  of  injustice  when  neither  the  Honor  or  dishonor 
is  disproportionate,  and  of  justice  when  it  is  proportionate 
to  the  merit  of  the  persons  concerned." — Aristotle,  "Poli- 
tics," p.  345. 

71.  Universal  military  service. 

"In  many  long  years  of  bitter  servitude  God  taught  our 
people  to  look  to  itself,  and  under  the  pressure  of  the  foot 
of  a  proud  conqueror  our  people  engendered  in  itself  that 
most  sublime  thought  that  it  is  the  highest  Honor  to  dedi- 
cate one's  blood  and  purse  to  the  Fatherland  in  her  armed 


56  WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

service." — Kaiser  Wilhelm,  addressing  the  Army,  Jan.  1, 
1900j  "Kaiser's  Speeches/'  p.  48. 

'IDEAL  SELF  PRESERVATION" 

Vengeance,  Retaliation,  Protection,  Defense, 
Regaining  Lost  Provinces. 

72.  To  retaliate  in  a  subsequent  war  for  defeat 

suffered  at  the  hands  of  an  enemy. 

"If  we  beat  Germany  and  then  humiliate  her,  she  will 
never  rest  until  she  has  redeemed  her  Honor  by  humiliat- 
ing us  more  cruelly  in  turn." — Arnold  Toynbee,  "Na- 
tionality and  the  War,"  p.  4. 

73.  Vengeance. 

"Among  the  tribes,  the  cities  or  the  hostile  states  as 
among  hostile  families,  vengeance  was  always  an  obliga- 
tion of  Honor;  in  the  same  way  each  member  was,  as  for- 
merly in  the  family,  responsible  for  the  actions  of  another 
member  or  of  those  of  the  social  groups  in  its  entirety." — 
Terraillon,  "L'Honneur,"  p.  254. 

74s.  To  try  to  regain  territory  lost  through  an  un- 
successful war. 

Typical  case:  Alsace  and  Lorraine  lost 
by  France  in  1870. 

"The  return  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine  to  France  is  the  first 
demand  of  our  National  Honor." — Viviani  on  his  Amer- 
ican Mission. 


A  SYMPOSIUM  67 

75.  Same  as  74. 

Typical  case:  Italy  and  Trentino. 

"Blessed  are  the  young  men  who  hunger  and  thirst  after 
Honor  for  their  desires  shall  be  fulfilled." — D'Annunzio 
writing  about  the  nationalist  spirit  in  Italy  (Irredenta 
movement) . 

76.  Same  as  74.     As  applied  to  territory  never 

owned  but  merely  conquered. 
Typical  case:  England  and  the  recon- 
quest  of  the  Sudan. 

"In  fact  there  was  never  a  moment  that  the  thought  of 
the  eventual  reconquest  of  the  Sudan  and  of  the  retrieving 
of  the  Honor  of  British  arms  was  not  before  them"  (Brit- 
ish).— H.  A.  Gibbons^  "New  Map  of  Africa,"  p.  2. 

77.  Revenge. 

"What  now  is  National  Honor?  It  is  not  Honor  to  be 
hunting  for  imaginary  insults.  It  is  not  Honor  to  look  on 
one's  neighbors  with  suspicion.  Revenge  is  not  Honor." — 
Rev.  Chas.  Dole,  "Democracy." 

78.  Readiness  to  fight. 

"It  is  not  Honor  worthy  of  civilized  men  to  be  quick  to 
take  up  arms  and  to  fight." — Rev.  Dole,  ibid. 

79.  Immediate  resentment  and  unwillingness  to 

delay. 

"It  is  a  preposterous  absurdity  for  a  league  of  nations 


58  WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

to  attempt  to  restrain  even  for  a  limited  time  one  of  its 
members  from  declaring  war  upon  another  when  a  question 
of  Honor  is  raised." — Theodore  Roosevelt,  Letter,  New 
York  Times,  Jan.  21,  1917. 

80.  Protection  and  defense  against  attack. 

"The  vital  interests  of  Austria-Hungary  were  at  stake 
and  she  had  to  protect  herself.  .  .  .  Threatened  in  her  vital 
interests  Austria-Hungary  chose  the  way  which  Honor  and 
duty  prescribed." — From  the  Austrian  Red  Book. 

81.  To  wage  defensive  but  never  offensive  war. 

"If  this  struggle  was  forced  upon  Germany  then  indeed 
she  stands  in  a  position  of  mighty  dignity  and  Honor  and 
the  whole  world  should  acclaim  her  and  succor  her. —  But 
if  this  outrageous  war  was  not  forced  upon  her  would  it 
not  follow  in  the  course  of  reason  that  her  position  is  with- 
out dignity  or  Honor." — S.  Warden  Church,  President 
Carnegie  Institute  of  Pittsburgh,  in  an  open  letter  Nov.  9, 
1914. 

82.  To  strike  back  when  attacked  or  rights  are 

invaded. 

Typical  case:  Germany  invaded  Ameri- 
can rights  on  the  Seas  by  her  submarine 
warfare. 

"I  have  said  nothing  of  the  governments  allied  with  the 
Imperial  government  of  Germany  because  they  have  not 
made  war  upon  us  and  challenged  us  to  defend  our  rights 
and  our  Honor." — Pres.  Wilson,  Declaration  of  War, 
April  2,  1917. 


A  SYMPOSIUM  59 

83.  Maintenance  of  territorial  integrity  against 

invasion. 

"The  only  effective  way  to  free  Germany  from  such  fear 
(aggression  from  without)  is  to  have  outside  nations  like 
the  United  States  in  good  faith  undertake  the  obligation 
to  defend  Germany's  Honor  and  territorial  integrity  if  at- 
tacked, exactly  as  they  would  defend  the  Honor  and  ter- 
ritorial integrity  of  Belgium  or  of  France  if  attacked." — 
Theo.  Roosevelt,  "America  and  the  World  War,"  p.  234. 

84.  Defense. 

"What  has  war  ever  done  to  settle  great  questions  ? —  I 
speak  not  of  defensive  wars — but  of  war  as  a  conflict  be- 
tween two  independent  nations  striving  to  obtain  satisfac- 
tion for  wounded  Honor,  or  to  settle  a  boundary  question, 
or  to  collect  a  financial  claim." — -Fred.  Coudert,  "Interna- 
tional Arbitration,"  p.  27. 

85.  Defense. 

"We  entered  the  war,  at  least  that  is  my  understanding, 
to  protect  our  own  rights,  to  defend  and  make  secure  the 
lives  of  our  people,  and  to  maintain  our  own  dignity  and 
Honor  and  prestige  among  the  nations  of  the  earth.  Why 
not  say  so?  It  is  not  only  the  truth,  but  it  is  infinitely 
more  important  that  it  be  said  than  that  we  undertake  to 
carry  on  the  war  upon  the  strength  of  vague  and  ever  re- 
ceding generalities." — Senator  Borah,  New  York  Times, 
Sunday,  June  3,  1917. 

86.  Defense  and  protection. 


60  WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

Typical  case:  Germany  declares  war  on 
Russia. 

"In  pursuance  of  her  historic  traditions  Russia,  sister  in 
blood  and  creed  of  the  Slav  nations,  has  never  remained 
indifferent  to  their  fate."  (The  document  then  points  out 
that  Austria's  bombardment  of  Belgrade  led  the  Russian 
government  to  issue  orders  that  the  army  and  the  navy 
should  be  mobilized,  that  Germany  demanded  the  revocation 
of  these  measures  and,  upon  the  refusal,  suddenly  declared 
war  upon  Russia.)  The  manifesto  then  continues:  "It  is 
no  longer  a  question  of  taking  the  part  of  a  sister  nation 
unjustly  wronged,  but  of  defending  the  Honor,  dignity 
and  integrity  of  Russia  and  her  position  among  the  great 
powers." — From  War  Manifesto  issued  by  the  Czar  on  July 
20,  1914. 

MORAL  PRINCIPLES 

Spreading  Civilizations,  Missions,  Humanity, 
Justice,  Democracy,  Honesty 

87.  To  lend  material  and  moral  aid  to  nations 

fighting  for  "principle." 

Typical  case :  France  helped  America  in 
Revolution. 

"France's  National,  Honor  has  always  consisted  in 
lending  material  and  moral  aid  to  those  who  fight  for  a 
principle  or  an  ideal  and  to  awaken  in  the  consciences  of 
those  outside  of  her  frontiers  ideas  of  justice  and  liberty." 
— Terraillon,  "L'Honneur,"  p.  260. 

88.  To  protect  helpless  nations  against  massacre. 


A  SYMPOSIUM  61 

England  aided  Armenia  against  Turk- 
ish oppression  repeatedly. 

"It  is  in  the  name  of  National  Honor  that  England  has 
alwaj's  protested  against  the  inhuman  acts  or  the  useless 
cruelties — against  the  Armenian  massacres." — Terraillon, 
"L'Honneur/'  p.  259. 

89.  To  oppose  slavery. 

"It  is  in  the  name  of  national  Honor  that  England  has 
placed  her  diplomatic  and  naval  forces  in  the  service  of 
anti-slavery." — Terraillon,  "L'Honneur/'  p.  257. 

90.  To  propagate  ideas  of  civilization. 

"England  has  always  considered  as  an  integral  part  of 
her  national  Honor  to  propagate  over  the  whole  Avorld 
ideas  of  civilization  and  progress." — Terraillon^  "L'Hon- 
neur," p.  257. 

91.  "Missions"  of  civilization. 

"National  Honor  according  to  the  nation  which  is  con- 
sidering it  at  the  time  consists  for  her  in  conserving  with 
her  traditional  qualities  her  particular  institutions  and  the 
MISSION  which  she  has  or  believes  she  must  fulfill." — Ter- 
RAiLLON,  "L'Honneur,"  p.  256. 

92.  "Progress  toward  human  freedom." 

"Any  man  who  touches  our  Honor  is  our  enemy.  Any 
man  who  stands  in  the  way  of  that  kind  of  progress  which 
makes  for  human  freedom  cannot  call  himself  our  friend." — 
Wilson,  May  16,  1917. 


62  WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

93.  To  establish  democracy  in  a  foreign  country. 

"Let  us  without  one  hour's  delay  put  the  American  flag  on 
the  battle-front  in  this  great  war  for  democracy  and  civ- 
ilization.—  We  owe  this  to  humanity — most  of  all  we 
owe  it  to  ourselves,  to  our  National  Honor  and  self-re- 
spect."— Theo.  Roosevelt,  asking  Congress  for  Volunteer 
Army,  April,  1917. 

94.  To  spread  a  type  of  civilization  by  force  of 

arms. 

"We  must  grow  into  a  world  power  and  stamp  a  great 
part  of  humanity  with  the  impress  of  the  German  spirit. 
If  we  persist — in  the  dissipation  of  energy — there  is  im- 
minent fear  that  in  the  great  contest  of  the  nations  we 
shall  be  dishonorably  beaten." — Bernhardi,  "Germany 
and  the  Next  War,"  p.  114. 

95.  To  liberate  a  neighboring  people  which  is  be- 

ing oppressed  by  a  foreign  power. 

Typical  case:  Cuba  unjustly  governed 
by  Spain  aroused  America  to  go  to  war 
for  its  liberation  in  1899. 

"We  both  felt  very  strongly  that  such  a  war  (against 
Spain)  would  be  as  righteous  as  it  would  be  advantageous 
to  the  Honor  and  interests  of  the  nation." — Roosevelt,  re- 
ferring to  himself  and  Gen.  Wood,  "Roughriders,"  p.  5. 

96.  To  help  the  "weak." 

"Our  flag  for  Honor  ever  stands 
To  lift  the  weak,  to  lead  the  free. 


A  SYMPOSIUM  63 

America  our  blessed  land  is  calling,  calling  thee." 
— Mrs.  Halsted,  in  a  poem  presented  to  War  Department, 

97.  Honesty. 

"The  phrase  Honor  and  vital  interests  embodied  the 
conscience  of  states.  Honor  or  its  cognate  honesty 
speaks  for  itself;  neither  man  nor  nation  should  consent  to 
that  which  is  before  God  a  shame  to  do  or  to  allow." — 
Admiral  Mahan,  "Armaments  and  Arbitration,"  p.  xvii. 

98.  Case  97. 

"What  attitude  should  politics  take  toward  falsehood.'' 
We  reply  that  political  activity  is  connected  with  a  pub- 
lic office,  obtained  by  inheritance  or  appointment,  but  no 
office  or  relation  of  service  can  authorize  or  compel  the 
commission  of  dishonorable  and  morally  unlawful  acts." 
— Rumelin,  "Relation  of  Politics  to  Moral  Law,"  p.  69. 

99.  To  espouse  the  cause  of  small  nationalities. 

Typical  case :  Uruguay  breaks  with  Ger- 
many for  the  defense  of  Belgium. 

"President  Viera  in  his  message  to  the  Parliament  de- 
clared that  the  Uruguayan  government  had  not  received 
any  direct  offense  from  Germany  but  that  it  was  necessary 
to  espouse  the  cause  of  the  defenders  of  justice,  democracy, 
and  small  nationalities." — Lead  to  this  article  in  New  York 
Times,  Oct.  7,  1917,  was  "Uruguay  breaks  with  Germany 
on  ground  of  Honor." 

100.  Internationalism. 

"We  are  anti-patriot  internationalists  and  have  in  no  de- 


64  WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

gree  a  love  for  the  mother  country.  Hence  we  do  not  know 
what  National  Honor  is.  .  .  .  It  is  a  matter  of  indiffer- 
ence to  us  whether  we  are  French  or  German.  As  for  the 
defense  of  our  mother  country  we  will  give  neither  one  drop 
of  blood  nor  one  square  centimeter  of  skin." — M.  Gustave 
Herve,  quoted  by  Sir  Arthur  Conway  in  "Crowds  in  War 
and  Peace/'  p.  279. 

101.  A  question  of  morality. 

"What  is  called  National  Honor  is  at  present  alto- 
gether too  much  a  matter  of  capricious,  private,  and  often 
merely  personal  judgment  simply  because  the  nations  are 
not  as  yet  self-conscious  moral  beings." — Josiah  Royce, 
"War  and  Insurance/'  p.  xxiv. 

102.  The  double  standard. 

"Thus  we  may  meet  the  old  assertion  that  the  laws  of 
private  honor  do  not  apply  to  national  affairs.  They  apply 
whenever  men  care  to  apply  them." — Stratton,  "Double 
Standard." 

PERSONAL  AS  RELATED  TO 
NATIONAL  HONOR 

103.  Transferring  personal  into  national  honor. 

"It  was  so  at  Syracuse  in  the  olden  days  when  a  political 
revolution  was  the  consequence  of  a  quarrel  between  two 
youths  of  official  rank  about  a  love  affair.  In  the  absence 
of  one  of  them  one  of  his  companions  seduced  the  object 
of  his  affections,  and  the  aggrieved  person  in  his  indigna- 
tion against  the  offender  retaliated  by  inducing  his  wife  to 
commit  adultery.     The  result  was  that  they  gradually  col- 


A  SYMPOSIUM  66 

lected  adherence  among  the  members  of  the  governing  class 
until  they  had  arrayed  the  whole  body  in  two  opposing 
factions." — Aristotle,  "Politics,"  p.  351. 

104.  Insults  by  "Representative  Men." 

"Must  we  then  consider  the  possibility  of  war  with  Eng- 
land over  some  fancied  insult  or  question  of  National 
Honor?  It  is  certain  that  representative  men  of  both  na- 
tions have  no  slightest  disposition  to  insult  or  prejudice  or 
injure  the  people  of  the  other  nation." — Rev.  Charles 
Dole,  "Spirit  of  Democracy." 

105.  Personal  Wrongs. 

"At  Mitylene  it  was  a  feud  arising  about  heiresses  that 
proved  to  be  the  beginning  of  a  world  of  troubles  and  more 
especially  of  the  war  with  the  Athenians  in  which  their 
city  was  captured  by  Paches.  The  circumstances  were  as 
follows:  A  rich  citizen  named  Timpphanes  died,  leaving 
two  daughters.  Dexandros,  who  had  been  a  rejected 
suitor  for  them  on  behalf  of  his  sons,  became  the  prime 
mover  in  the  feud  and  as  he  was  Athenian  counsel  at  Mity- 
lene incited  the  Athenians  to  declare  war.  Again  in  Phocis 
it  was  a  quarrel  of  which  an  heiress  was  the  subject  be- 
tween Mnasias,  the  father  of  Mneson,  and  Euthycrates, 
the  father  of  Onomanchus,  that  proved  to  be  the  beginning 
of  the  Phocian  sacred  war.  And  lastly  the  polity  of  Epi- 
damaus  was  revolutionized  in  consequence  of  a  marriage 
engagement.  A  person  who  had  secretly  betrothed  his 
daughter  to  a  young  citizen  being  fined  by  the  father  of  his 
future  son-in-law  in  his  official  capacity  felt  the  indignity 
so  acutely  that  he  formed  an  alliance  with  the  unenfran- 
chised classes  in  the  state  to  effect  a  revolution." — Aris- 
totle, "Politics,"  p.  352. 


66  WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

100.  Personal  Insult  to  National  Prestige. 

Typical  case:  Senator  Kellogg  accuses 
Senator  LaFollette  of  making  false 
statements  with  regard  to  America's 
entrance  into  the  war. 

"I  am  as  jealous  of  the  right  of  free  speech  as  any  mem- 
ber of  this  body,  but  this  is  a  question  of  erroneous  state- 
ment of  facts  ratlier  tlian  of  free  speech.  I  have  no  right 
to  wish  to  criticise  any  man  who  voted  against  this  nation 
going  to  war  although  I  may  disagree  with  him;  but  we 
are  at  war,  and  I  believe  men  of  this  body,  men  of  influ- 
ence, should  not  make  statements  tending  to  aid  and  en- 
courage the  enemy,  and  to  cast  dishonor  and  discredit  upon 
this  nation." — Senator  Kellogg  in  the  Senate,  Oct.  7, 
1917. 

107.  Individual  pledging  the  honor  of  the  coun- 

try without  the  consent  of  the  legislative 
body. 

"The  Foreign  Secretary  pledged  our  Honor  to  defend 
France  in  certain  contingencies  behind  the  back  of  Parlia- 
ment and  the  Nation." — G.  Lowes  Dickinson,  referring  to 
Entente  Cordiale  in  "The  League  of  Peace,"  p.  12. 

108.  Similarity  between  personal  and  national 

honor. 

"And  the  lesson  which  the  shock  of  being  taken  by  sur- 
prise in  a  matter  so  deeply  vital  to  all  tlie  nations  in  the 
world,  has  made  poignantly  clear  is,  that  the  peace  of  the 
world  must  henceforth  depend  upon  a  new  and  more  whole- 
some diplomacy.   ...   It  is  clear  that  nations  in  the  future 


A  SYMPOSIUM  67 

must  be  governed  by  the  same  high  code  of  Honor  that  we 
demand  of  individuals." — Pres.  Wilson  in  "The  League  to 
Enforce  Peace,"  May  26,  1916. 

109.  A  "dead  sailor"  and  National  Honor. 

"Even  a  dead  sailor  or  a  live  artist  may  affect  a  nation's 
Honor  or  conceivably  even  its  vital  interests." — L.  S. 
Wolff,  "International  Government,"  p.  52. 

ECONOMIC  MATTERS 

110.  To  collect  the  debt  owing  by  citizens  of  one 

country  to  citizens  of  another. 

"It  can  scarcely  be  alleged  that  anything  like  an  inter- 
national consensus  now  obtains  as  to  the  ethical  propriety 
of  forcing  a  nation  to  pay  its  creditors.  The  principle  at 
stake  though  novel  and  important  can  hardly  be  said  to 
touch  vital  interests  or  National  Honor." — Admiral  Ma- 
HAN,  "Practical  Aspects  of  War,"  p.  61. 

111.  To  force  a  nation  to  open  its  ports  to  com- 

merce. 

Typical  case :  England  forces  China  to 
open  its  ports  in  1861  to  British  com- 
merce. 

"It  is  in  the  name  of  Honor  that  England  once  believed 
it  possible  to  force  China  to  open  her  doors  to  the  com- 
merce and  the  ideas  of  the  West." — Terraillon,  "L'Hon- 
neur,"  p.  260. 

112.  Difference  of  opinion  with  regard  to  the  use 

of  national  insurance  funds. 


68  WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

"Differences  of  opinion  concerning  the  use  of  the  insur- 
ance fund  would  frequently  involve  what  is  usually  called 
National  Honor.  They  would  tlierefore  be  hopeless  dif- 
ferences."— JosiAH  RoYCE,  "\A'ar  and  Insurance,"  p.  xix. 

113.  Foreigners  and  the  ownership  of  land. 

Typical  case :  Japanese  land-holding  in 
California. 

"It  seems  then  that  there  is  a  sort  of  honor  which  does 
not  allow  a  stranger  to  establish  himself  in  a  region  as  a 
landed  proprietor." — Terraillon,  "L'Honneur,"  p.  252. 

114.  The  question  of  the  loss  or  depreciation  of 

business  interests. 

"In  case  it  should  happen  that  these  business  interests 
of  the  nation's  businessmen  interested  in  trade  or  invest- 
ment abroad  are  jeopardized  by  a  disturbance  of  any  kind 
in  these  foreign  parts  in  which  their  business  interests  lie, 
then  it  immediately  becomes  the  urgent  concern  of  the  na- 
tional authorities  to  use  all  means  at  hand  for  maintaining 
the  gainful  traffic  of  these  businessmen  undiminished,  and 
the  common  man  pays  the  cause.  Should  such  an  untoward 
situation  go  such  sinister  lengths  as  to  involve  actual  loss 
to  these  business  interests  or  otherwise  give  rise  to  a  tan- 
gible grievance  it  becomes  an  affair  of  the  National 
Honor,  whereupon  no  sense  of  proportion  as  between  the 
material  gains  at  stake  and  the  cost  of  remedy  or  retalia- 
tion need  longer  be  observed,  since  the  National  Honor 
is  beyond  price." — Thorstein  Veblen,  "The  Nature  of 
Peace,"  p.  27. 

115.  The  definiteness  of  Honor  as  a  moral  ideal. 


A  SYMPOSIUM  69 

"A  large  proportion  of  the  questions  embraced  under 
Honor  and  vital  interests  are  precisely  in  that  inchoate 
condition  of  non-decision  and  even  of  dispute  which  cannot 
be  brought  under  the  head  of  law.  .  .  .  All  efforts  fail  be- 
cause we  are  dealing  with  men's  consciences,  their  honor 
and  vital  interests." — Admiral  IMahan,  ibid. 

116.  Interests  and  Honor  as  synonyms. 

"Within  fifteen  years  Japan  has  twice  found  it  essential 
to  go  to  war  on  account  of  interests  in  Korea;  interests  by 
her  esteemed  so  vital  to  her  people  and  their  future  that 
she  could  not  with  Honor  submit  the  decision  of  them 
to  any  judgment  but  their  own." — Admiral  Mahan,  "Neg- 
lected Aspects  of  War,"  p.  xvi. 

UTILITY  OF  HONOR 

117.  As  an  aid  to  the  creation  of  a  nation: 

"The  Italian  national  Honor  existed  before  modern 
Italy;  it  is  the  idea  of  national  Honor  which  made  her." — 
Terraillon,  "L'Honneur,"  p.  252. 

118.  Its  use  for  a  material  purpose. 

"National  Honor  is  a  highly  valued  asset  or  at  least  a 
valued  possession ;  but  it  is  of  a  metaphysical,  not  of  a  phys- 
ical nature,  and  it  is  not  known  to  serve  any  material  or 
otherwise  useful  end  apart  from  affording  a  practicable 
grievance  consequent  upon  its  infraction." — Veblen,  ibid., 
p.  29. 

119.  Its  economic  value. 

"This  national  Honor,  which  so  is  rated  a  necessary  of 


70  WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

life  is  an  immaterial  substance  in  a  peculiarly  high-wrought 
degree,  being  not  only  not  physically  tangible,  but  also  not 
even  capable  of  adequate  statement  in  pecuniary  terms, 
as  would  be  the  case  with  ordinary  material  assets." — 
Veblen,  ibid.,  p.  29. 

DEFINITION 

120.  Honor  as  an  evolution. 

"But  Honor,  as  the  term  is  applied,  is  a  mental  concept 
varying  with  the  mood  of  the  times." — Ralston,  ibid.,  p.  5. 

121.  Distinction  between  disputes  of  Honor  and 

other  disputes. 

"One  must  repeat  that  to  make  arbitration  obligatory  is 
impossible  if  you  try  to  distinguish  questions  which  do  and 
do  not  affect  Honor  and  vital  interests.  The  distinction 
is  based  neither  upon  reason  or  fact." — L.  S.  Wolff,  "In- 
ternational Government,"  p.  52. 

122.  Any  question  as  a  possible  Honor  dispute. 

"It  is  amusing  to  read  after  days  and  days  of  discussion 
that  one  diplomatist  at  length  remarked  that  any  question 
may  affect  the  Honor  and  vital  interests  of  a  nation." — L. 
S.  Wolff,  ibid.,  p.  51. 

123.  Honor  as  a  peculiar  possession  of  each  na- 

tion. 

"And  one  may  even  show  that  each  nation  has  a  par- 
ticular concept  and  a  more  or  less  clear  idea  of  what 
Honor  means  to  it." — Terraillon,  "L'Honneur,"  p.  215. 


A  SYMPOSIUM  71 

124.  Same  as  123. 

"I  know  but  one  thing;  it  is  that  we  again  have  a  German 
Empire,  a  German  Emperor  and  a  German  Honor." — Su- 
derman;  "Le  Conjure  Socrate." 

TRADITION;  PAST  AND  FUTURE  OF 
A  NATION 

125.  The  perpetuation  of  a  national  culture. 

"It  is  a  nice  question  whether  in  practical  effect  the  aspi- 
ration to  perpetuate  the  national  culture  is  consistently  to 
be  distinguished  from  the  vindication  of  the  national 
Honor." — Veblen,  "The  Nature  of  Peace/*  p.  23. 

126.  Loyalty  to  hatred  and  friendships. 

"Honor  to  a  nation  is  then  the  claiming  of  loyalty  to 
herself,  to  her  friendships,  to  her  justified  hatreds  and  her 
legitimate  aspirations." — Terraillon,  "L'Honneur,"  p. 
261. 

127.  The  obligation  a  nation  owes  to  her  past  and 

to  her  future. 

"Even  though  the  overthrow  may  have  been  a  certainty 
it  would  be  necessary  to  brave  it.  There  is  a  thing  which 
Athens  has  always  placed  above  success,  and  that  is  Honor, 
the  elevated  feeling  of  what  she  owes  to  her  traditions  in 
the  past,  and  to  her  good  fame  in  the  future.  Formerly, 
at  the  time  of  the  Persian  invasion,  Athens  sacrificed  all 
to  this  heroic  sentiment  of  Honor." — Demosthenes,  "Dis- 
course on  the  Crown." 


72  WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

128.  The  respect  for  tradition. 

"The  Government  of  the  living  by  the  dead  which  we 
have  shown  as  an  essential  part  of  family  Honor,  we  find  it 
again  at  the  foundation  of  National  Honor.  Not  only  in 
ancient  cities,  but  even  in  modern  states." — Terraillon, 
"L'Honneur,"  p.  251. 

MILITARY  HONOR 

129.  Divisions  of  military  Honor. 

"No.   1.  Escape  of  interned  prisoners. 

"2.  Sponsions. 

"3.   Tacit  agreements. 

"4.  The  abuse  of  the  White  Flag. 

"5.   Ruses  or  stratagems. 

"6.  Spies. 

"7.  Treachery  and  criminal  warfare." — Stowell 
and  MuNRo,  "International  Cases,"  Vol.  2,  Table  of  Con- 
tents. 

130.  Balance  of  militaiy  force. 

"And  so,  in  presenting  them  to  you,  who  at  this  tragic 
hour  judge  the  destinies  of  the  belligerent  nation,  we  in- 
dulge a  gratifying  hope  that  they  (suggested  peace  terms) 
will  be  accepted,  and  that  we  shall  thus  see  an  early  termi- 
nation of  the  terrible  struggle  which  has  more  and  more 
the  appearance  of  a  useless  massacre. 

"Everybody  acknowledges,  on  the  other  hand,  that  on 
both  sides,  the  Honor  of  arms  is  safe.  Do  not  then  turn  a 
deaf  ear  to  our  prayer,  accept  the  international  invitation 
which  we  extend  to  you  in  the  name  of  the  Divine  Re- 


A  SYMPOSIUM  73 

deemer,  the  Prince  of  Peace." — The  Pope's  Appeal  to  the 
Rulers  of  the  Belligerent  Peoples,  given  at  the  Vatican, 
Aug.  1,  1917. 

POSITIVE  OR  CONSTRUCTIVE  SIDE 
OF  HONOR 

131.  The  relative  importance  of  the  debit  side  of 

Honor. 

"To  preserv^e  her  Honor  should  be  the  nation's  main 
purpose  and  object,  but  she  should  not  readily  believe  those 
who  tell  her  that  by  hard  blows  alone  may  its  integrity  be 
protected.  A  nation's  Honor  consists  in  her  fidelity  to 
her  engagements,  in  carrying  out  her  contract  in  spirit  as 
well  as  in  letter,  in  paying  her  just  debts,  in  respecting  the 
rights  of  others,  in  promoting  the  welfare  of  her  people, 
in  the  encouragement  of  truth,  in  teaching  obedience  to  the 
law,  in  cultivating  honorable  peace  with  the  world." — 
Frederic  Coudert,  ibid. 

132.  Honor  at  stake  in  time  of  peace. 

"Is  a  nation's  Honor  at  stake  only  in  times  of  imminent 
peril?  I  crave  for  every  one  of  you  a  like  spirit  of  conse- 
cration for  the  tasks  of  peace."— Pres.  Grier  Hibben,  Ser- 
mon at  Princeton  University,  June  13,  1915,  "Martial 
Valor  in  Time  of  Peace." 

133.  Constructive  aspect. 

"Must  we  then  consider  the  possibility  of  war  with  Eng- 
land over  some  fancied  insult  or  question  of  National 
Honor?  It  is  certain  that  the  representative  men  of  both 
have  not  the  slightest  disposition  to  insult,  to  prejudice,  or 


74.  WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

injure  the  people  of 'the  other  nation.  There  has  been 
immense  gain  in  this  respect  on  both  sides  in  fifty  years. 
What  now  is  national  Honor?  It  is  not  Honor  to  be 
hunting  for  imaginary  insults,  it  is  not  Honor  to  look  on 
one's  neighbors  with  suspicions,  it  is  not  Honor  worthy 
of  civilized  men  to  be  quick  to  take  up  arms  and  to  fight. 
Revenge  is  not  Honor.  Is  it  not  national  Honor  to  be 
humane  and  friendly?" — Rev.  Charles  Dole,  "Spirit  of 
Democracy." 

HONOR  AND  PEACE 

134.  To  give  up  plans  of  conquest  and  the  main- 

tenance of  honorable  peace. 

Typical  case :  Germany  gradually  gives 
up  her  plans  of  conquest  without  feel- 
ing a  depreciation  of  her  national 
Honor. 

"It  is  interesting  to  note  that  Bethmann-Hollweg  did  not 
feel  himself  strong  enough  at  this  time  to  declare  himself 
openly  a  partisan  of  the  Annexationist  plan.  We  may 
gather  from  this  that  there  is  a  strong  demand  in  Germany 
for  peace  with  Honor,  but  not  with  conquest.  This  is  a 
hopeful  sign." — Editorial,  New  York  Tribune,  May  17, 
1917. 

135.  Honorable  peace  and  the  emancipation  of 


enthralled  population 


"If  the  war  is  to  end  in  an  honorable  peace  there  must  be 
annexation,  continuing  the  emancipation  of  the  enthralled 
population  who  are  laboring  under  despotism,  and  the  re- 
tention of  strategic  positions  as  safeguards  against  future 


A  SYMPOSIUM  76 

attack." — Ex-Premier    Asquith,    in    House    of    Commons, 
May  17,  1917. 

HONOR  AND  PUBLIC  OPINION 

136.  Honor  and  public  opinion. 

"I  hear  much  about  the  Honor  of  our  country,  and  I  be- 
lieve the  Honor  of  this  country  should  be  maintained,  but  I 
want  to  see  the  term  Honor  defined  by  the  men  who  have 
to  maintain  it.  I  would  not  like  to  have  some  fat  fellow 
define  my  Honor,  tell  me  when  it  had  been  assailed,  and 
shove  me  into  a  fight." — Hon.  Denver  S.  Church,  in  a 
speech  in  the  House  of  Representatives,  April  26,  1916. 

NATIONAL  HONOR  AND  ARBITRA- 
TION 

"Might  it  not  be  felt  that  the  Honor  and  vital  interests 
of  a  nation  are  better  conserved  by  accepting  a  reward  im- 
partially decided  by  the  merits  of  the  case  than  by  insist- 
ing on  the  ordeal  of  battle  .f"" — J.  Hobhouse,  "Towards  In- 
ternational Government,"  p.  40. 

"Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  pledged  them- 
selves to  abide  by  that  tribunal  (Geneva)  whatever  it  might 
be.  That  decision  in  due  time  was  rendered ;  and  the  two 
nations  do  abide  by  it.  Did  it  ever  enter  the  thought  of  the 
British  nation  to  refuse  obedience  to  that  decision  because 
it  was  in  some  sense  adverse  to  her?  To  her  eternal 
Honor  be  it  said  no." — At  the  Hague,  "An  International 
Tribunal,"  Dr.  James  P.  Miles,  1875, 

"In  no  case  that  I  can  recall  has  a  great  nation  dishon- 
ored her  hand  and  seal  by  refusing  to  carry  out  the  decrees 


76  WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

of  the  tribunal  to  which  she  has  submitted  her  claims  and 
her  arguments." — Frederic  Coudert,  "Annual  American 
Arbitration  Treaty,"  p.  53. 


WILLINGNESS  TO  ARBITRATE 

PRESIDENT  NICHOLAS  MURRAY  BUTLER 

"To  argue  that  a  nation's  Honor  must  be  defended  by 
the  blood  of  its  citizens,  if  need  be,  is  quite  meaningless,  for 
any  nation,  though  profoundly  right  in  its  contention,  might 
be  defeated  at  the  hands  of  a  superior  force  exerted  on 
behalf  of  an  unjust  and  unrighteous  cause.  What  becomes 
of  national  Honor  then.^" 

EX-PRESIDENT  WILLIAM   HOWARD   TAFT 

"If  now  we  can  negotiate  and  put  through  a  positive 
agreement  with  some  great  nation  to  abide  the  judication 
of  an  international  arbitral  court  in  every  issue  which  can- 
not be  settled  by  negotiation,  no  matter  what  it  involves, 
whether  Honor,  territory  or  money,  we  shall  have  made 
a  long  step  forward  by  demonstrating  that  it  is  possible 
for  two  nations  at  least  to  establish  as  between  them  the 
same  system  of  due  process  of  law  that  exists  between  in- 
dividuals under  a  government." — Before  American  Society 
for  Judicial  Settlement  of  International  Disputes,  Decem- 
ber, 1910. 

EX-PRESIDENT  WILLIAM  HOWARD  TAFT 
"Personally  I  do  not  see  any  more  reason  why  matters 
of  National  Honor  should  not  be  referred  to  a  Court  of 
Arbitration  than  matters  of  property  or  matters  of  national 
proprietorship.  I  know  that  it  is  going  further  than  most 
men  are  willing  to  go;  but  I  do  not  see  why  questions  of 
Honor  may  not  be  submitted  to  a  tribunal,  supposed  to  be 
composed  of  men  of  Honor,  who  understand  questions  of 


A  SYMPOSIUM  77 

national  Honor,  and  then  abide  by  their  decisions  as  well 
as  any  other  question  of  difFerence  arising  between  na- 
tions."— March,  1910.  Address,  Amer.  Peace  and  Arb. 
League. 

ALFRED  H.  FRIED 
"Moreover  people  are  apparently  ignorant  of  the  fact 
that  new  and  powerful  factors  have  appeared  with  an  in- 
terest in  the  prevention  of  war,  and  that  in  many  cases, 
conflicts,  even  those  involving  Honor  and  vital  matters, 
can  at  the  present  time,  be  settled  in  a  manner  consonant 
with  reason  and  worthy  of  humanity." — "German  Emperor 
and  Peace  of  World,"  p.  185. 

COSMOS 

"For  example,  if  the  international  commissions  of  in- 
quiry are  to  be  really  valuable,  the  limitations  imposed 
upon  it  as  to  disputes  of  an  international  nature,  that  in- 
volve either  Honor  or  essential  interests  must  be  removed. 
It  is  a  poor  sort  of  international  dispute  in  which  some  one 
cannot  find  a  point  involving  either  Honor  or  an  essen- 
tial interest.     "The  Basis  of  Durable  Peace." 

FRED.  COUDERT 

"If  our  National  Honor  were  concerned,  it  is  gravely 
alleged,  no  aspersion  on  that  delicate  organ  could  be  treated 
otherwise  than  with  bombs  and  guns.  A  great  nation  can- 
not talk  when  her  Honor  is  assailed;  action  must  then  be 
prompt  and  energetic." — Ibid.,  p.  50. 

FRED.  COUDERT 

"National  Honor  is  a  sonorous  phrase  under  which  the 
civilized  man  cloaks  those  feelings  of  the  primitive  man 
only  partially  submerged  within  him.  The  emptier  and 
vainer  a  nation's  intellect,  the  greater  becomes  the  clamor  for 
national    Honor.     We    talk    of    national    Honor.     How 


78  WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

many  questions  of  national  Honor  have  we  not  submitted 
to  a  court?  Has  not  almost  every  arbitration  that  the 
United  States  has  had  with  Great  Britain  been  based  upon 
a  controversy  which  might  have  been  tortured  into  a  ques- 
tion of  National  Honor  and  which  a  lot  of  jingoes  said 
were  questions  of  national  Honor  and  hence  opposed  it?" — 
Washington  Ass.  of  N.  J.,  Feb.  12,  1912. 

HERE  DERNBERG 
"  'Questions  of  Honor  and  national  self-preservation  can 
never  be  submitted  to  Courts  of  Arbitration.'  I  take  the 
liberty  of  differing  with  him.  Every  officer  whose  Honor 
is  insulted  is  not  permitted  to  take  up  arms  without  fur- 
ther ado;  he  must  submit  to  a  court  of  Honor  composed 
of  his  friends,  and  these  are  in  duty  bound  to  try  every 
means  in  their  power  to  bring  about  an  honorable  com- 
promise.    Nations  too  must  do  that." — In  New  York  Times. 

CARL  SCHURZ 
"Does  not  this  magnificent  achievement  (Alabama  claims) 
form  one  of  the  most  glorious  pages  of  the  common  history 
of  England  and  America.  Truly  the  two  great  nations 
that  accomplished  this  need  not  be  afraid  of  unadjustable 
questions  of  Honor  in  the  future." 

MRS.  MEAD 
"Justice  and  Honor  are  larger  words  than  peace,  and 
if   fighting   would   enable   us   to   get   justice   and   maintain 
Honor,  I  would  fight,  but  it  is  not  that  way." 

L.  S.  WOLFF 
"The  past  has  shown  that  nations  can  and  will  accept 
judicial  decisions  in  questions  affecting  Honor  and  vital 
interests  provided  that  (1)  a  rational  and  suitable  judicial 
procedure  exists,  and  (2)  the  question  can  be  put  to  the 
Tribunal  in  a  logical  form." — "International  Government," 
p.  48. 


A  SYMPOSIUM  79 

FRED.  COUDERT 
"Above  all  let  us  not  be  misled  by  high  sounding  phrase 
about  national  Honor.  The  only  danger  which  our  Honor 
may  run  is  an  exaggerated  tendency  to  make  readiness  to 
strike  the  test  of  its  delicacy  and  the  proof  of  its  exist- 
ence."— Ibid.,  p.  59. 

FRED.  COUDERT 
"Tradition  has  ordained  that  a  nation's  Honor  had  to 
be  lubricated  with  blood  in  order  to  be  kept  in  good  working 
condition.  Both  of  the  conflicting  nations  usually  assured 
the  other  nations  that  were  looking  on  of  the  imperative 
necessity  under  which  the  honor  of  the  other  was  placed  to 
do  some  fighting  to  make  it  fresh  and  bright.  When  a 
sufficient  number  of  men  had  been  slaughtered,  and  a  proper 
number  of  towns  had  been  burnt  and  plundered,  and  when 
the  treasury  of  either  or  both  was  empty,  Honor  smiled 
once  more  with  restored  cheerfulness,  made  her  graceful 
obeisance  and  retired  from  the  scene  leaving  the  victor  to 
have  his  way.  Honor,  National  Honor,  has  been  a 
priceless  possession  but  a  very  expensive  one  to  keep,  the 
more  expensive  because  of  its  uncertain  character,  its  vague 
definition  and  its  unreasonable  demands.  .  .  .  The  salutary 
process  of  a  blood  baptism  can  alone  renovate  and  preserve 
this  delicate  and  susceptible  quality  of  a  nation's  Constitu- 
tion."— Ibid.,  p.  46. 

UNWILLINGNESS  TO  ARBITRATE 

VON  BERNHARDI 
"Even  if  a  comprehensive  international  code  were  drawn 
up  no  nation  would  sacrifice  its  own  conception  of  right  to 
it.  By  so  doing  it  would  renounce  its  highest  ideals;  it 
would  allow  its  own  sense  of  justice  to  be  violated  by  an 
injustice  and  so  dishonor  itself." — "Germany  and  the 
Next  War,"  p.  32. 


80  WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

Do   Arbitration   Treaties   compromise   the   Na- 
tion's Honor  by  their  very  nature? 

VON  BERNHARDI 

"Arbitration  treaties  must  be  peculiarly  detrimental  to 
an  aspiring  people  which  has  not  yet  reached  its  political 
and  national  zenith  and  is  bent  on  expanding  its  power  in 
order  to  play  its  part  honorably  in  the  civilized  world." — 
"Germany  and  the  Next  War." 


PART  II 

A  PSYCHOLOGICAL  ANALYSIS  OF 
HONOR 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE   EMOTIONAL   BASIS   OF    HONOR 

The  foregoing  pages  if  they  do  not  prove  that 
national  honor  as  an  ethical  ideal  is  an  empty 
phrase,  at  least  suggest  its  elastic  quality. 
When  a  phrase  can  be  used  to  condone  so  many 
varied  and  even  contradictory  aspects  of  national 
conduct,  so  many  cases  of  questionable  sincerity, 
and  so  many  obvious  injustices,  it  is  not  unfair  to 
question  its  rational  character.  It  is  clear  from 
an  analysis  of  the  symposium  that  national 
honor  as  it  is  conceived  by  representative  states- 
men, is  a  chaotic  notion,  that  far  from  being 
a  definite  ideal  it  is  an  all-embracing  moral  cap- 
tion, and  that  in  acquiring  the  wealth  of  its  im- 
plications, it  has  lost  its  moral  significance. 

Those  who  delight  in  reducing  all  human  action 
to  a  nicely  calculated  economic  hedonism  will 
explain  this  confusion  into  which  the  ideal  of 
honor  has  fallen,  by  the  fact  that  diplomats  have 
persistently  misapplied  the  term  with  conscious 
hypocrisy.     Such  an  accusation  is  unfair  and  un- 

psychologic.     Whatever  the  evils  of  secret  di- 
ss 


84  WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

plomacy  it  could  never  have  gone  the  extreme  of 
unscrupulous  deception  in  the  name  of  national 
honor.  While  there  may  be  instances  in  history 
of  Machiavelhanism  where  a  diplomat  consciously 
misused  and  misapplied  the  slogan  of  national 
honor  in  order  to  rouse  a  patriotic  fervor  among 
his  compatriots  for  an  unjust  war,  it  is  hardly 
possible  to  account  for  this  confusion  by  the 
wholesale  indictment  that  diplomats  have  dese- 
crated the  ideal  of  honor  by  malicious  intent.  If 
the  average  man,  as  it  is  said,  is  a  good  deal  below 
the  average  in  other  respects,  he  is  a  good  deal 
above  the  average  when  his  country's  honor  is  in 
any  way  involved  and  when  he  uses  the  word  in 
justification  for  certain  actions.  National  honor 
is  a  collective,  social  ideal,  and  it  is  well-known 
that  in  the  face  of  collective  aims  or  ideals  even 
the  meanest  men  rise  above  the  petty  motives 
which  might  influence  them  in  ordinary^  life.  On 
the  level  of  the  herd  instinct  men  are  as  equally 
capable  of  the  most  altruistic  conduct  as  they  are 
incapable  of  calculated  unscrupulousness. 

The  charge  of  hypocrisy  besides  being  unfair 
is  inadequate  as  an  explanation  for  the  confused 
state  in  which  we  find  the  notion  of  honor. 
Psychologists  repeatedly  warn  us  against  the  "in- 
tellectualist"  fallacy,  the  notion  that  human  con- 
duct is  the  result  of  an  intellectual  process  in 


THE  EMOTIONAL  BASIS  OF  HONOR      85 

which  the  end,  and  the  means  to  the  end,  are  coolly 
and  deliberately  calculated  before  hand.  The 
charge  of  hypocrisy  is  an  undeserved  tribute  to 
the  rational  character  of  human  nature,  while  it 
does  not  do  justice  to  the  great  emotional  well- 
springs  and  impulses  that  account  for  our  actions 
in  nine  out  of  ten  cases.  The  fair  explanation  for 
the  mental  gymnastics  which  the  ideal  has  been 
made  to  perform  is  that  without  taint  of  insin- 
cerity and  without  any  conscious  encouragement, 
it  has  become  a  beautiful  delusion — beautiful  be- 
cause the  adherence  to  it  even  as  a  delusion  affords 
a  very  positive  joy  and  calls  forth  some  of  the 
most  beautiful  qualities  of  human  nature. 

That  it  is  unfair  and  foolish  to  attempt  re- 
form by  inviting  antagonism  and  ill  feeling, 
needs  no  lengthy  exposition  in  these  days  of 
reform  penology.  Criminals  are  no  longer  re- 
formed by  being  continually  reminded  that  they 
are  the  most  wicked  and  hopeless  that  have  ever 
been.  Even  if  there  were  not  a  shadow  of  a 
doubt  that  diplomacy  has  been  as  corrupt  as  the 
above  hypothesis  would  suggest,  it  would  be  bad 
psychology  to  approach  the  subject  of  political 
reform  in  the  spirit  of  such  a  recognition. 

We  can  analyze  out  without  difficulty  the  ele- 
ments that  account  for  the  delusion.  Honor 
like  all  moral  ideals  is  a  growth,  and  in  the 


86  WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

process  of  its  evolution  four  variable  factors 
were  concerned.  The  abstraction  of  honors 
never  having  been  defined  in  an  even  approxi- 
mate way  or  clearly  conceived,  could  not  accu- 
rately have  been  handed  down  from  one  genera- 
tion to  the  next.  Each  generation  received  a  set 
of  traditional  notions  about  honor  and  uncon- 
sciously modified  them  so  that  the  succeeding 
generation  inherited  somewhat  different  tradi- 
tions. While  the  new  accretions  to  the  ideal  may 
have  been  dimly  perceived  by  the  generation 
contributing  them,  the  inherited  accretions  were 
much  more  dimly  conceived,  if  at  all,  in  the 
shadowy  region  of  emotional  association.  And 
so  if  the  generation  contributing  the  new  varia- 
tions of  national  honor  apprehended  them  in 
only  the  most  general  way,  it  is  easy  to  un- 
derstand why  a  great  confusion  presents  itself 
now  after  dozens  of  generations  have  lived  and 
died  and  fastened  their  emotional  and  intel- 
lectual associations  to  the  ideal.  We  might 
call  this  the  subjective  variable  in  the  com- 
plex. Then  there  is  an  objective  variable  that 
is  equally  complex.  National  institutions,  war, 
and  political  machinery  in  connection  with  which 
national  honor  arises,  have  also  been  chang- 
ing, and  consequently  modifications  and  influ- 
ences were  at  work  on  the  ideal  from  the  outside. 


THE  EMOTIONAL  BASIS  OF  HONOR      87 

Between  the  two,  national  honor  has  lost  most  of 
its  rational  quahty,  but  has  retained  in  a  cumula- 
tive way,  emotional  power  and  manifold  associa- 
tions. 

There  are  two  other  variable  factors  which  have 
entered  into  the  mental  processes  by  which  the 
term  has  lost  its  specific  quality.  Not  only  has 
the  ideal  of  national  honor  changed  from  genera- 
tion to  generation  in  the  natural  course  of  evolu- 
tion, but  it  has  at  no  time  even  in  the  same  gen- 
eration had  anything  like  a  universal  interpre- 
tation. Just  as  each  nation  feels  it  has  a  pe- 
cuhar  mission  in  the  world,  a  mission  that  is 
necessarily  colored  and  determined  by  its  his- 
tory, its  traditions,  its  poHtical  institutions,  its 
culture  and  its  aspirations,  so  every  nation  has  its 
own  peculiar  ideal  of  honor  which  is  a  direct 
development  and  outgrowth  of  these  distinctly 
national  peculiarities.  Each  nation  believes  sin- 
cerely that  its  honor  is  a  peculiar  possession  of  its 
poHtical  constitution  and  must  necessarily  be 
different  from  the  honor  of  its  neighbors.  Uni- 
versality is  the  last  thing  in  the  world  to  expect 
of  the  ideal  of  honor.  The  reason  for  this  is  not 
hard  to  find.  For  example  we  can  readily  see 
that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  a  peculiar  policy  of 
honor  which  has  grown  out  of  the  historical  de- 
velopment of  the  United  States,  and  that  it  would 


88  WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

be  illogical  for  Japan  or  Russia,  let  us  say,  to 
claim  the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  a  matter  which  its 
honor  includes  and  which  it  must  defend  at  all 
costs. 

The  vigorous  opposition  to  the  arbitration 
of  honor  disputes  arises  from  a  frank  recog- 
nition of  the  peculiarly  national  character  of  it, 
and  the  impossibility  of  universalizing  it  as  a 
guiding  principle  for  arbitration.  That  no  for- 
eigner can  render  a  "just  decision"  in  matters 
affecting  "the  vital  interests  of  honor"  of  an- 
other country,  is  an  opinion  which  we  have 
heard  only  too  often  from  opponents  of  all- 
inclusive  arbitration  agreements.  Mr.  Roose- 
velt recognizes  the  local  quality  of  honor  when  he 
says — 

"This  proposal  (Mr.  Roosevelt's)  therefore 
meets  the  well-founded  objections  against  the 
foolish  and  mischievous  all-inclusive  arbitration 
treaties  recently  negotiated  by  Mr.  Bryan,  under 
the  direction  of  Pres.  Wilson.  These  treaties — 
explicitly  include  as  arbitrable — questions  of 
honor  and  vital  national  interest." 

We  have  this  same  silent  recognition  of  the  pe- 
culiar quality  of  honor  by  Von  Bernhardi.  He 
says  in  this  connection — 

"Even  if  a  comprehensive  international  code 
were  drawn  up  no  nation  would  sacrifice  its  own 


THE  EMOTIONAL  BASIS  OF  HONOR      89 

conception  of  right  to  it.  By  so  doing  it  would 
renounce  its  highest  ideals ;  it  would  allow  its  own 
sense  of  justice  to  be  violated  by  an  injustice  and 
so  dishonor  itself." 

If  each  nation  has  its  own  peculiar  sense  of 
honor  therefore,  it  is  not  hard  to  see  why  any 
universal  abstraction  from  such  conflicting  and 
variable  data  would  be  difficult,  and  this  condition 
is  indeed  to  be  held  responsible  in  great  measure 
for  the  confusion  in  which  the  concept  is  steeped. 

Still  another  variable  element  that  has  compli- 
cated the  confusion  is  that  nearly  every  man 
within  the  nation  differs  quantitatively  and  quali- 
tatively with  every  other  man  in  respect  to  his 
sensitiveness  and  understanding  of  honor.  Just 
as  there  is  variation  as  between  nations,  so 
there  is  variation  within  each  nation  as  to 
what  each  member  of  it  regards  as  matters 
aff'ecting  honor.  If  a  questionnaire  were  sent 
out  to  representative  men  in  the  United  States 
it  would  undoubtedly  reveal  a  startling  confusion 
and  difference  of  opinion  as  to  what  subjects  of 
our  own  foreign  policy  for  example  were  prop- 
erly to  be  classed  as  questions  involving  our  honor. 
Some  men  believe  that  the  subject  of  immigra- 
tion bears  directly  upon  it  and  that  it  should 
therefore  at  all  costs  be  withheld  from  arbitra- 
tion ;  others  would  refuse  to  admit  disputes  of  this 


90  WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

character  to  the  precincts  of  non-arbitrable  ques- 
tions. If  there  are  as  many  varieties  of  honor 
as  there  are  nations  to  conceive  it,  it  may  be  said 
with  some  exaggeration  that  there  are  likewise  as 
many  individual  conceptions  of  each  national 
honor  as  there  are  individuals  to  conceive  it.  No 
wonder  that  we  must  refrain  from  any  attempt 
to  define  or  universalize  this  confused  and  non- 
descript ideal  if  we  wish  to  retain  its  sweeping 
emotional  momentum. 

The  fact  that  rationality  seems  nevertheless  to 
be  attributed  to  honor  in  the  apparently  logical 
justifications  which  the  ideal  is  so  repeatedly 
given  in  every  case  in  which  national  honor 
arises,  does  not  alter  the  fact  that  strictly 
speaking  honor  has  become  an  impulse,  an  emo- 
tion. Human  nature  takes  what  it  wants 
emotionally,  instinctively  and  without  any  pre- 
viously deliberated  recognition  of  the  justice 
of  its  desire.  Reason  enters  only  as  an  "ex- 
post-facto  justification."  Frederick  the  Great 
used  to  say — "I  begin  by  taking;  later  I  shall 
find  pedants  to  show  that  I  was  quite  within  my 
rights."  So  himian  nature  might  be  said  to  feel 
a  similar  assurance  instinctively,  i.e.,  that  ra- 
tional justification  will  automatically  follow 
upon  the  expression  of  the  most  purely  emo- 
tional impulses, 


THE  EMOTIONAL  BASIS  OF  HONOR     91 

This  attempted  rational  justification  in  the 
case  of  national  honor  is  the  more  surprising 
in  view  of  the  fact  that  it  is  generally  recog- 
nized as  an  emotion  by  the  very  men  who 
so  try  to  defend  it.  The  pre-rational  character 
of  the  emotion  of  honor  is,  when  it  is  regarded  as 
a  detached  psychological  problem,  almost  uni- 
versally admitted;  yet  in  spite  of  this  admission 
men  go  on  to  explain  the  rationality  of  it  just 
the  same.  The  position  is  illustrated  by  Mr. 
Gilbert  Murray  who,  starting  from  the  premise 
that  honor  is  a  "sentiment  not  to  be  justified 
in  reason"  proceeds  nevertheless  to  eulogize  it  as 
a  rational  ideal  on  the  very  same  page  on  which 
he  admits  its  essentially  emotional  character.  If 
the  purpose  of  this  quotation  were  to  point  out 
merely  an  accidental  contradiction,  it  would  have 
been  omitted,  but  this  stand,  impossible  as  it  is, 
is  almost  generally  assumed  by  men  who  talk  of 
honor.  When  frankly  put  to  them  they  usually 
admit  that  it  is  an  emotion,  but  this  does  not  seem 
to  vitiate  the  ethical  and  rational  defense  which 
they  go  on  to  present  in  the  same  breath.  By  a 
mental  somersault  the  ex-post- facto  justification 
is  taken  out  of  its  chronological  order  and  as- 
sumed to  be  the  preconceived  rational  incentive 
and  stimulus  of  the  emotional  activity. 

Mr.  Gilbert  Murray  says — 


92  WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

"A  deal  of  nonsense  no  doubt  is  talked  about 
honor  and  dishonor.  They  are  feelings  based  on 
sentiment  not  on  reason.  The  standards  by 
which  they  are  judged  are  often  conventional  or 
shallow  and  sometimes  utterly  false.  Yet  honor 
and  dishonor  are  real  things.  7  will  not  try  to 
define  them,  but  will  only  notice  that  like  religion 
their  characteristic  is  that  they  admit  of  no  bar- 
gaining. Indeed  we  can  almost  think  of  honor 
as  being  that  which  a  free  man  values  more  than 
life,  and  dishonor  as  that  which  he  avoids  more 
than  suffering  or  death.  And  the  important 
point  for  us  is  that  there  are  such  things. 

"There  are  some  people,  followers  of  Tolstoi 
who  accept  this  position  so  far  as  dying  is  con- 
cerned, but  will  have  nothing  to  do  with  killing. 
Passive  resistance  they  say  is  right;  martyrdom 
is  right;  but  to  resist  violence  by  violence  is  sin. 

"I  was  once  walking  with  a  friend  and  dis- 
ciple of  Tolstoi's  in  a  country  lane;  and  a  little 
girl  was  running  in  front  of  us.  I  put  to  him  the 
well-known  question — 'Suppose  you  saw  a  man 
wicked  or  drunk  or  mad,  run  out  and  attack  that 
child.  You  are  a  big  man  and  carry  a  big  stick; 
would  you  not  stop  him  and  if  necessary  knock 
him  down?' 

"'No,'  he  said;  'why  should  I  commit  a  sin? 
I  would  try  to  persuade  him,  I  would  stand  in 


THE  EMOTIONAL  BASIS  OF  HONOR      93 

his  way,  I  would  let  him  kill  me,  but  I  would  not 
strike  him.' 

"Some  few  people  will  always  be  found,  less 
than  one  in  a  thousand  to  take  this  view.  They 
will  say,  'Let  the  little  girl  be  killed  or  carried 
off;  let  the  wicked  man  commit  another  wicked- 
ness; I  at  any  rate  will  not  add  to  the  mass  of 
useless  violence  that  I  see  all  around  me.' 

"With  such  persons  one  cannot  reason  though 
one  can  often  respect  them.  Nearly  every  nor- 
mal man  will  feel  that  the  real  sin,  the  real  dis- 
honor lies  in  allowing  an  abominable  act  to  be 
committed  under  your  eyes  while  you  have  the 
strength  to  prevent  it."  ("Faith,  War  and 
Policy,"  p.  26.) 

Here  we  have  the  frank  admission  that  honor 
impulses  are  "feelings  based  on  sentiment  not  on 
reason."  In  the  next  breath  Mr.  Murray  as- 
sumes these  imj^ulses  can  and  ought  to  be  ra- 
tionally defended. 

When  the  fallacy  is  not  the  common  one  of 
separating  the  recognition  of  the  emotional  qual- 
ity of  honor  from  an  independent  rational  justifi- 
cation, it  is  often  the  equally  untenable  fallacy  of 
attributing  an  ethical  "tone"  to  what  is  conceded 
to  be  impulsive  conduct.  The  admittedly  unra- 
tionalized  emotion  is  by  some  strange  logic  never- 
theless erected  into  an  apotheosis  of  pure  reason 


94.  WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

and  eulogized  as  such.  When  the  discrepancy  is 
pointed  out  between  the  admission  of  honor  as  an 
emotion,  and  the  justification  of  it  as  a  rational 
ideal,  men  shrink  from  the  inevitable  inference 
that  suggests  itself  and  usually  will  go  on  to  show 
the  "holiness  of  instinct."  Mr.  Rumelin  in  his 
suggestive  little  work  on  "Politics  and  the  Moral 
Law"  says  for  example, 

"It  is  well-known  and  perhaps  a  fortunate  fact 
that  we  are  not  dependent  upon  the  keenness  and 
clearness  of  our  reasoning  faculty  alone  to  teach 
us  what  we  ought  and  ought  not  to  do.  We 
have  an  inner  guide  in  those  natural  impulses 
which  spontaneously  cause  us  to  turn  in  one  di- 
rection or  another.  Though  not  infallible  these 
impulses  are  seldom  entirely  wrong,  and  we  find 
that  not  infrequently  blind  tact  gives  answer  to 
the  most  difficult  and  complicated  questions  long 
before  the  wisdom  of  the  wise  has  found  a  solu- 
tion. On  the  other  hand  when  we  attempt  to 
analyze  these  impulses  we  seem  to  be  in  a  position 
similar  to  that  of  a  somnambulist  who  having 
walked  with  a  sure  step  upon  dark  and  dangerous 
ways  is  suddenly  awakened,  and  stops  confused 
and  helpless,  not  knowing  how  and  whence  he 
came.  ...  Is  politics,  i.e.,  the  untrammeled 
practice,  of  public  affairs,  subject  to  the  moral 


THE  EMOTIONAL  BASIS  OF  HONOR      95 

law,  or  does  it  follow  laws  of  its  own?"  (p.  24). 

The  admission  of  honor  as  an  emotion  or  senti- 
ment runs  side  by  side  in  political  literature  with 
elaborate  ethical  and  rational  defenses  of  it. 
Herman  Merivale  in  the  second  edition  of  his 
work  "Colonization,"  (p.  675),  stresses  the  im- 
portance of  honor  which  "statesmen  cannot  dis- 
regard" and  calls  it  an  "impulse." 

"To  retain  or  abandon  a  dominion  is  not  an 
issue  which  will  ever  be  determined  on  the  mere 
balance  of  profit  or  loss,  not  on  the  more  refined 
but  even  less  powerful  motives  supplied  by  ab- 
stract pohtical  philosophy.  The  sense  of  Na- 
tional Honor;  the  pride  of  blood,  the  tenacious 
spirt  of  self-defense,  the  sympathies  of  kindred 
conmiunities,  the  instincts  of  a  dominant  race, 
the  vague  but  generous  desire  to  spread  one's 
civilization  and  our  religion  over  the  world ;  these 
are  impulses  which  the  student  in  his  closet  may 
disregard,  but  the  statesman  does  not."     (1861) 

At  the  risk  of  appearing  over-rational  and  of 
apparently  ignoring  the  aesthetic  appeal  which 
honor  makes  to  every  normally  constituted  man, 
my  object  in  this  work  is  to  show  that  by  all  tests 
which  can  be  applied,  honor  as  it  is  popularly  con- 
ceived, is  strictly  speaking,  an  emotion,  with  only 
irrelevant  rational  accretions — which  do  not  es- 


96  WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

sentially  belong  to  the  ideal  but  which  in  the 
course  of  development  have  grown  to  be  a  part 
of  it. 

Though  I  believe  that  honor  is  an  emotion,  I  do 
not  mean  to  contend  that  that  in  itself  is  sufficient 
reason  for  deprecating  it  or  for  ignoring  its  com- 
mands. Emotions  are  the  creative  forces  of  life 
and  are  at  the  base  of  every  humanitarian 
activity,  every  work  of  art,  all  invention,  science 
and  literature.  But  when  we  admit  this  we  are 
using  the  word  emotion  in  a  very  unscientific  way 
to  mean  the  most  general  constructive  forces 
of  hmiian  nature.  For  the  purpose  of  this 
work  it  is  necessary  to  distinguish  between 
emotions  that  accompany  constructive  instincts 
such  as  the  parental  instinct,  and  those  that 
accompany  destructive  instincts  such  as  pugnac- 
ity and  fear,  at  the  same  time  keeping  distinct 
such  a  midway  instinct  as  self-assertion  which  is 
both.  If  honor  were  a  distillation  of  the  con- 
structive instincts  and  manifested  itself  only  in 
such  legitimate  expressions  as  defense  of  hearth 
and  home,  justice,  himianity  and  other  elevated 
aspirations,  the  assertion  and  proof  that  it  is 
essentially  an  emotion  would  be  nothing  in  its 
disfavor.  It  is  true  that  a  political  concept  is 
in  bad  taste  when  it  is  purely  an  emotion,  but  if 


THE  EMOTIONAL  BASIS  OF  HONOR      97 

that  were  the  only  objection  here,  honor  might 
well  afford  to  remain  in  all  its  sacred  emotional 
glamor;  for  the  end,  ie.,  righteousness  and  hu- 
manity, would  more  than  justify  the  means  that 
attained  them. 

If,  on  the  other  hand,  it  has,  as  I  maintain, 
grown,  through  misuse,  to  be  largely  the  accom- 
panying emotion  of  the  destructive  instincts  and 
impulses  of  human  nature,  such  as  hatred,  pug- 
nacity, fear,  suspicion,  greed,  and  the  small- 
boy-chip-on-the-shoulder  attitude;  then  this 
honor  is  not  a  beautiful  thing  to  be  left  in 
emotional  obscurity  and  allowed  to  work  havoc 
with  our  civilization.  The  honor  which  made 
America  go  to  war  in  defense  of  Cuba  was  a  re- 
sult of  the  constructive  parental  instinct  (INIc- 
Dougall's  classification)  working  on  a  national 
scale  and  therefore  hardly  to  be  deprecated.  But 
a  war  of  conquest  which  is  the  outgi'owth  of  the 
instinct  of  acquisitiveness  is  the  much  more  fre- 
quent expression  of  honor,  and  this  cannot  be 
said  to  be  beautiful  or  holy  simply  because  it  is 
an  emotion. 

When  that  which  is  regarded  as  an  ethical 
ideal  loses  its  essentially  reasonable  charac- 
ter, and  the  blind  residual  feeling  becomes 
the   motive    force   for   the   inception    and   per- 


98  WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

petiiation  of  the  greatest  crime  of  civilization,  it 
is  no  longer  a  beautiful  thing  to  be  respected,  but 
a  criminal  taint  to  be  wiped  out  by  all  the  re- 
lentless forces  of  logic. 


CHAPTER  V 

TESTING   FOR   RATIONALITY 

Honor  can  not  be  rational  unless  it  can  be  shown 
that  it  has  been  conceived  at  least  largely  by 
reason  and  unless  its  modus  operandi  and  expres- 
sions can  be  justified  in  reason.  All  action  be- 
comes rational  only  when  the  end  is  clearly  ap- 
prehended and  the  means  to  attain  that  end 
calmly  calculated  before  hand.  These  are  so 
clearly  conceived  that  the  recognition  of  them  in- 
duces action  and  actuates  the  will.  That  is  to 
say,  the  action  of  emotion  may  more  accurately 
be  described  as  a  yielding ;  rational  conduct  usu- 
ally requires  an  effort  which  is  sustained  by  a 
recognition  of  the  objective  goal.  If  honor  is  to 
be  admitted  into  the  domain  of  reason,  its  activity 
must  embrace  a  deliberate  consideration  of  the 
means  and  the  consequences  of  what  is  to  be 
brought  about;  and  in  this  process  it  cannot  vio- 
late any  of  the  logical  requirements  demanded  of 
other  reasonable  conceptions  and  activities. 

At  the  outset,  we  are  forced  to  concede  that  at 
best  the  "end"  of  honor  is  very  vaguely  conceived. 

99 


100        WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

Before  a  thing  can  be  said  to  be  conceived  it  must 
admit  of  at  least  approximate  definition.  Defini- 
tion is  only  another  way  of  labeling  the  end. 
The  impossibility  of  defining  honor  even  in  the 
most  unsatisfactory  way  is  evident  from  the  fact 
that  the  Second  Hague  Conference  deliberately 
avoided  this  embarrassing  task.  A  review  of 
the  conflicting  and  confused  utterances  con- 
tained in  the  Symposium  attest  the  nebulous 
and  elusive  character  of  it.  It  is  elastic,  vague 
and  all-embracing  and  consequently  even  the 
most  general  definition  would  do  violence  to  com- 
mon usage.  Insistence  upon  definition  or  enun- 
ciation of  an  ideal  supposedly  rational  is  not  a 
rigorous  test;  it  is  the  most  legitimate  test  that 
can  be  applied  to  determine  rationality.  No  one 
would  think  of  admitting  that  the  duty  a  husband 
owes  to  his  wife,  or  a  father  to  his  son,  or  our 
ideal  of  honesty,  or  justice,  or  in  fact  any  of  our 
moral  ideals,  can  not  be  satisfactorily  defined. 
Ideals  can  be  fully  justified  in  reason  and  to  ask 
this  for  honor  is  not  to  be  exacting.  Yet  na- 
tional honor  begs  to  be  excused  from  the  difficult 
task  of  defending  itself  in  the  Court  of  Reason 
and  through  its  speechless  embarrassment  stands 
self-convicted.  The  mass  of  contradictory  ex- 
pressions which  are  gathered  together  elsewhere, 
and  which  would  be  the  legitimate  material  for 


TESTING  FOR  RATIONALITY  101 

definition,  only  emphasizes  its  irrational  char- 
acter. 

This  difficulty  with  regard  to  definition  makes 
men  naturally  avoid  asking  pointed  questions 
about  it.  In  fact  there  has  been  so  consistent  a 
recognition  of  this  evasiveness  on  the  part  of 
statesmen  that  few  have  dared  to  do  so,  perhaps 
out  of  compliance  with  a  sort  of  "gentleman's 
agreement."  In  the  case  of  personal  honor  we 
have  passed  the  stage  where  people  are  timid 
about  asking  for  a  reasonable  defense  of  it  in  each 
peculiar  case,  but  we  have  not  yet  arrived  at  the 
point  when  a  man  is  able  to  answer  the  question 
without  feeling  a  slight  suggestion  of  having  com- 
promised himself  thereby.  The  following  illus- 
tration taken  from  a  popular  magazine  story  is 
typical  of  this  delicate  evasiveness. 

"I  am  a  gentleman." 

"Oh,  are  you?  How  amusing.  How  very 
amusing  to  be  a  gentleman  and  not  a  man.  I 
suppose  that  is  what  it  means  to  be  a  gentleman ; 
to  have  no  thought  outside  your  career." 

"Outside  my  honor  none." 

"And  might  I  ask  what  is  your  honor?"  She 
spoke  in  extreme  irony. 

"Yes,  you  may  ask,"  he  replied  coolly.  "But 
if  you  don't  know  without  being  told,  I  am  afraid 
that  I  cannot  explain  it." 


102        WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

In  the  case  of  nations  it  is  clear  that  opposi- 
tion to  all  inclusive  arbitration  treaties  arises 
from  the  fact  that  honor  cannot  be  defined,  and 
that  therefore  there  are  no  standards  or  criteria 
by  which  it  can  be  fairly  judged  and  arbitrated. 
So  long  as  honor  comprises  such  a  multiplicity  of 
confused  ends,  it  cannot  be  classified  as  a  rational 
ideal.  Not  only  is  the  end  of  honor  as  an  ab- 
straction, vague,  but  the  end  of  honor  in  any 
specific  dispute  is  equally  obscure.  The  fact  that 
a  nation  is  unanimous  in  such  cases,  is  no  indi- 
cation of  its  obvious  rationality,  or  of  the  fact 
that  every  individual  who  so  stoutly  wishes  to 
defend  his  country's  honor,  knows  just  what  that 
honor  happens  to  consist  in  at  the  time.  In  fact 
it  makes  little  difference  to  him,  for  the  patriotic 
attitude  is,  "My  country  right  or  wrong."  One 
of  our  most  prominent  publicists  states  this 
position  in  unequivocal  terms. 

"In  the  place  of  the  old  motto,  'my  country 
right  or  wrong,'  we  are  told  that  we  should  adopt 
that  other  motto,  *My  country  when  right  and 
when  wrong  to  be  put  right.'  But  who  is  to  be 
judge  as  between  you  and  your  country?  Is  it 
the  full  measure  of  patriotic  citizenship  to  be  for 
your  country  when  it  agrees  with  you  and  against 
it  when  it  does  not?  I  cannot  so  estimate  the 
impulses  of  loyalty.     In  the  great  tribunal  of 


TESTING  FOR  RATIONALITY  103 

public  opinion  I  shall  strive  always  to  bring  my 
countrymen  to  the  adoption  of  my  views,  but  if 
their  judgment  differing  from  mine  becomes  the 
basis  for  national  action  and  the  cause  of  na- 
tional conflict,  I  can  find  no  satisfaction  in  the 
triumph  of  my  country's  foe;  neither  logic  nor 
pride  of  opinion  will  soften  the  pain  with  which 
I  greet  the  death  of  its  defenders;  with  all  my 
heart  and  soul  and  hopes  and  prayers,  I  am  al- 
ways for  my  country  and  its  victory;  and  in  no 
other  spirit  do  I  see  aught  but  discord,  the  disso- 
lution of  allegiance  and  the  death  of  loyalty." 

Since  patriotism  demands  that  a  country's 
honor  must  be  defended  regardless  or  whether 
the  honor  be  based  upon  right  or  wrong,  it  is  not 
surprising  that  men  should  be  unwilling  to  in- 
quire into  the  validity  of  the  specific  case.  A 
rational  recognition  of  his  country  in  the  wi'ong 
would  perhaps  take  a  little  of  his  zest  away,  and 
this  must  not  be  allowed  in  any  event,  for  it  is 
my  country's  honor,  right  or  wrong.  This  is  not 
a  case  of  reductio  ad  absurdum  but  a  simple  case 
of  accepting  the  most  obvious  inference  follow- 
ing upon  this  position.  When  men  go  to  war, 
though  they  know  their  country  to  be  wrong  ra- 
tionally, it  is  not  human  nature  for  them  to  really 
believe  so.  Their  country  is  right  even  when  it 
is  wrong  and  honorable  even  in  its  dishonor. 


104.        WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

Tennysou's  paradox  gives  us  this  moral  confu- 
sion. 

"His  honor  rooted  in  dishonor  stood, 
And  faith  unfaitliful  kept  him  falsely  true." 

It  is  no  wonder  that  in  all  this  moral  confusion 
an  attempt  at  definition  is  a  delicate  task  and  has 
been  consistently  avoided. 

If  honor  cannot  and  need  not  be  defined,  there 
is  obviously  no  need  of  universalizing  it.  But 
universality  is  a  prerequisite  of  rationality. 
Given  the  assumption  that  it  is  wrong  for  France 
to  violate  Belgian  neutrality,  then  it  is  equally 
wrong  for  England  to  do  so.  Or  if  it  is  wrong 
for  Germany  to  impose  its  form  of  government 
on  England  then  it  is  wrong  for  England  to  com- 
mit the  same  offense  upon  Germany.  Rational 
ideals  are  universal  and  if  they  do  not  work  in 
every  situation  they  at  least  must  work  both 
ways. 

The  test  of  universality  shows  honor  to  be 
irrational.  For  example  England  demanded  to 
be  consulted  in  the  Morocco  treaty  but  unreason- 
ably refused  to  allow  Germany  this  privilege; 
and  the  interesting  thing  is  that  she  defended 
these  contradictory  positions  by  insisting  that 
they  were  both  obhgations  of  her  national  honor. 
(See     Symposium.)      Germany    to-day    would 


TESTING  FOR  RATIONALITY  105 

be  perfectly  willing  to  dominate  other  races, 
but  she  would  rather  be  wiped  off  the  map 
than  submit  to  domination.  In  fact  the  whole 
principle  of  this  aspect  of  honor  consists  in  a 
recognition  that  another  nation  will  submit  to 
what  we  would  never  submit.  In  fact  be- 
cause honor  lacks  the  quality  of  universality, 
it  is  nothing  more  than  a  dignified  expression 
of  the  simple  rule  of  right  which  a  Moham- 
medan once  enunciated.  When  asked  what  was 
right,  he  replied,  "It  is  right  for  me  to  take 
my  neighbor's  wife."  "And  wrong?"  "For 
my  neighbor  to  take  my  wife,"  he  returned 
sharply. 

The  application  of  our  rational  ideals  can  not 
stop  at  rivers  and  mountains.  And  likewise  the 
mere  difference  in  the  particular  object  of  a  na- 
tional mission  does  not  alter  the  universal  fact 
that  spreading  such  missions  by  force  is  either 
wrong  in  every  case  or  wrong  in  no  case. 

Another  fallacy  is  committed  in  what  might  be 
called  the  granted  premise.  The  error  of  "beg- 
ging the  question"  is  perhaps  the  most  frequent 
and  persistent  in  the  discussion  of  honor  disputes. 
The  men  who  would  suppress  all  opposition  to 
a  proposed  war  even  going  so  far  as  physical 
violence,  defend  their  extreme  measures  on  the 
theory  that  a  man  who  will  not  uphold  the  honor 


106        WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

of  his  country  is  a  traitor,  and  that  no  punish- 
ment is  adequate  for  him.  This  may  be  true, 
but  the  premise  which  is  taken  for  granted  in 
condemning  such  men,  is  the  very  thing  which 
the  alleged  traitor  refuses  to  admit,  namely,  that 
in  the  war  proposed,  genuine  honor  is  at  stake. 
The  whole  justification  for  his  stand  is  that  the 
point  at  issue  does  not  involve  rational  honor; 
but  militarists  and  patriots  refuse  to  meet  such 
pacifists  on  the  plane  of  this  premise,  and  rail 
against  them  on  the  unfair  assumption  that  they 
will  not  fight  for  honor.  Voltaire  has  well  said 
that  much  discussion  could  be  obviated  if  men 
only  defined  their  positions. 

The  following  quotation  from  Lord  Russell 
represents  this  fallacy,  in  a  slightly  different 
way. 

"That  (Alabama  claims)  is  a  question  of 
honor  which  we  will  not  arbitrate,  for  England's 
honor  can  never  be  made  the  subject  of  arbitra- 
tion." 

Now  the  premise  which  was  taken  for 
granted  here  and  not  argued  out  on  its  own 
merits,  is  that  the  Alabama  claims  was  a  ques- 
tion of  honor.  Nobody  thought  of  asking  the 
question  at  the  time— "Are  the  Alabama  claims 
something  which  offends  British  honor?"  That 
was  taken  for  granted  just  as  all  such  statements 


TESTING  FOR  RATIONALITY  107 

made  by  the  "custodians  of  the  national  honor" 
are  taken  on  faith.  The  argument  and  interest 
never  revolve  about  the  genuineness  or  falseness 
of  the  point  of  honor,  but  about  the  question 
whether  it  ought  to  be  resented  or  arbitrated. 
The  very  ring  of  the  sentence — "That  is  a 
question  of  honor  which  we  will  never  arbi- 
trate for  England's  honor  can  never  he  made 
the  subject  of  arhitrationf'  suggests  where  the 
psychological  stress  really  lies.  If  there  is  any 
debate  it  may  possibly  be  in  connection  with  the 
wisdom  of  arbitrating  the  honor ;  but  the  peremp- 
tory tone  of  the  first  part  of  the  sentence — "that 
is  a  question  of  honor  which  we  will  not  arbi- 
trate"— precludes  all  rational  questioning  on  that 
score. 

This  granted  premise  creeps  in  so  quietly, 
especially  when  men  are  being  swayed  by  Chau- 
vinism, that  it  is  not  noticed,  and  if  some  very 
skeptical  individual  does  observe  it,  he  wisely 
keeps  his  mouth  shut. 

An  exact  parallel  of  this  fallacy  is  given  by 
James  who  draws  this  illustration  of  an  irrational 
process  containing  a  granted  premise. 

"Suppose  I  say  when  offered  a  piece  of  cloth, 
— 'I  won't  buy  that;  it  looks  as  if  it  would  fade'; 
— meaning  merely  that  something  about  it  sug- 
gests the  idea  of  fading  to  my  mind.     My  judg- 


108        WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

merit  though  possibly  correct  is  not  reasoned  but 
purely  empirical;  but  if  I  can  say  that  into  the 
color  there  enters  a  certain  dye  which  I  know  to 
be  chemically  unstable,  and  that  therefore  the 
color  will  fade,  my  judgment  is  reasoned." 

In  excluding  from  its  jurisdiction  disputes  in- 
volving honor  the  Hague  in  a  somewhat  similar 
way  took  for  granted,  as  needing  no  justification, 
the  very  thing  which,  above  all  other  material  of 
international  discord,  needed  to  be  defined. 

The  definition  of  honor  was  taken  for  granted, 
and  no  one  at  the  Conference  dared  to  ask  for 
enlightenment  on  this  very  interesting  point. 
The  same  timidity  which  is  shown  by  ordinary 
citizens  toward  the  question — "Does  this  dispute 
involve  our  honor?" — was  shown  by  the  delegates 
at  the  Hague  toward  the  question — "What  is 
national  honor?"  Both  these  questions  show  a 
spii'it  of  cold  calculation  toward  a  sentiment  that 
is  woven  into  the  emotional  and  assthetic  nature 
of  men.  The  only  way  in  which  one  may  show 
a  proper  appreciation  of  the  sentiments,  there- 
fore, is  not  to  question  the  validity  of  any  of  the 
premises  upon  which  it  rests.  The  sentiment 
makes  a  very  strong  dramatic  appeal  and  to  look 
beneath  this  brings  upon  the  earnest  thinker  the 
stigma  of  cowardice  and  disloyalty.  Men  re- 
spond only  to  the  dramatic  quality  of  honor  and 


TESTING  FOR  RATIONALITY  109 

since  this  quality  reaches  its  highest  expression 
on  an  emotional  foundation,  it  is  no  wonder  that 
men  should  care  little  about  rational  justifica- 
tion. Honor  may  be  rooted  in  dishonor,  yet  it 
has  the  same  beauty  as  if  it  were  planted  in  the 
Garden  of  Eden.  It  is  like  a  castle  in  the  air; 
we  see  its  beauty  entirely  disconnected  from  a 
substantial  foundation.  A  foundation  is  taken 
for  gi'anted ;  if  it  is  not  there,  an  improvised  one 
can  be  erected;  if  that  is  impossible  the  castle 
appears  to  have  sufficient  buoyancy  to  hang  in 
the  air  just  the  same.  Honor  appears  to  be  its 
own  justification;  it  is  the  end  which  in  true 
Jesuit  fashion  sanctifies  the  means.  .  .  .  When 
the  false  premises  are  pointed  out  the  structure 
does  not  fall  but  becomes  stronger  and  firmer. 
The  miracle  which  the  Irishman  expected  to  per- 
form is  attained  here.  Having  piled  a  number 
of  boxes  on  top  of  each  other  he  found  that  he 
needed  one  more  to  reach  the  first  story  and  so 
he  suggested  to  his  friend  that  they  take  the 
bottom  box  out  and  place  it  on  the  top. 

Another  difficulty  is  the  readiness  with  which 
men  draw  inferences  by  automatic  association. 
Honor  and  war  have  for  centuries  been  insepara- 
bly associated,  so  that  try  as  we  may  to  associate 
peace  and  honor  we  have  the  neurone  associa- 
tions against  us.     Just  as  honor  and  war  form 


110        WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

one  distinct  associative  process,  so  peace  and 
cowardice  form  another,  and  reason  though  we 
may,  the  power  of  these  automatic  processes  can 
not  be  decreased,  and  its  influence  on  our  think- 
ing nuHified.  The  recognition  of  this,  therefore, 
gives  the  mihtarist  a  certain  advantage  in  a  dis- 
pute. The  mechanical  associations  which  spring 
up  around  honor  are  many  and  beautiful — cour- 
age, strength,  sacrifice,  national  emblems,  music, 
poetry,  and  all  the  aesthetic  and  emotional  rami- 
fications of  these.  But  the  thought  of  an  honor- 
able peace  makes  no  such  automatic  connections. 

I  will  have  more  to  say  on  this  point  of  the 
attractiveness  of  honor  through  mental  and  emo- 
tional associations  elsewhere,  but  for  the  present 
it  is  only  necessary  to  admit  the  demoralizing  in- 
fluence of  these  automatic  associations  upon  the 
rational  quality  of  the  ideal.  When  a  subject 
must  be  judged  on  the  merits  and  logic  of  each 
case,  it  is  necessary  if  we  wish  our  inference  to 
be  genuine,  to  approach  the  case  without  bias 
or  prejudice.  In  so  far  as  we  approach  it  with, 
such  bias  our  judgment  must  necessarily  be  col- 
ored. We  must  strip  our  minds  of  these  accre- 
tions of  automatic  associations  if  we  wish  to  at- 
tain to  a  really  reasoned  judgment. 

The  foolishness  of  this  inveterate  association  of 
honor  and  war  becomes  obvious  when  we  con- 


TESTING  FOR  RATIONALITY  111 

sider  that  in  almost  every  war  either  one  or  both 
sides  were,  according  to  the  judgment  of  his- 
tory, wrong.  The  axiomatic  truth  which  we 
must  draw  from  this,  is  that  a  nation  stands  an 
equal  chance  of  being  wrong  and  of  its  true 
honor  lying  more  rationally  with  the  alterna- 
tive of  peace.  But  in  spite  of  the  equal  lia- 
bility to  error  which  every  nation  should  feel  in 
every  dispute  that  may  arise,  the  automatic 
processes  are  altogether  on  the  side  of  the  war 
alternative,  with  the  absoluteness  of  infallibility. 
With  such  a  psychological  handicap  it  is  no  won- 
der that  men  cannot  approach  each  case  in  a 
scientific  spirit  and  accept  the  impersonal  con- 
clusion which  a  free  and  unfettered  intellect 
might  be  compelled  to  draw. 

Having  assured  ourselves  that  honor  has  none 
of  the  distinguishing  ear-marks  of  a  rational  ideal, 
we  will  consider  the  only  alternative  which  is 
left — whether  it  has  any  or  all  of  the  distinctive 
traits  of  an  emotion. 


CHAPTER  VI 

TESTING   FOR   AN   EMOTION 

The  tests  applied  in  the  last  chapter  prove  with 
a  fair  amount  of  conclusiveness  that  honor  is  not 
a  rational  concept  by  any  psychological  test  that 
can  be  applied;  that  it  lacks  the  most  essential 
characteristics  of  rationality  both  in  the  way  it  is 
conceived,  and  in  the  mode  of  its  expression. 
And  in  determining  its  irrational  quality  we  have 
laid  the  foundations  for  determining  what  it 
must  as  the  only  alternative  be,  that  is,  an  emo- 
tion; for  the  first  requisite  of  emotion  is  irration- 
ality. It  will  appear  that  just  as  honor  lacks 
every  characteristic  of  a  rational  concept,  it  con- 
tains every  quality  of  an  emotion. 

Next  to  irrationality,  the  most  characteristic 
thing  about  emotion  is  uniformity,  or  unanimity 
of  reaction  to  a  given  situation  among  any  large 
group  of  people.  When  millions  of  people  con- 
fined within  one  set  of  geographical  boundaries, 
can  agree  among  themselves  and  at  the  same  time 
disagree  diametrically  with  millions  of  people 
within  another  set  of  boundaries,  it  is  difficult  to 

112 


TESTING  FOR  AN  EMOTION  113 

explain  the  uniformity  within  the  two  opposing 
camps  in  any  other  way  than  as  being  due  to  the 
contagion  of  emotion.  The  fervor  with  which 
every  Enghshman  but  Russell  is  convinced  that 
Germany  ought  to  be  crushed;  the  accord  with 
which  every  German  but  Liebknecht  cries,  "Gott 
Strafe  England;"  the  certainty  with  which  every 
Frenchman  but  Holland  regards  Germany  as  the 
aggressor;  these  instances  of  unanimous  convic- 
tion emphasize  the  extreme  mental  vigor  that 
is  required  to  detach  oneself  from  the  influence 
of  national  consciousness,  and  prove  that  na- 
tional assurance  in  a  war  of  national  honor  is  not 
based  upon  reason  which  is  peculiar  to  the  indi- 
vidual, but  inspired  by  emotion  which  is  common 
to  all.  On  questions  of  science,  religion,  moral- 
ity, law,  men  following  their  rational  impulses 
are  divided;  on  matters  of  honor  there  is  always 
within  any  country  a  unanimous  bias.  This  is 
not  an  accident  of  rational  uniformity,  but  the  in- 
evitable result  of  emotional  infection.  If  such 
unanimity  happened  within  the  confines  of  a 
country  once  or  twice  it  would  even  then  be 
stretching  a  point  to  regard  it  as  the  mere  coin- 
cidence arising  from  independent  judgments. 
But  when  a  country  is  known  to  be  one  and  to 
present  a  united  front  in  every  war  of  honor; 
when  differences  of  opinion  on  resenting  honor 


114        WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

offenses  are  almost  non-existent;  when  Con- 
gresses and  Reichstags  vote  to  defend  honor  by 
unanimous  assent,  we  can  no  longer  depend  upon 
the  law  of  chance  to  explain  the  alignment  of 
independent  rational  judgments  into  such  solid 
geographical  phalanxes.  Thought  is  not  conta- 
gious ;  if  it  were  some  of  our  most  serious  educa- 
tional problems  would  be  solved. 

What  is  wanted  in  a  nation  in  time  of  crisis  is 
action,  and  action  cannot  be  secured  as  a  result 
of  critical  conflicting  thought.  The  prerequisite 
to  effective  action  is  unanimity  and  unanimit}^ 
can  only  be  achieved  through  the  medium  of  the 
emotions  and  feelings.  And  though  we  may 
agree  that  national  efliciency  in  the  sense  of  ac- 
complishing an  object  independently  of  its  jus- 
tice or  injustice,  wisdom,  or  foolishness,  requires 
unanimity,  the  explanation  of  this  unanimity  of 
thought  on  the  basis  of  accident,  is  nevertheless 
inadequate. 

How  much  more  easily  this  uniformity  is  ex- 
plained when  we  think  of  honor  as  an  emotion. 
Given  an  emotional  situation  and  it  can  be  safely 
predicted  that  every  normal  man  and  child  will 
react  in  exactly  the  same  way  with  only  slight  dif- 
ference in  the  degree  of  reaction  due  to  individ- 
ual peculiarity.     The  contact  with  a  slimy  wrig- 


TESTING  FOR  AN  EMOTION  115 

gly  thing  will  almost  universally  inspire  an  emo- 
tion of  disgust.  Equally,  every  normal  person 
will  feel  the  tender  emotion  of  protection  toward 
a  child  that  is  being  mistreated.  The  basic  ap- 
peal of  literature,  drama,  music,  in  fact,  all  art, 
is  its  emotional  quality  which  calls  forth  a  uni- 
versal and  inevitable  response.  Even  when  we 
have  decided  that  rationally  it  is  better  not  to 
yield  to  certain  impulses,  such  as  helping  an  un- 
worthy beggar,  we  still  react  uniformly  and  re- 
sist with  an  effort,  if  we  do  resist,  the  impulse 
which  we  cannot  help  feeling  nevertheless. 

The  instinct  which  explains  this  uniformity  of 
emotional  response  to  what  is  admittedly  an  in- 
tellectual problem,  is  the  gregarious  instinct, 
"the  consciousness  of  kind."  The  gregarious 
instinct  kills  more  independent  thinking  than  all 
the  bad  intellectual  processes  of  our  school  sys- 
tems. Under  the  influence  of  this  powerful 
instinct  men  either  unconsciously  fall  into  line 
with  the  general  attitude  without  reasoning  on 
their  own  part,  gravitating  toward  the  current 
attitude  emotionally;  or  they  fall  into  line  con- 
sciously though  they  disapprove  of  the  popular 
trend,  preferring  to  violate  promptings  of  their 
own  reason,  rather  than  to  ignore  the  incessant 
tugging  at  the  heart  to  follow  the  crowd.     In  the 


116        WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

one  case  reason  does  not  enter  at  all,  and  in  the 
other  it  is  forcibly  expelled  when  it  does  enter. 
In  both  cases  the  result  is  unanimity. 

Professor  Giddings  regards  the  "consciousness 
of  kind"  as  the  basic  principle  of  social  organiza- 
tion.    He  says — 

"In  its  widest  extension  the  consciousness  of 
kind  marks  off  the  animate  from  the  inanimate. 
Within  the  wide  class  of  the  animal  it  marks  off 
species  from  races.  Within  racial  lines  the  con- 
sciousness of  kind  underlies  the  more  definite 
ethical  and  political  groupings,  it  is  the  basis  of 
class  distinctions,  of  innumerable  forms  of  alli- 
ances, of  rules  of  intercourse  and  of  peculiarities 
of  policy.  Our  conduct  toward  those  whom  we 
feel  to  be  most  like  ourselves  is  instinctively  and 
rationally  different  from  our  conduct  towards 
others,  whom  we  believe  to  be  less  like  ourselves. 
Again  it  is  the  consciousness  of  kind  and  nothing 
else,  which  distinguishes  social  conduct  as  such 
from  purely  economic,  and  purely  political  or 
purely  religious  conduct,  for  in  actual  life  it  con- 
stantly interferes  with  the  theoretically  perfect 
operation  of  the  economic,  political,  or  religious 
motive.  The  workingman  joins  a  strike  of  which 
he  does  not  approve  rather  than  cut  himself  off 
from  his  fellows.     For  a  similar  reason  the  man- 


TESTING  FOR  AN  EMOTION  117 

ufacturer  who  questions  the  value  of  protection 
to  his  own  industry  yet  pays  his  contribution  to 
the  protectionist  campaign  fund.  The  southern 
gentleman  who  believed  in  the  cause  of  the  union, 
none  the  less  threw  in  his  fortunes  with  the  con- 
federacy, if  he  felt  himself  to  be  one  of  the  South- 
ern people  and  a  stranger  to  the  people  of  the 
North.  The  liberalizing  of  creeds  is  accom- 
plished by  the  efforts  of  men  who  are  no  longer 
able  to  accept  the  traditional  dogma,  but  who  de- 
sire to  maintain  associations  which  it  would  be 
painful  to  sever.  In  a  word  it  is  about  the  con- 
sciousness of  kind  that  all  other  motives  organize 
themselves,  in  the  evolution  of  social  choice,  social 
volition,  or  social  'policy" 

The  salient  thing  about  this  "consciousness  of 
kind"  is  that  it  is  emotional;  that  it  operates  in 
the  dim  and  shadowy  orbs  of  emotional  associa- 
tions, carrying  as  satellites  to  it,  rational  accre- 
tions and  philosophic  speculations.  We  need 
but  to  take  an  extreme  case  to  see  that  the  ra- 
tional explanations  follow  in  the  wake  of  this 
emotional  consciousness  of  kind  with  its  deaden- 
ing influence  on  thought.  Mr.  Stewart  Cham- 
berlain's book  which  sets  out  to  prove  that  every- 
thing worth  while  that  was  ever  accomplished  in 
the  world,  had  a  Teutonic  origin,  is  a  position 


118        WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

which  has  many  emotional  adherents  in  Ger- 
many, and  is  changing  the  geographical  origin  of 
j^erfection  in  many  other  countries. 

The  conclusion  therefore  is  that  the  unanimity 
which  we  invariably  see  within  countries  when 
"honor  is  at  stake,"  is  not  due  to  any  uniform 
recognition  of  justice  either  through  the  instru- 
ment of  reason  or  divine  revelation,  but  that  it  is 
due  to  the  deadening  influence  of  the  gregarious 
instinct  upon  independent  thinking.  This  una- 
nimity must  have  an  emotional  cause,  for  una- 
nimity is  one  of  the  most  important  character- 
istics of  an  emotion. 

Directness  of  response  to  stimuli,  which  is  an- 
other characteristic  of  honor,  is  also  a  quality  of 
emotion,  not  of  reason.  Rationally  we  stop  to 
think  before  acting,  no  matter  for  how  short  an 
intei*val.  But  in  the  case  of  honor  we  resent 
directly.  Honor  insults  are  not  resented  after 
careful  thought  and  deliberation.  It  is  not  the 
thought  of  the  offense  which  makes  us  resent,  but 
it  is  the  apprehension  of  the  offense  itself  which 
directly  arouses  our  resentment  without  the  in- 
terposition of  any  thought  or  conscious  process 
at  all.  Some  reasonable  activity  may  follow  di- 
rectly after  the  resentment  is  spontaneously 
aroused,  but  this  is  not  to  say  that  reason  in  any 
way  enters  in  the  apprehension  of  the  offense. 


TESTING  FOR  AN  EMOTION  119 

In  other  words  we  do  not  want  to  strike  because 
we  think  of  the  abstraction  of  honor,  but  we  think 
of  the  abstraction  of  honor  because  we  feel  the 
impulse  to  strike. 

In  fact  the  more  directly,  that  is  to  say  the 
more  immediately,  an  offense  to  honor  is  resented 
and  the  less  the  consideration  or  thought  intro- 
duced between  the  time  the  offense  is  received 
and  the  time  that  it  is  resented,  the  more  virile  and 
honorable  a  nation  is  felt  to  be.  In  other  words 
the  quality  of  the  honor  deteriorates  in  direct 
proportion  to  the  amount  of  time  which  is  allowed 
for  the  purpose  of  thoughtful  consideration  to 
elapse,  between  the  time  of  offense  and  the  time 
of  vindication.  Consequently  a  nation  which 
pauses  to  examine  the  offense,  to  determine 
whether  it  is  real  or  fancied,  must,  according  to 
the  ideal  be  fundamentally  deficient  in  the  quality 
of  its  national  honor. 

This  melodramatic  quality  of  immediate  re- 
sentment to  offenses  of  honor,  of  spontaneous 
and  instantaneous  yielding  to  impulse,  is,  except 
for  the  point  of  unanimity  above  mentioned,  the 
most  fundamental  and  characteristic  thing  about 
all  emotions.  Emotion  seeks  its  expression  in- 
stinctively and  without  thought.  Men  do  not 
fall  in  love,  strike  when  offended,  or  protect  a 
helpless  child  out  of  an  intellectual  choice  in  the 


120        WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

matter;  nor  is  it  to  satisfy  their  desire  for  a  pre- 
conceived end.  They  do  these  things  in  direct 
response  to  certain  pre-rational  pushes  which  are 
woven  into  the  fabric  of  their  natures.  One 
may  be  thrown  into  a  paroxysm  of  fear  by  the  ap- 
pearance of  a  white  sheet  in  the  night  though 
he  know  positively  that  no  harm  can  come  to  him 
from  it.  And  so  the  fact  that  an  honor  activity 
is  an  immediate  expression  in  response  to  a  stim- 
ulus, places  it  automatically  in  the  category  of 
emotion. 

In  this  connection  it  is  common  knowledge 
that  the  less  rational  a  man  becomes,  the  more 
sensitive  does  his  honor  become,  and  the  quicker 
does  he  react  to  a  real  or  imaginary  insult.  If 
we  could  apply  an  anaesthetic  to  the  rational 
faculty  of  a  man  we  would  find  that  he  would  be 
governed  by  his  "honor"  impulses  in  direct  pro- 
portion to  the  amount  of  anaesthetic  administered. 
While  such  an  experiment  would  be  difficult, 
we  can  see  that  this  is  true  by  examining  the  case 
of  a  drunkard  which  is  as  nearly  a  case  of 
numbed  rationality  as  we  can  reasonably  find. 
There  is  no  one  more  sensitive  and  melodramatic 
about  his  honor  than  a  drunkard.  The  least 
slight,  the  most  casual  aspersion  upon  his  ambi- 
tion or  his  character,  the  most  guarded  intima- 


TESTING  FOR  AN  EMOTION  121 

tion  that  he  is  drunk — all  these  things  send  the 
flush  to  his  cheek,  and  wound  his  honor.  And, 
yet  psychologists  tell  us  that  drunkenness  is  the 
let-down  of  all  the  rational  and  intellectual 
checks,  and  a  complete  yielding  to  impulse.  The 
sensitiveness  of  honor  therefore  can  have  no  rela- 
tion to  the  clarity  of  reason,  but  obviously  de- 
pends upon  emotionalism.  We  associate  the  fol- 
lowing expression  of  melodramatic  honor  for 
example,  more  commonly  with  a  bar-room  than 
with  a  co-educational  college,  let  us  say — 
"If  you  touch  that  woman,  I'll  kill  you." 
In  the  same  way  the  idiot  who  is  totally  un- 
able to  interpose  any  reasoning  between  the  re- 
ception of  an  offense  to  his  honor  and  his  vindi- 
cation of  it,  for  the  obvious  reason  that  he  has 
none  to  interpose,  is  nevertheless  very  sensitive 
about  his  honor.  He  responds  and  responds  di- 
rectly because  his  idiocy  does  not  weaken  the 
emotional  springs  from  which  honor  draws  its 
sustenance.  The  story  is  told  of  an  idiot  in  the 
N.  Y.  State  Insane  Asylum  who  was  insulted  by 
a  warden  and  as  a  result  has  refused  to  have 
anything  to  do  with  any  one  who  comes  to  visit 
him.  From  the  day  he  was  insulted,  which  was 
about  fifteen  years  ago,  until  to-day,  he  has  per- 
sistently refused  to  talk  to  any  one,  so  that  he  has 


122        WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

by  this  time  probably  lost  all  power  of  speech. 
Such  was  the  delicacy  and  sensitiveness  of  his 
sense  of  honor. 

Another  important  quality  of  emotional  ac- 
tivity and  one  which  follows  as  a  corollary  to 
"direct  response,"  is  intolerance.  A  Supreme 
Court  judge  who  may  differ  very  vitally  from  his 
associates  in  a  matter  of  justice  will  not  throw 
himself  into  a  panic  of  fury  or  intolerance  if  he 
is  careful  to  preserve  his  judicial  calm.  Open- 
mindedness,  unlike  "closed-heartedness,"  is  never 
intolerant  of  a  difference  of  opinion.  Guided  by 
reason  solely  a  nation  could  not  in  justice  take 
the  position  that  all  who  disagreed  with  it  were 
wrong.  A  rational  man  grants  his  liability  to 
error  in  every  dispute.  Reason  is  admittedly 
fallible,  but  emotion,  to  judge  from  the  positive 
expressions  which  it  assumes,  is  the  apotheosis  of 
infallibility.  There  is  no  one  more  impatient  or 
intolerant  than  a  man  or  a  nation  whose  honor 
has  been  wounded.  Then  it  is  not  the  time  to  ar- 
gue, to  compromise,  to  hesitate  or  to  reason ;  it  is 
time  to  strike.  Not  only  do  nations  refuse  to 
listen  to  explanations  from  without,  but  they 
show  an  unreasonable  intolerance  toward  opposi- 
tion from  within.  The  suppression  of  such  op- 
position is  not  justly  explained  by  the  fact  that 
men  coolly  recognize  the  inefficiency  of  a  country 


TESTING  FOR  AN  EMOTION  123 

divided  against  itself.  They  may  build  up  this 
justification  later,  but  at  the  moment  they  are 
intolerant  because  the  emotion  which  has  been 
roused  is  intolerant.  It  is  this  intolerance  which 
leads  not  only  to  war,  but  which  manifests  itself 
as  well  in  riots  and  in  forcible  suppression  of 
views  contrary  to  popular  opinion.  It  is  not 
surprising  that  the  jingo  should  use  upon  his 
compatriots  as  well  as  his  enemies,  the  logic  of 
force  as  his  instrument  of  persuasion.  The  same 
emotions  which  make  him  intolerant  to  heed  the 
justice  of  the  enemy  country,  makes  him  intoler- 
ant to  see  the  other  side  of  the  controversy  in  his 
own  country.  His  emotions  are  reasonable 
enough  to  be  consistently  irrational.  The  rea- 
son that  those  who  are  not  influenced  by  the  emo- 
tional "honor"  stimulus,  are  comparatively  toler- 
ant, is  because  their  sustaining  force  is  calm 
reason.  The  "honor"  champion  is  buoyed  along 
by  the  emotional  forces  of  hatred,  fear,  self- 
assertion;  and  it  is  no  wonder  that  having  this 
backing  he  is  so  sure  of  himself  and  of  his 
strength;  so  intolerant  of  his  antagonist. 

The  James-Lange  test  of  an  emotion  can  not 
be  applied  to  national  honor  for  the  simple  rea- 
son that  the  nation  can  not  be  said  to  have  the 
physical  manifestation  of  the  individual.  But 
if  we  regard  military  power  as  the  collateral 


124        WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

physical  manifestation  of  the  national  emotion, 
just  as  the  increased  heart  beat  and  blood  pres- 
sure are  the  physical  manifestations  of  individ- 
ual emotions,  we  can  draw  an  interesting  parallel. 
The  James-Lange  theory  maintains  that  the  in- 
tensity of  an  emotional  state  depends  directly 
upon  its  physical  expressions,  in  fact  that  the 
emotion  is  the  sum  total  of  these  expressions ;  and 
that  if  it  were  possible  to  subtract  the  physical 
ear-marks,  the  emotion  would  be  lost  entirely. 
For  example,  if  we  could  stop  the  increased 
blood-pressure,  the  tenseness  of  the  muscles,  and 
the  strained  eyes  in  the  case  of  anger,  we  would 
find  that  in  spite  of  the  existence  of  an  adequate 
stimulus,  we  would  no  longer  feel  the  emotion. 

In  just  this  way  if  we  subtracted  the  single 
tangible  manifestation  of  a  nation  that  accom- 
panies great  national  emotions,  that  is  to  say,  its 
military  power,  we  would  find  that  the  emotion 
of  national  honor  would  no  longer  exist  in  the 
same  sense  in  which  it  exists  to-day.  And  it 
would  not  disappear  because  of  a  co7iscious  rec- 
ognition of  military  incapacity  to  sustain  it.  It 
would  disappear  automatically.  Honor  will 
keep,  and  has  kept  direct  pace  with  national 
"visceral"  change  of  military  power,  and  in- 
versely. In  fact  the  application  of  the  James- 
Lange  test  suggests  the  following  generalization 


TESTING  FOR  AN  EMOTION  125 

which  might  be  termed  the  Law  for  National 
Honor. 

The  sensitiveness  and  intensity  of  a  nations 
ho?ior  increases  directly  with  a  recognition  of  its 
relative  military  strength,  and  inversely  with  the 
consciousness  of  the  strength  of  an  opposing  mili- 
tary power. 

A  country  which  is  decidedly  weaker  than  an- 
other, by  the  instinct  of  self-preservation,  be- 
comes more  reflective  about  the  type  of  honor  of- 
fenses which  ought  to  be  resented  by  war.  In  the 
preHminaries  of  the  Franco-Prussian  War,  Bis- 
mark  never  felt  for  a  moment  that  Germany's 
honor  was  at  stake  in  the  wrangle  over  the  Span- 
ish candidature,  until  his  War  Minister  Von 
Roon  assured  him  that  Geraiany  was  in  a  position 
to  overcome  Napoleon's  forces.  It  is  a  historical 
fact  that  for  a  time  Germany  was  not  so  sure 
of  its  relatively  stronger  army.  But  when  the 
time  came,  though  the  dispute  was  not  changed, 
and  was  still  the  candidacy  to  the  Spanish  throne, 
Bismarck  changed  the  Ems  dispatch  and  created 
a  point  of  honor  for  the  occasion  by  making  it 
appear  that  the  French  minister  had  insulted 
the  Kaiser.  In  his  "Errinerungen  und  Ge- 
danken"  he  admits  having  artificially  created  a 
point  of  honor  when  the  army  was  ready. 

But  in  most  cases  the  process  is  not  so  calmly 


126        WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

intellectualized,  but  works  instinctively.  A 
country  like  Holland  will  naturally  have  less  of 
an  exacting  sense  of  honor  than  Germany,  that 
is  when  the  latter  is  involved  in  some  dispute  with 
Germany;  but  toward  Siam,  Holland  might  be- 
come extremely  exacting  about  punctihos  of 
honor.  It  is  true  that  even  a  comparatively 
small  nation  hke  Belgium  felt  its  honor  to  be 
uncompromising  and  inviolable  even  as  against 
such  a  mighty  nation  as  Germany.  But  here  the 
point  was  clear  and  fundamental — the  inviola- 
bility of  her  territory ;  a  thing  which  she  had  de- 
clared to  the  world  she  would  regard  as  an  ob- 
ligation of  honor.  And  in  order  to  live  up  to 
her  honor,  Belgium  disregarded  the  most  pri- 
mary instincts  of  self-preservation,  and  invited 
annihilation.  This  is  certainly  an  exceptional 
case  and  can  be  regarded  as  the  exception  to 
prove  the  rule,  that  honor  varies  with  the  rec- 
ognition of  relative  military  strength  or  weak- 
ness. Luxemburg,  which  was  bound  by  a  simi- 
lar convention,  did  not  resist  Germany's  invasion 
but  allowed  the  armies  to  pass  through  her  terri- 
tory. 

In  its  foreign  relations,  there  is  a  tendency 
on  the  part  of  the  nation  who  has  the  giant's 
power,  to  use  it  like  a  giant;  and  to  do  this  not 


TESTING  FOR  AN  EMOTION  127 

out  of  a  recognition  of  the  discrepancy  in  mili- 
tary power  between  it  and  its  opponent,  but 
instinctively  and  unconsciously.  We  find  Ger- 
many's sense  of  honor  increasing  in  delicacy  with 
her  growing  sense  of  power  until  in  1907  the 
Kaiser  declared  that  it  was  a  "matter  of  honor" 
now  that  Germany  had  "become  a  world  power," 
to  be  consulted  "in  any  future  exploitation  of 
the  globe"  and  in  the  "making  of  any  and  all 
treaties."  In  the  days  of  Napoleon  it  is  not 
speculation  to  say  that  Prussia  would  honestly 
not  have  felt  so  ambitious  a  sense  of  national 
honor. 

In  fact  psychology  helps  us  in  this  theory 
which  I  maintain,  namely,  that  in  the  face  of  peril 
nations  do  not  feel  the  emotion  of  honor.  In  a 
situation  of  genuine  peril  there  is  an  instinctive 
tendency  to  think  more  clearly  and  dismiss  emo- 
tion. Here  the  law  of  self-preservation  comes 
in,  for  it  is  clear  that  those  people  who  in  the  face 
of  danger  had  given  way  to  emotion  would  by 
the  law  of  survival  have  been  eliminated.  A 
man  in  a  burning  building  will  very  often  calcu- 
late calmly  the  best  way  to  escape  instead  of 
throwing  himself  into  a  paroxysm  of  fear.  The 
complete  instinct  of  self-presei'\^ation  overcomes 
mere  fragments  of  itself,  of  which  all  the  other  in- 


128        WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

stincts  and  emotions  may  properly  be  considered, 
for  the  whole  is  bigger  and  stronger  than  any  of 
its  parts. 

The  JMcDougall  test  for  an  emotion — hyper- 
trophy, or  pathological  abnormalities,  bears  out 
the  point  that  honor  is  an  emotion.  Hypertro- 
l^hy  of  the  honor  sentiment  is  quite  common. 

His  other  test;  namely,  that  the  rudimentary 
beginnings  of  a  fundamental  emotion  may  be 
found  in  lower  animals,  is  illustrated  by  the  fact 
that  a  dog  for  example  can  be  insulted,  and  will 
snarl  around  with  his  tail  between  his  legs  until 
he  has  either  vindicated  what  might  be  analo- 
gously termed  canine  honor,  or  until  he  has  been 
reconciled. 

In  the  case  of  nations,  the  honor  emotion  has 
often  become  hypertrophied  and  grotesquely  ex- 
aggerated. The  meglomania  and  passion  for 
world  dominion  which  Napoleon  felt  was  a  path- 
ological expression  of  honor.  Everything  was 
done  for  "Ij'honneur  et  la  gloire  de  la  patrie." 
And  to-day  "Deutchtum"  with  its  pathological 
craving  for  world  domination  is,  too,  a  grotesque, 
dramatic  perversion  of  "Deutsche  Ehre,"  for 
there  is  no  country  in  the  world  which  has  used 
the  slogan  of  honor  in  so  many  bizarre  connec- 
tions. 

The  above  illustrations  of  pathological  exag- 


TESTING  FOR  AN  EMOTION  129 

geration  are  really  abnormal  to  the  second  de- 
gree for  the  reason  that  normally  a  man  or  a 
nation  is  not  conscious  of  honor  at  all.  The  man 
in  the  streets,  except  in  times  of  war  or  crisis, 
never  feels  or  talks  about  his  country's  honor. 
It  is  only  when  an  abnormal  situation  arises,  and 
when  he  becomes  abnormally  stimulated  and 
fired  with  a  war-like  patriotism,  that  he  begins 
to  feel  it.  So  the  McDougall  test  for  an  emo- 
tion is  really  doubly  satisfied  here. 

There  is  only  one  way  to  account  for  the  ob- 
viously false  position  which  nations  have  under 
the  cloak  of  honor  assumed,  positions  which 
they  themselves  admitted  later  to  have  been  false 
and  unwarranted;  namely,  that  when  we  feel 
emotion,  we  become  blind  to  the  most  obvious 
facts,  and  our  minds  work  in  such  a  way  as  to 
preclude  everything  which  might  conflict  with,  or 
weaken  the  emotion  that  we  feel.  The  fact  that 
this  is  exactly  what  happens  invariably  in  the 
case  of  honor,  puts  another  emotional  ear-mark 
upon  it.  The  following  obsei'vation  made  by  the 
British  psychologist  Bain  is  pertinent  at  this 
point : 

"In  a  state  of  strong  excitement  no  thoughts 
are  allowed  to  present  themselves  except  such 
as  concur  in  the  present  moods;  the  links  of  as- 
sociation  are   paralyzed   as   regards   everything 


130        WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

which  conflicts  with  the  ascendant  influence;  and 
it  is  through  this  stoppage  of  the  intellectual 
trains  that  we  come  into  the  predicament  of  re- 
nouncing or  as  it  is  called  disbelieving,  for  the 
moment  what  we  have  felt  and  acted  on.  Our 
feelings  convert  our  convictions  by  smiting  us 
with  intellectual  blindness.  It  depends  upon 
many  circumstances  what  intensity  of  emotion 
shall  be  required  to  produce  this  higher  effect  of 
keeping  utterly  back  the  faintest  recollection  of 
whatever  discords  with  the  reigning  fury.  The 
natural  energy  of  the  emotional  temper  on  the 
one  hand,  and  feebleness  of  the  forces  of  effective 
resuscitation  on  the  other,  conspire  to  falsify  the 
views  entertained  at  the  moment."  (P.  21, 
"Emotion  and  Will.") 

The  fact  that  in  honor  disputes  nations  have 
really  given  up  the  obvious  axiom  of  equal  liabil- 
ity to  error,  can  only  be  explained  in  the  way  that 
Bain  asserts.  The  fact  that  England  could  have 
regarded  the  Opium  War  as  a  matter  of  honor, 
is  a  case  in  point.  The  power  of  "emotion  to  bar 
out  the  impression  of  reality,"  is  one  of  the  most 
fundamental  truths  in  psychology. 

"Intense  emotions,  while  inspiring  the  actions, 
and  influencing  the  intellectual  acquisitions,  like- 
wise affect  the  judgment  of  true  and  false.  The 
emotion  of  terror  proves  the  greatness  of  its 


TESTING  FOR  AN  EMOTION  131 

power  by  inducing  the  most  irrational  beliefs. 
In  the  extreme  manifestations  of  anger,  a  man 
will  be  suddenly  struck  blind  to  his  most  familiar 
experiences  of  fact,  and  will  for  the  moment  deny 
what  at  other  times  he  would  most  resolutely 
maintain.  Take  also  self-complacency.  The 
habitual  dreamer  is  not  instructed  by  a  thou- 
sand failures  of  pet  projects;  he  enters  upon  each 
new  attempt  as  full  of  confidence  as  if  all  the 
rest  had  succeeded.  We  note  with  surprise  that 
in  every  day  life  an  individual  goes  on  promis- 
ing to  himself  and  to  others  with  sincere  convic- 
tion what  he  has  never  once  been  known  to  exe- 
cute; the  feeling  of  self-confidence  lords  it  over 
the  experiences  of  life.  He  has  not  stated  to 
himself  in  a  proposition  the  conflicting  experi- 
ence. He  does  not  know  that  he  never  fulfilled 
his  purposes. — Also  love's  blindness  is  the 
world's  oldest  proverb."     (Ibid.,  p.  21.) 

Emotions  are  sometimes  objectless;  that  is, 
they  exist  without  any  reasonable  cause.  We 
sometimes  feel  fear  and  do  not  know  to  what  to 
refer  it.  Men  suffering  from  acute  indigestion 
often  become  frightened  in  a  very  serious  way 
for  no  reason.     Wand  says  in  this  connection : 

"The  moods  of  emotion  to  which  we  are  at 
times  subject  are  caused  by  bodily  states;  and  it 
is  in  these  cases  that  the  cause  to  which  they  are 


132        WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

due  is  so  different  from  the  object  to  which  they 
come  to  be  referred.  For  while  the  cause  is  some 
state  of  the  body,  the  object  is  something  we 
invent  to  complete  and  justify  the  emotion.  For 
it  does  not  satisfy  us  to  feel  an  emotion  and  not 
to  be  able  to  refer  it  to  anything  in  particular; 
and  when  a  man  is  in  an  angry  mood  there  is 
scarcely  anything  however  unreasonable  to  which 
he  may  not  attribute  it."  ("Foundations  of 
Character,"  p.  199.) 

Honor  in  just  this  way  is  known  to  float 
in  the  atmosphere  as  it  were,  with  no  anchor- 
age, no  particular  resting  place.  A  man  often 
goes  around  with  a  chip  on  his  shoulder  for  no 
reason  but  just  "contrariness,"  and  woe  to  the 
one  who  wounds  his  honor  which  at  such  times 
is  exceedingly  delicate.  And  so,  a  nation  drunk 
with  power,  will  carry  a  similar  chip,  and  look 
for  some  convenient  object  to  submerge  with  a 
torrent  of  honorable  rage. 

Putting  all  these  tests  together  we  must  infer 
that  expressions  of  honor  require  no  effort  of  the 
will,  as  is  the  case  with  all  purely  rational  judg- 
ments, but  might  be  described  as  a  "yielding." 
And  it  is  only  when  we  act  thus  emotionally  that 
we  ever  speak  of  yielding. 

The  tests  applied  above  prove  that  honor  an- 
swers every  prerequisite  of  an  emotion. 


CHAPTER  VII 

DISSECTING   THE    HONOR   COMPLEX 

In  the  preceding  chapters  I  asserted  somewhat 
dogmatically  that  the  motive  force  of  the  senti- 
ment of  honor  radiated  from  the  emotion  purely, 
and  not  from  the  intellectual  element  of  the  com- 
plex. By  divorcing  the  two  elements,  and  imag- 
ining each  of  them  in  various  situations  alone,  it 
will  be  easier  to  determine  experimentally  just 
how  much  there  is  of  truth  in  this  theory.  So 
long  as  the  complex  is  considered  as  a  unit,  it  is 
impossible  to  determine  what  proportion  of 
directivity  arises  from  the  emotional  and  what 
from  the  pseudo-intellectual  ingredients. 

Now,  if  a  man  whose  honor  has  been  roused 
by  these  two  inseparable  elements,  should  sud- 
denly for  some  reason  lose  the  justification,  that 
is  the  rational  element  from  his  consciousness, 
the  emotional  momentum  will  carry  him  on. 
The  emotion  is  remembered  long  after  the  justi- 
fication is  forgotten,  and  just  as  it  is  born  long 
before  reason  has  had  a  chance  to  introduce  it, 
so  it  remains  long  after  reason  has  died  away 
from  it. 

133 


134        WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

Suppose  a  situation  in  which  a  man's  honor 
has  been  wounded,  and  in  which  he  later  dis- 
covers that  rationally  he  had  no  right  to  take 
offense.  Does  that  loss  of  justification  effect  the 
emotional  momentum  which  he  feels  nevertheless 
toward  vindicating  himself?  Does  the  mere  rec- 
ognition that  he  had  "no  business  being  hurt" 
suffice  and  appease  his  anger?  It  is  possible  to 
reason  with  reason,  but  with  emotion  the  task  is 
much  more  difficult  because  emotion  must  be  con- 
sistent even  at  the  cost  of  being  irrational.  Once 
an  emotion  is  roused,  it  will  seek  its  expression, 
and  will  be  swept  along  by  its  own  momentum 
over  any  rational  obstacles  that  suggest  a  turn- 
ing back.  Once  it  turns  its  hand  to  the  plow 
emotion  turns  not  backward  to  retrace  its  steps. 
We  have  so  often  heard  the  story  of  the  father 
who  decided  to  give  his  youngster  a  good  licking 
for  getting  into  a  fight,  and  although  he  later 
found  that  the  boy  did  not  commit  the  offense,  he 
licked  him  just  the  same  because  he  had  made  up 
his  mind  to  do  so  and  wished  to  be  consistent. 
On  a  national  scale  the  Boer  War  furnishes  us 
another  illustration  of  this  interesting  point; 
namely  that  the  loss  of  justification  offers  no 
embarrassment  to  emotion.  England  after  hav- 
ing entered  the  Boer  War  found  that  the  jus- 
tification for  her  entrance  had  been  built  on  mis- 


DISSECTING  THE  HONOR  COMPLEX      136 

information.  But  she  could  not  turn  back. 
"Whatever  good  reason  there  may  have  been  for 
recognizing  that  our  (English)  claims  of  sov- 
ereignty in  the  Transvaal  rested  on  a  mistaken 
view  of  native  sentiment,  and  however  fairly  such 
recognition  might  have  been  allowed  to  affect  the 
ultimate  settlement,  the  game  of  war  once  en- 
tered upon  ought  to  have  been  played  out  until 
it  was  either  lost  or  won.  To  this  the  Honor  of 
the  country  was  fully  pledged."  (H.  I.  D.  Ry- 
der in  Nineteenth  Century — referring  to  Boer 
War— 1899.) 

The  emotion  of  honor  carried  England  along 
"consistently,"  and  in  the  face  of  this  sweeping 
undercurrent,  the  mere  recognition  that  she  was 
persisting  in  a  false  and  mistaken  ideal,  was  pow- 
erless. At  such  times  the  intellect  may  in  fact 
be  so  little  affected  as  "to  play  the  cold-blooded 
spectator"  and  note  the  absence  of  justification 
for  the  emotion. 

We  have  frequent  illustrations  of  the  distinct- 
ness of  the  two  elements,  and  of  the  fact  that  ra- 
tionality does  not  affect  the  emotional  aspect 
except  in  the  case  of  the  most  strong-minded 
people.  How  often  we  hear  an  offended  person 
say,  even  after  a  rational  and  adequate  explana- 
tion has  been  given  him  by  the  offender;  "But  I 
can't  help  it  if  I  feel  hurt."     The  hui't  has  regis- 


136        WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

tered,  and  all  the  assurance  in  the  world  cannot 
remove  the  hurt  nor  the  consequent  irrational 
resentment  of  it.  The  mere  circumstance  of 
wiping  away  the  intellectual  side  of  the  hurt, 
does  not  alter  the  emotional  currents,  because  the 
two  work  independently,  and  it  is  only  because 
the  former  takes  its  cue  from  the  emotion,  that 
there  are  so  many  happy  coincidences. 

That  the  emotion  is  the  vital  and  sole  force 
behind  honor  impulses  we  can  see  from  the  ves- 
tiges that  remain  of  duel  honor.  A  man  who  has 
been  insulted,  though  he  may  think  as  most  men 
do,  that  a  "gentleman"  is  not  supposed  to  fight, 
will  nevertheless  feel  a  very  strong  impulse  to 
strike.  He  admits  the  good  sense  of  giving  up 
private  vengeance  in  the  interest  of  social  order, 
but  he  cannot  make  himself  feel  the  justice  of  it. 
The  duel  is  still  common  in  France  and  in  Ger- 
many, especially  among  military  students. 
These  are  merely  illustrations  of  the  difficulty 
which  logic  has  in  overcoming  the  emotional  im- 
pulses upon  which  our  conduct  is  so  largely  de- 
termined. 

Honor,  like  art,  becomes  its  own  justification. 
To  turn  back,  is  never  regarded  as  a  recognition 
of  the  injustice  which  a  country  would  commit 
by  continuing,  but  as  a  confession  of  cowardice. 
This  attitude  is  almost  a  tacit  acceptance  of  the 


DISSECTING  THE  HONOR  COMPLEX      137 

saying  of  Nietzsche,  "a  good  war  will  sanctify  a 
bad  cause." 

To  take  an  instance  from  personal  honor,  let 
us  suppose  the  case  of  a  man  who  feels  his 
sense  of  civic  honor  to  be  violated.  Intellec- 
tually such  an  expose  as  the  Tweed  affair  some 
years  ago  in  New  York  City,  may  have  of- 
fended the  civic  honor  of  thousands  of  good 
citizens.  So  far  as  value  to  society  and  to  the 
advancement  of  vital  ideals  is  concerned,  an 
offense  to  a  man's  civic  honor  might  sen- 
sibly call  forth  a  willingness  to  undergo  almost 
any  sacrifice.  Yet  the  cold  abstract  recogni- 
tion of  the  rottenness  of  the  political  corrup- 
tion did  not  lead  the  outraged  citizens  to  do  more 
than  cast  their  vote  against  the  corrupt  official  at 
the  next  election,  while  less  vigilant  citizens  may 
not  even  have  done  that.  But  an  insult  to  the 
wife  of  any  one  of  these  men  might  have 
prompted  him  to  any  measure  in  her  defense.  In 
reason,  it  is  not  hard  to  see  that  that  insult  is  not 
nearly  so  vital  an  offense  to  social  ideals  as  public 
plunder.  A  man  might  conceivably  give  his  life, 
as  men  so  often  did  in  the  age  of  chivalry,  to 
vindicate  one  honor  impidse,  and  be  unwilling 
to  give  one  dollar  to  the  Honest  Ballot  Associa- 
tion. The  one  offense  arouses  his  emotion,  which 
carries  honor  to  any  length  in  vindication,  while 


138        WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

the  other  arouses  intellect,  which  is  dead  and 
lifeless  for  the  purposes  of  stimulating  action. 
Few  feel  an  emotional  vigor  and  intensity  for 
the  latter  except  in  the  rare  cases  where  men  have 
a  "passion"  for  public  service. 

It  is  impossible  to  work  upon  an  emotional 
correlative  artificially,  as  William  James  says. 
"Just  as  an  artificially  imitated  sneeze  lacks  some- 
thing of  the  reality,  so  the  attempt  Xo  imitate  an 
emotion  in  the  absence  of  the  normal  instigating 
cause  is  apt  to  be  rather  hollow." 

Often  when  we  have  associated  the  rational  jus- 
tification with  the  emotion,  we  ourselves  admit  the 
stupidity  of  the  justification  when  the  emotion 
has  cooled.  I  heard  a  great  professor  admit 
that  he  was  ashamed  of  the  imperialistic  honor 
which  he  felt  during  McKinley's  administration. 
When  the  emotion  dies  away  the  embarrassed 
pseudo-rational  fragment  is  left  out  in  the  cold  in 
all  its  naked  unreasonableness  and  injustice. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE   TYKANNY   OF   A   PHRASE 

"There  never  were  creatures  of  prey  so  mischievous, 
never  diplomats  so  cunning,  never  poisons  so  deadly,  as  these 
masked  words.  They  are  the  unjust  stewards  of  all  men's 
ideas.  Whatever  fancy  or  favorite  instinct  a  man  most 
cherishes  he  gives  to  his  favorite  masked  words  to  take  care 
of  for  him.  The  zcord  at  last  comes  to  have  an  infinite 
power  over  him,  and  you  can  not  get  at  him  but  by  its 
ministry." 

— John  Ruskin. 

It  would  seem  that  thought  must  precede  lan- 
guage, determining  our  choice  of  words,  and 
that  the  latter  are  merely  symbols  predeter- 
mined by  the  nature  of  the  thought  itself.  But 
only  too  often  the  relationship  is  reversed  and 
a  word  which  has  acquired  a  deep  significance 
through  various  associations,  will  determine 
our  thought  regardless  of  the  specific  connec- 
tion in  which  it  is  used.  For  example  when 
the  term  honor  is  spoken,  the  specific  associations 
of  the  moment  disappear  and  are  virtually  sub- 
merged in  a  deluge  of  emotional  respect  for 
honor  as  an  abstract  principle.     We  approve  the 

139 


140        WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

principle  and  by  the  strange  logic  of  a  trans- 
ferred epithet  we  approve  the  point  in  the  par- 
ticular case,  overlooking  the  necessity  of  deciding 
whether  the  particular  issue  raised  really  involves 
honor  or  not.  We  do  not  judge  each  case  on  its 
own  merits  but  on  the  merits  of  the  great  national 
imperative  which  has  come  down  to  us  as  a  beauti- 
ful tradition.  All  our  thought  and  feeling  seem 
to  go  not  to  an  analysis  of  the  dispute  but  to  a 
worship  of  the  ethical  dogma. 

Thus  it  has  come  about  that  the  logical 
process  whereby  our  thought  fixes  the  labels, 
has  been  reversed.  Our  reason  no  longer 
works  untrammeled  and  free  from  bias,  be- 
cause we  are  working  as  it  were,  inductively. 
Emotion  shot  through  with  subconscious  experi- 
ences and  associations  bearing  upon  the  general 
principle,  fonnulate  a  justification  for  us  in  every 
case  which  our  reason  is  later  compelled  to  sup- 
port. With  a  sort  of  a  priori  vengeance,  emotion 
and  bias  cast  the  die  into  which  we  pour  a  ra- 
tional justification. 

This  has  come  to  be  true  of  the  phrase  "na- 
tional honor"  which,  by  filling  us  with  an  emo- 
tional thrill,  calls  forth  not  only  a  spontaneous 
intellectual  approval,  no  matter  in  what  connec- 
tion it  arises,  but  also  a  deliberate  moral  justifica- 
tion, even  though  conventional  morality  must  be 


THE  TYRANNY  OF  A  PHRASE         IM 

torn  to  shreds  in  the  process.  It  makes  little  dif- 
ference whether  a  nation  invokes  the  term  honor 
in  defense  of  a  crime  or  an  ideal ;  the  essential  sa- 
credness  of  the  term  remains.  When  a  country 
connects  honor  with  aggression,  the  unthinking 
patriot  feels  only  the  honor  and  is  blind  to  the  ag- 
gression. The  term  has  become  hallowed  and 
consecrated  by  the  centuries  of  blood  and  suffer- 
ing which  it  has  called  forth  since  men  first  began 
to  fight  for  honor.  The  vehemence  of  hatred 
caused  by  repeated  wars,  the  sacrifice  in  life  and 
money,  the  intensity  of  pain  and  suffering,  the 
glories,  and  the  progress  of  civilization  which  is 
attributed  to  war,  have  been  transferred  to  the 
term  honor  and  have  filled  the  phrase  itself  with 
an  intense  fervor  and  a  sacred  glamor.  In  the 
face  of  these  emotional  ramifications  reason  is 
paralyzed.  We  have  transferred  the  cumulative 
emotion  of  a  series  of  intense  experiences  to  the 
term  national  honor,  so  that  it  has  become  a  tyran- 
nous phrase  invested  with  the  magic  power  to 
shape  our  moral  thinking.  Instead  of  attempt- 
ing to  strip  the  term  of  its  unwarranted  sugges- 
tiveness  at  this  late  stage  of  its  involution,  we 
have  long  since  made  a  fetish  of  it  at  which  we 
kneel  blindly  in  worship. 

When  the  psychological  tyranny  of  the  phrase 
is  brought  into  question,  it  is  easy  to  escape  the 


142        WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

necessity  for  rational  analysis  by  taking  refuge  in 
the  ideal  of  national  honor  as  an  abstract  prin- 
ciple. From  a  psychological  tyrant  it  then  be- 
comes an  intellectual  despot,  a  sort  of  categorical 
imperative  to  which  reason  and  good  sense  must 
submit.  Loyalty  to  an  abstract  principle,  re- 
gardless of  specific  applications  is  doubtful  mor- 
ality, especially  when,  as  is  often  the  case  with 
an  adherence  to  the  abstraction  of  honor,  such 
loyalty  defeats  the  very  purposes  for  which  the 
ideal  is  supposed  to  exist. 

There  is  yet  another  factor  which  lends 
strength  to  this  tyranny,  and  that  is  the  very 
indefiniteness  of  the  honor  abstraction.  An  ab- 
straction is  tyrannical  even  when  its  power 
can  be  limited  by  definition.  A  principle  is 
always  absolute,  while  incidents  are  relative; 
so  that  adherence  to  the  principle  usually  does 
violence  to  the  experiences  which  it  governs. 
But  when  a  definition  of  an  abstraction  and  its 
implications  is  impossible  as  is  the  case  with  honor, 
its  power  necessarily  becomes  unlimited,  in  di- 
rect proportion  to  its  vagueness.  It  would  seem 
that  a  principle  must,  by  its  very  function  as  a 
guide  to  conduct,  be  a  definite  criterion  by  which 
particular  incidents  can  be  judged.  It  does  not 
appear  unreasonable  then  to  expect  that  this  cri- 
terion by  which  the  right  or  wrong  of  specific  in- 


THE  TYRANNY  OF  A  PHRASE         143 

cidents  are  defined  should  itself  admit  of  defini- 
tion. But  national  honor  defies  analysis  in  di- 
rect proportion  to  the  absoluteness  with  which 
it  tyrannizes  over  a  situation. 

The  attitude  of  men  toward  honor  therefore, 
becomes  a  matter  of  "loyalty  to  loyalty,"  or  loy- 
alty for  loyalty's  sake,  rather  than  loyalty  to  an 
ideal  involved  in  a  specific  case.  The  loyalty  has 
become  so  intense  as  to  overlook  completely  the 
necessity  for  rational  ideals.  It  has  become  an 
absolute  devotion  to  the  principle  of  "dying  for 
an  ideal/'  The  average  man  who  is  willing  to 
die  for  the  ideal  of  national  honor  is  only  con- 
cerned with  the  element  of  loyalty,  which  he  feels 
to  be  the  only  element  in  true  patriotism.  He  is 
wholly  indifferent  to  the  character  of  the  ideal  for 
it  is  "my  country  right  or  wi'ong."  He  seldom 
stops  to  consider  that  ideal  living  might  better 
serve  his  purpose  than  ideal  dying. 

The  ethical  justification  of  dying  for  an  ideal 
is  three-fold.  First,  the  ideal  for  which  we  are 
willing  to  lay  down  our  lives  must  be  genuine, 
that  is  to  say,  it  must  be  strong  enough  to 
bear  the  analysis  of  reason;  secondly,  there 
must  be  unflinching  and  uncompromising  loy- 
alty; lastly  we  must  determine  with  deliber- 
ation whether  the  ideal  can  be  advanced  bet- 
ter by  dying  than  by  sensible  living.     It  is  in 


144        WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

the  second  of  these  elements  alone  that  the  great 
bulk  of  well-meaning  men  are  strong,  in  most 
cases  ignoring  entirely  the  third,  and  giving  very 
little  thought  indeed  to  the  first,  if  we  can  judge 
by  the  unanimity  of  patriots  in  any  country. 
By  being  so  over  enthusiastic  in  the  element  of 
loyalty  as  to  ignore  the  importance  of  assuring 
ourselves  of  the  validity  of  the  ideal  itself,  to- 
gether in  each  case,  with  the  best  means  of  serv- 
ing it,  we  have  unconsciously  fallen  into  the  sen- 
timentalism  of  regarding  death  as  a  virtue. 
We  have  stressed  out  of  all  proportion  the  ele- 
ment of  loyalty  in  the  ethical  complex  of  honor. 
As  much  as  we  may  admire  the  courage  of  a  man 
who  dies  for  honor,  we  nevertheless  deplore  his 
indifference  toward  his  obligation  to  analyze  the 
validity  of  the  honor  claims.  Everything  from 
brutal  aggression  to  spoliation  and  injustice  have 
been  regarded  by  peoples  at  one  time  or  another 
as  obligations  of  honor,  a  fact  which,  if  it  does  not 
prove  that  very  little  thought  has  been  employed 
by  those  who  died  in  its  defense,  must  at  least 
impute  their  judgment. 

The  foolishness  of  an  irrational  devotion  to 
the  principle  of  dying  for  "an  ideal"  becomes 
clear  when  we  take  something  other  than  national 
honor.  Let  us  suppose  a  man  who  believes  in 
polygamy.     Suppose  that  such  a  man  arrived  at 


THE  TYRANNY  OF  A  PHRASE         145 

this  social  ideal  by  as  little  thinking  as  the  aver- 
age man  does,  in  assuring  himself  that  liis 
country's  honor  is  at  stake.  Then  let  us  suppose 
further  that  on  such  a  weak  intellectual  convic- 
tion he  added  some  inexplicable  emotional  assur- 
ance which  when  questioned  he  would  persist- 
ently evade  to  answer.  Suppose  then  that  he 
struck  out  to  do  all  in  his  power  to  spread  the 
ideal  of  polygamy  even  at  the  cost  of  his  own 
life.  He  would  be  criminal  we  would  say,  even 
though  he  were  dying  for  "an  ideal."  Unless 
he  spent  a  good  many  years  thinking  the  whole 
marriage  question  out,  and  arrived  at  a  definite, 
sincere  philosophy  of  the  marital  relation,  be- 
lieving honestly  that  polygamy  was  the  best  so- 
cial institution  the  world  could  adopt  with  regard 
to  marriage,  we  would  feel  that  he  was  unjusti- 
fied in  "acting"  upon  his  conviction.  In  other 
words,  if  the  ideal  of  polygamy  just  struck  him 
as  an  emotional  fancy,  and  he  laid  down  his  life 
for  it,  we  could  admire  his  courage,  but  hardly 
his  ideal.  Furthermore  even  if  we  granted  his 
sincerity  and  maturity  of  conviction,  we  would 
even  then  in  his  case  have  to  regard  his  dying  as 
sheer  folly,  because  the  best  thing  that  such  a 
man  could  do  for  his  eccentric  ideal  would  be  to 
live  for  it  and  spread  it  by  every  means  in  his 
power.     With  him  would  die  the  most  ardent 


146        WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

champion  of  the  ideal,  and  it  is  sentiment  to 
believe  that  his  ideal  would  be  advanced  by 
martyrdom.  There  are  many  cases  where  death 
is  an  efficient  means  of  advancing  ideals,  but  the 
example  at  least  shows  the  necessity  for  cool  de- 
liberation with  respect  to  this  efficiency  aspect 
of  the  question  of  dying  for  an  ideal. 

Men  hold  an  attitude  of  contempt  toward  com- 
patriots who  question  the  validity  of  the  honor 
ideal,  while  they  respect  such  an  idealist  if 
he  happens  to  be  a  member  of  an  enemy  country. 
Any  one  in  a  country  at  war  who  stands  out 
against  the  national  honor,  and  questions  its 
sacredness  when  men  are  willing  to  die  for  it  on 
all  sides,  is  immediately  branded  by  his  com- 
patriots, as  a  coward.  He  is  never  regarded  as 
a  martyr  except  in  rare  cases,  posthumously. 
But  when  a  man  stands  out  in  an  enemy  country 
against  the  enemy  national  honor,  he  becomes 
straightway  a  martyr.  To  the  Allies,  Lieb- 
knecht  is  a  hero  and  a  moral  giant ;  in  Germany 
he  is  a  traitor  and  a  coward  serving  his  sentence 
in  jail.  In  Germany  Bertrand  Russell  is  a 
martyr ;  in  England  he  is  spurned  and  ostracized. 
Martyrdom  assuredly  is  in  the  point  of  view. 

By  accepting  a  philosophy  of  honor  which  re- 
gards those  who  question  its  moral  validity  in  any 
particular  application,  as  traitors  and  cowards 


THE  TYRANNY  OF  A  PHRASE         147 

equally  with  those  who  feel  that  dying  for  a  par- 
ticular ideal  might  not  help  to  advance  it,  and  by 
insisting  upon  loyalty  for  loyalty's  sake,  we  have 
come  to  the  point  of  regarding  death  as  a  virtue. 
In  theii'  intense  sincerity  and  earnestness,  men 
have  become  blind  to  the  obvious  fact  that  an 
ideal  must  be  reasonable,  a  product  of  the  mind. 
A  complete  rationalization  of  honor  is  neces- 
sary. We  must  turn  a  deaf  ear  to  the  majestic 
ring  of  the  word  as  it  reverberates  through  the 
emotional  recesses  of  the  mind,  and  attempt 
bravely  an  analysis  of  the  bell  itself  as  we  find  it 
in  the  political  belfry  of  the  twentieth  century. 


PART  III 

THREE  PROGRAMS  FOR 
PERMANENT  PEACE 


CHAPTER  IX 

MORALIZATION    OF   NATIONAL    HONOR. 
A   PROBLEM   IN   ETHICS 

There  is  little  doubt  that  the  Peace  Congress 
which  will  meet  at  the  close  of  the  present  war, 
will  be  more  ready  than  have  been  the  former 
Conferences  at  the  Hague,  to  face  squarely  the 
perplexing  and  delicate  question  of  national 
honor.  It  will,  we  hope,  make  a  genuine  at- 
tempt to  come  to  a  more  definite  understand- 
standing  of  the  political  principles  which  it  prop- 
erly embraces  in  its  scope,  and  if  it  is  retained  at 
all  in  international  usage,  it  will  be  put  through 
a  thorough  and  exacting  process  of  morahzation. 
The  deliberate  evasion  of  the  Second  Hague 
Conference  with  regard  to  "vital  interest  and  na- 
tional honor"  will  not  be  repeated  by  a  war- 
chastened  world. 

The  crimes  and  injustices  that  have  been  com- 
mitted in  its  name  and  under  its  sanction,  are  so 
numerous,  that  it  is  not  unfair  to  deny  to  the  cur- 
rent meaning  of  the  term  any  moral  significance 
at  all.     In  acquiring  the  quality  of  an  irresistible 

151 


152        WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

slogan  for  all  wars,  just  and  unjust  alike,  it  is  no 
wonder  that  it  has  lost  its  essential  moral  impli- 
cation and  become  an  empty  shell ;  or  even  worse, 
a  mockery  of  the  very  thing  it  professes  to  be. 

If  the  nations  do  not  agree  to  the  arbitration 
of  honor  disputes,  they  will  at  least  make  a  very 
serious  effort  to  define  it  in  such  a  way  as  to  af- 
ford some  clearly  enunciated  criteria  by  which 
individual  cases  of  honor  may  be  judged  in 
the  future.  Without  "some  common  sentiment 
to  which  the  individual  can  make  appeal,"  ^ 
personal  honor  would  be  impossible;  and  in 
the  same  way  a  morally  consistent  national 
honor  is  impossible  without  a  similar  com- 
mon international  sentiment,  not  hidden  in  the 
shadowy  region  of  emotional  obscurity,  but  con- 
ceived in  the  light  of  reason  and  justice.  A  ra- 
tionalization of  honor  would  require  a  sifting  of 
all  possible  honor  disputes  with  the  ultimate  codi- 
fication of  the  approved  casus  belli  into  an  Inter- 
national Code  of  Honor  accepted  by  the  world 
of  nations. 

For  this  code  to  be  of  any  value  in  preventing 
unrighteous  wars,  it  would  have  to  be  based  upon 
universal  principles  of  justice,  i.e.,  the  ideal  of 
honor  would  have  to  be  shorn  of  its  "impossible" 
accretions,  and  be  put  through  a  very  deliberate 

1  "Dewey  and  Tuft"— "Ethics,"  p.  86. 


MORALIZATION  OF  NATIONAL  HONOR      153 

process  of  moralization.  None  of  the  political 
philosophies  by  which  the  conduct  of  nations  is 
governed  to-day,  could  serve  as  a  basis  for  this 
moralization.  A  political  philosophy  which 
might  obviate  conflicts  of  honor  and  still  preserve 
justice,  is  not  impossible.  The  influences  which 
have  been  responsible  for  the  degeneration  and 
perversion  of  the  political  ideal,  would,  to  secure 
moralization,  have  to  be  frankly  recognized  and 
checked;  new  and  wholesome  standards  would 
have  to  be  introduced  into  our  political  thinking. 

If  the  Peace  Congress  attempts  this  task  of 
moralization,  it  will  not  be  easy.  It  will  require 
more  than  a  mere  vague  "uncoordinated  desire 
for  peace."  Somebody  will  have  to  be  entrusted 
to  work  out  the  implications  and  ramifications  of 
such  a  moralization.  It  will  necessitate  the  aban- 
donment of  much  of  our  diplomatic  terminology 
that  suggest  the  out-worn  moral  confusion  from 
which  national  honor  must  emerge.  It  will  mean 
that  "instinctive  political  morality"  ^  will  have  to 
yield  to  law. 

Let  us  consider  briefly  what  such  a  moraliza- 
tion of  national  honor  would  imply;  and  what 
would  be  the  technique  as  it  were,  by  which  it 
could  be  attained.  It  is  one  thing  to  recognize 
the  perversions  into  which  it  has  fallen ;  it  is  quite 

1  Rumelin — "Relation  of  Politics  to  Moral  Law." 


154        WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

another  to  appreciate  the  colossal  task  of  its  re- 
moralization. 

To  erect  a  political  morality  we  can  not  build 
in  the  sands  of  emotion.  Our  first  task  then  in 
the  moralization  process  would  be  to  assure  our- 
selves that  the  new  sense  of  honor  is  a  rational 
ideal  stripped  of  emotional  accretions. 

The  material  of  morality  is  rational  ideals,  not 
vague  aesthetic  emotions;  and  in  erecting  new 
standards  for  honor  we  must  at  the  outset  dispel 
the  film  of  emotionahsm  that  has  hitherto  en- 
veloped it. 

This  means  first  that  honor  will  have  to  ad- 
mit of  universal  application.  In  order  to  claim 
moral  validity  it  will  have  to  abandon  its  climatic 
character.  The  theory  of  an  honor  peculiar  to 
each  nation  in  the  way  that  language  or  custom 
may  be  said  to  be  peculiar,  must  give  way  to  uni- 
versal law.  "Always  act  as  if  you  would  wish 
that  action  to  become  universal  law,"  was  Kant's 
admonition,  and  we  cannot  afford  to  overlook 
this  in  formulating  an  international  morality. 
Moral  law  admits  of  no  peculiar  interpretations. 
The  theory  that  each  nation  must  have  its  own. 
peculiar  code  of  honor  which  depends  upon  its 
traditions  and  its  "legitimate  aspirations,"  is  com- 
monly accepted  to-day.     "Any  one  may  even 


MORALIZATION  OF  NATIONAL  HONOR      155 

show,"  says  Terraillon,  "that  each  nation  has  a 
particular  concept  and  a  more  or  less  clear  idea 
of  what  honor  means  to  it."  This  doctrine,  pop- 
ular as  it  is,  could  not  bear  moral  analysis. 

So  long  as  honor  is  not  regarded  as  a  universal 
ideal  but  merely  as  the  peculiar  expression  of 
each  people,  it  is  no  wonder  that  strange  incon- 
sistencies and  moral  confusion  arise.  For  ex- 
ample England  demanded  to  be  consulted  in  the 
drawing  of  the  Treaty  of  IMorocco  but  refused  to 
extend  this  identic  privilege  to  Germany  who  had 
the  same  right  to  it,  and  she  defended  both  these 
positions  as  obligations  imposed  by  her  honor. 
The  two  citations  given  below  illustrate  this  point. 

"The  claim  that  Germany  made,  that  no  treaty 
should  be  made  in  any  part  of  the  world  without 
the  approval  of  Germany  was  not  one  which  a 
SELF-RESPECTING  nation  could  admit."  Gilbert 
Murray. 

"If  peace  can  only  be  preserved  by  the  sur- 
render of  the  great  and  beneficent  position  which 
Great  Britain  has  won  by  centuries  of  heroism 
and  achievement,  by  allowing  England  to  be 
treated  where 'her  interests  were  concerned  as  if 
she  were  of  no  account  in  the  cabinet  of  nations 
(i.e.,  not  to  be  consulted  in  the  Morocco  treaty), 
then  I  say  emphatically  that  peace  at  that  price 


156        WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

would  be  a  humiliation  intolerable  for  a  great 
nation  like  ours  to  endure."  Lloyd  George — 
Mansion  House  Speech. 

It  is  utter  foolishness  to  claim  ethical  sanction 
for  an  ideal  that  works  only  one  way. 

Very  important  it  is  indeed  if  we  wish  to  main- 
tain a  minimum  of  moral  content,  to  provide  ade- 
quate correctives  for  honor.  If  national  honor 
is  to  be  kept  generous,  we  must  see  to  it  that  all 
the  influences  that  could  keep  it  from  demoraliz- 
ing are  allowed  to  work  upon  it.  In  the  case  of 
personal  and  professional  honor,  the  correctives 
that  insure  their  moralization  continually,  are 
provided  for,  first  in  the  class  character  of  it,  and 
secondly  in  the  freedom  with  which  points  of 
honor  may  be  discussed,  within  the  class.  No 
deviation  from  the  class  code  is  tolerated  until  it 
has  fought  its  way  in  against  conservatism  and 
prejudice,  when  it  becomes  generally  sanctioned 
and  assumes  the  same  inviolable  character  as  the 
other  principles  in  the  code.  This  has  been  the 
history  of  honor  as  it  has  been  the  history  of  all 
moral  ideals.  Class  honor  has  retained  its  high 
standards  through  the  corrective  influence  of 
associates  who  are  quick  to  detect  any  practice 
which  is  selfish  and  inimical  to  the  welfare  of  the 
group.     The  class  character  of  honor  has  always 


MORALIZATION  OF  NATIONAL  HONOR      157 

maintained  a  minimum  moral  level,  first  by  de- 
fining the  principles  to  be  embodied  in  the  code, 
and  secondly  by  demanding  rigorous  observance 
of  them. 

Rigorous  observance  of  the  code  insured  mor- 
alization  and  an  unselfish  minimum.  That  is  to 
say,  a  member  was  always  free  to  improve  the 
code,  to  make  it  even  more  unselfish  and  exacting 
so  far  as  his  personal  conduct  was  concerned; 
but  improvement  could  not  be  a  peculiar  interpre- 
tation which  he  might  give  to  the  term  himself. 
The  class  determines  whether  the  variations  are 
indeed  unselfish.  It  is  quite  conceivable,  for  ex- 
ample, that  the  medical  profession  would  not  con- 
demn the  practice  of  free  service  to  the  poor, 
though  the  ethics  of  the  profession  does  not  in- 
clude this  in  the  "irreducible  minimum."  But 
self-advertising  would  never  receive  anything 
but  rigid  condemnation.  Physicians  could  erect 
a  specious  justification  for  advertising  them- 
selves. They  might  regard  themselves  as  such 
skilled  practitioners  that  it  was  performing  a 
service  to  get  themselves  before  the  public.  But 
the  profession  as  a  whole  passes  upon  these  mat- 
ters and  no  individual  interpretations  of  honor 
such  as  this  would  be  likely  to  receive  approval. 
It  is  to  keep  alive  the  spark  of  altruism  that 


158        WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

sputters  in  the  winds  of  all  our  selfish  instincts 
and  passions,  that  we  reserve  the  sacred  term 
"honor." 

Now  the  great  difficulty  with  our  conception  of 
national  honor  is  that  we  have  transferred  an 
ideal  from  the  individual  to  the  nation  without 
providing  for  the  corrective  influences  that  would 
insure  its  moralization.  First  of  all  we  have 
failed  to  admit  in  international  politics  that  if 
national  honor  means  anything  at  all,  it  must  he 
a  class  ideal,  and  it  is  the  family  of  nations  which 
comprises  that  class  as  it  is  the  whole  community 
of  physicians  which  makes  it  possible  to  talk  of 
the  honor  of  the  medical  profession,  for  example. 
So  long  as  we  renounce  the  class  character  of  na- 
tional honor  and  accept  instead  the  theory  that 
each  nation  must  have  its  own  code,  it  is  stupid  to 
call  it  "honor"  We  might  call  it  "  self-preserva- 
tion," or  the  "law  of  national  life."  But  if  we 
take  a  term  that  has  a  very  specific  moral  impli- 
cation, remove  it  from  its  context,  and  then  apply 
it  to  something  to  which  it  does  not  belong  by  a 
stretch  of  the  most  liberal  interpretation,  we  con- 
demn ourselves  not  only  of  stupidity  but  of  hy- 
pocrisy. 

An  equivalent  corrective,  of  course,  would  be 
some  sort  of  a  recognition  by  the  family  of  na- 
tions of  certain  ideals  of  international  polity  with 


MORALIZATION  OF  NATIONAL  HONOR      159 

respect  to  questions  of  honor.  International 
law,  however,  covers  only  the  approved  practices 
of  war,  and  does  not  provide  checks  against  the 
abuse  of  the  honor  justification.  By  renouncing 
the  class  character  of  honor  among  states  which 
we  accept  in  the  case  of  persons,  we  have  lost  the 
best  opportunity  for  the  moralization  of  national 
honor,  and  have  in  our  moral  dilemna  come  to 
confuse  the  whole  matter  in  a  maze  of  emotional 
obscurity  in  which  the  unconscious  forces  of  self- 
seeking  and  natiofial  ambition  not  only  determine 
our  action  but  color  our  whole  tJwiking. 

There  is  another  possible  corrective  influence 
which  we  have  just  as  deliberately  denied  to  na- 
tional honor;  namely  the  free  and  unrestrained 
discussion  of  points  of  honor  within  a  nation  as 
disputes  arise.  When  the  "custodians  of  the  na- 
tional honor"  declare  that  "honor  is  at  stake," 

"Theirs  not  to  reason  why, 
Theirs  but  to  do  and  die." 

Any  rational  discussion  of  it  is  an  indication  to 
the  angry  Junker,  not  of  a  desire  to  be  fair  or 
sensible,  but  of  cowardice  and  treason.  Such 
discussion  is  vigorously  suppressed  and  in  this 
way  the  other  possible  corrective  check  for  honor 
is  also  lost. 

Consequently  if  we  wish  to  restore  to  honor  the 


160        WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

ethical  sanction  which  it  has  lost  through  persist- 
ent abuse  and  perversion,  we  will  have  to  take 
an  entirely  different  attitude  toward  criticism 
from  without  as  well  as  to  that  from  within.  In- 
ternal suppression  of  views  on  honor  when  these 
views  happen  to  be  unpopular,  will  have  to  be 
abandoned,  and  external  criticism  will  have  to 
be  embraced.  In  this  way  alone  can  we  hope  to 
approach  that  ideal  which  must  ultimately  lead  to 

an  INTERNATIONAL  HONOR. 

Unless  we  consciously  introduce  these  correc- 
tives and  encourage  criticism,  we  must  sooner  or 
later  fall  into  the  untenable  position  of  the  mili- 
tarist who  respects  force  more  than  justice.  All 
the  nations  rigorously  adhere  to  the  principle  that 
a  national  desire  if  it  is  a  matter  of  national  honor 
(and  it  is  hard  to  discover  a  dispute  that  could 
not  be  changed  into  a  dispute  of  honor)  must  be 
enforced  even  in  defiance  of  the  moral  judgment 
of  the  world.  No  concert  of  powers,  no  inter- 
national code,  can  pass  judgment  on  the  right  or 
wrong  of  a  question  of  honor.  Behind  the  pre- 
text of  this  justification,  nations  have  taken  such 
unwarranted  stands,  that  the  statement  that 
"honor"  (with  all  its  vague  implications) ,  cannot 
be  arbitrated,  is  a  euphonious  way  of  saying, 
might  is  right. 

If  instead  of  passing  individual  judgment,  na- 


MORALIZATION  OF  NATIONAL  HONOR      161 

tions  would  consent  to  accept  the  judgment  of  an 
impartial  world  court,  then  unwillingness  to  arbi- 
trate the  disputes  which  this  world  court  declared 
involved  honor,  would  not  indicate  an  adher- 
ence to  the  ethics  of  force.  It  might  be  that  such 
a  body  would  err,  but  a  majority  opinion  of  an 
impartial  group  of  men  trained  in  affairs  of  honor 
would  at  least  be  the  best  approximation  to  jus- 
tice that  civilization  affords.  It  is  sometimes 
true  that  the  majority  is  wrong,  and  a  nation  that 
stands  alone  might  be  nearest  the  tioith.  But  the 
chance  for  this  is  slight.  The  acceptance  of  an 
impartial  judgment  rendered  by  a  court  on  af- 
fairs of  honor,  though  it  might  not  insure  justice, 
at  least  recognizes  that  truth  must  be  sought  in 
the  spirit  of  truth,  that  it  is  an  attribute  of  the 
mind,  not  of  the  cannon. 

The  last  step  in  the  moralization  process  would 
demand  a  clear  recognition  that  honor  is  an  ethi- 
cal complex  implying  the  honor  of  two  parties. 
Morally  regarded  a  nation  cannot  dishonor  an- 
other without  dishonoring  itself,  any  more  than 
one  man  can  hold  another  "in  the  ditch  without 
himself  remaining  there."  We  recognize  this 
principle  in  the  case  of  individuals.  A  man  dis- 
honors himself  in  dishonoring  a  woman.  But  in 
the  case  of  nations  we  feel  that  we  can  assert  our 
honor  independently,  and  do  not  realize  that  at 


162        WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

the  very  best  our  honor  is  only  a  fractional  part 
of  the  "integral  moral  complex"  which  must  em- 
brace the  honor  of  the  other  side.  Just  as  a 
concavity  and  a  convexity  are  indispensable  to  a 
curvature,  so  there  can  be  no  ethical  honor  of  one 
country  that  is  coupled  with  a  violation  of  the 
honor  of  another.  All  wars  have  resulted  from 
this  one-sided  conception  of  honor. 

The  one-sided  aberration  which  pervades  all 
our  political  thinking  in  connection  with  the  ma- 
terial out  of  which  wars  grow,  recurs  even  in  this 
purely  moral  question.  It  is  true  that  nations 
do  not  mean  to  stain  the  honor  of  other  countries 
in  asserting  their  own,  and  that  rationally  consid- 
ered they  believe  in  the  two-fold  obligation  which 
genuine  honor  implies.  Wars  of  conflicting  hon- 
ors however  would  be  impossible  if  one  nation 
felt  that  the  defense  of  its  own  honor  was  not 
complete  without  the  protection  of  the  honor  of 
the  other.  If  this  had  been  the  attitude  of  na- 
tions, then  the  wars  of  honor  of  the  past  would 
have  to  be  explained  as  the  repeated  phenomena 
of  one  nation  proudly  defending  its  honor  against 
another  who  persistently  refuses  to  affront  it,  but 
whose  purpose  in  fact  is  protection.  We  have  a 
situation  of  double  defense  with  no  attack.  Dr. 
Felix  Adler  in  this  connection  says — 

"The  great  ethical  error  of  the  world  till  now 


MORALIZATION  OF  NATIONAL  HONOR      163 

has  been  that  in  righteous  self-defense  men  have 
become  most  unrighteous,  because  in  self-defense 
they  have  thought  of  their  right  as  sundered  from 
the  right  of  others.  Yet  my  right  is  but  one 
blade  of  the  shears,  and  the  right  of  my  fellow, 
even  though  he  be  the  aggressor,  is  the  other 
blade.  .  .  .  The  employer  announces  his  inten- 
tion to  crush  the  union  of  laborers,  and  in  his 
blind  assertion  of  the  fractional  right  which  is  his, 
he  destroys  the  integral  right  which  is  com- 
pounded of  his  and  theirs." 

Of  course  the  reason  that  honor  has  fallen  into 
this  moral  confusion  and  one-sidedness,  is  because 
the  object  of  loyalty  has  been  the  nation  and  not 
humanity.  To  give  honor  genuine  moral  valid- 
ity, "the  basis  of  loyalty  will  have  to  be  broad- 
ened," and  the  ideal  of  honor  as  peculiar  posses- 
sions of  fractional  sections  of  hiunanity  will  have 
to  yield  to  a  more  comprehensive  ideal.  By  in- 
creasing the  area  of  moral  obligation  we  will  elim- 
inate this  paradox  of  honor.  Insistence  upon  a 
national  honor  has  very  naturally  diverted  men 
from  a  wider  code  and  more  fundamental  general 
principles  of  morality.  The  serious  moral  objec- 
tion to  all  codes  of  honor  is  that  they  are  frac- 
tional, and  sufficient  unto  themselves,  bearing  no 
relation  to  larger  aggregates  of  people.  The 
Southern  patriot  who  owed  undivided  allegiance 


164        WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

to  the  South  and  its  honor,  found  it  hard  to  yield 
to  the  demands  of  a  more  comprehensive  national 
honor. 

The  moral  world  is  a  unit  in  which  every  act 
must  bear  a  very  definite  relation  to  the  whole. 
"The  pebble  that  is  thrown  into  the  pond  des- 
troys the  center  of  gravity  of  the  universe." 
Every  act  if  it  is  to  be  moral  must  take  into  ac- 
count the  continuity  of  ethical  conduct.  Na- 
tional boundaries  cannot  be  used  as  legitimate 
barriers  to  interiiipt  this  continuity. 

The  steps  in  the  moralization  of  national  honor 
would  be,  first,  rationalization  and  universaliza- 
tion;  secondly,  the  providing  of  adequate  correc- 
tives against  its  demoralization,  by  the  acceptance 
of  external  criticism  and  internal  discussion; 
thirdly,  the  abandonment  of  the  doctrine  that 
each  nation  must  be  the  sole  judge  of  matters 
affecting  its  honor;  fourthly,  the  giving  up  of  the 
principle  of  "my  country,  right  or  wrong";  and 
lastly,  a  recognition  of  the  two-fold  implication 
of  the  honor  complex.  This  would  be  a  basis 
for  the  moralization  of  the  much  abused  and  ir- 
resistible war-slogan  of  national  honor. 


CHAPTER  X 

A    COURT   OF    INTERNATIONAL    HONOR. 
A   PROBLEM   IN    POLITICS 

In  the  last  chapter  I  outlined  the  ethical  tech- 
nique by  which  the  moralization  of  national 
honor  could  be  attained.  In  the  present  chapter 
we  will  consider  an  equally  effective  political 
scheme  for  accomplishing  the  same  purpose. 

It  is  an  ethical  truism  that  one  country's 
national  honor  will  approach  perfect  moral- 
ization only  in  so  far  as  it  takes  into  account  the 
just  demands  of  other  countries.  Excessive  and 
unjust  requirements  must  be  modified  to  meet  the 
legitimate  aspirations  of  other  nations,  if  any 
particular  code  of  national  honor  is  to  become 
moral. 

Now  in  order  to  make  these  ethical  adjust- 
ments with  regard  to  foreign  policies  one  thing 
is  imperative.  It  is  necessary  that  all  the  nations 
enunciate  very  definitely  and  clearly  their  respec- 
tive codes  of  honor,  declaring  in  unequivocal 
terms  those  elements  of  foreign  policy  which  if 
disputed  would  involve  national  honor.     Without 

165 


166        WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

such  diplomatic  candor  nothing  can  he  accom- 
plished. 

To  facilitate  the  articulation  and  the  later  ad- 
justment of  separate  honor  policies,  a  court  of 
INTERNATIONAL  HONOR  must  be  Created  in  which 
all  the  distinct  national  obligations  of  honor  will 
be  considered  and  compared.  To  formulate  a 
code  of  honor  which  will  embrace  for  each  nation 
all  the  important  elements  of  foreign  policy  that 
might  be  said  to  involve  honor,  will,  it  is  true, 
be  a  colossal  and  embarrassing  task.  The  vague 
character  of  "honor,"  the  ease  with  which  it 
may  be  involved  in  almost  any  dispute,  and 
the  elusive  way  in  which  it  escapes  defini- 
tion, would  make  the  function  of  the  court 
"delicate"  indeed.  But  more  than  this,  its  func- 
tion would  be  impeded  by  the  fact  that  na- 
tions would  very  reluctantly  remove  their  honor 
skeletons  from  the  diplomatic  closets  to  expose 
them  to  the  scorn  of  an  international  pub- 
lic opinion.  It  is  quite  possible  for  a  nation  to 
accept  silently  in  time  of  peace  a  specious  foreign 
policy,  and  were  it  disputed,  to  rise  deluded  by 
passion  and  proclaim  it  a  matter  of  national  honor 
to  defend  it ;  it  is  quite  another  thing  for  a  nation 
to  declare  in  a  time  of  dispassionate  calm,  before 
a  world  tribunal,  that  it  proposed  to  adhere  as  an 
obligation  of  honor  to  a  policy  which  was  ob- 


A  COURT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  HONOR      167 

viously  one  of  questionable  character.  A  nation 
preserves  its  sense  of  justice  as  well  as  its  sense  of 
humor  much  better  in  times  of  peace  than  in  a 
moment  of  impending  war. 

The    COURT   OF    INTERNATIONAL    HONOR   WOuld 

not  necessarily  be  a  Court  of  Ai'bitration.  Its 
task  of  defining,  codifying  and  amending  the  sep- 
arate national  codes  of  honor  in  accordance  with 
the  political,  economic  and  social  demands  and 
aspirations  of  the  respective  nations,  would  more 
than  justify  its  existence.  It  is  to  be  expected 
that  the  problem  of  defining  in  any  adequate  way 
the  obhgations  imposed  by  a  nation's  honor  upon 
its  foreign  policies,  will  be  a  delicate  thing,  and 
it  will  in  many  cases  help  matters  to  define  the 
codes  by  a  process  of  definite  exclusion  of  certain 
matters  as  those  not  involving  honor,  as  well  as 
by  inclusion. 

Let  us  suppose  such  a  Court  to  exist.  What 
would  be  the  ease  with  which  a  given  dispute,  ap- 
parently involving  economics  or  politics,  could  be 
converted  into  an  affair  of  honor.  Let  us  sup- 
pose further,  that  England  had  incorporated  into 
her  code  of  honor  which  was  on  record  at  the 
Court,  that  she  would  never  regard  a  boundary 
dispute  as  an  affair  involving  her  honor.  And 
suppose  that  the  Venezuelan  boundary  dispute 
should  come  up  again.     Any  complications  of 


168        WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

such  a  dispute  that  might  arise  because  of  offen- 
sive attitudes  or  abusive  language  would  be  the 
only  possible  "honor"  ground  on  which  the  two 
nations  might  clash.  But  no  nation  would  really 
go  to  war  because  of  a  mere  attitude  or  a  shghting 
phrase  used  by  one  diplomat  to  another.  The 
court  then  would  be  asked  to  determine  whether 
the  dispute  was  a  boundary  matter  without  "com- 
plications." England  would  not  be  compelled  to 
abide  by  the  decision,  but  at  least  she  would  have 
the  clearly  articulated  judgment  of  an  authorita- 
tive Court  that  the  dispute  involved  a  question  of 
boundary  and  nothing  else,  and  that  if  she  went  to 
war  about  it,  it  would  be  in  violation  of  her 
pledge  as  embodied  in  her  code  of  honor. 

This  purely  judicial  function  of  determining 
whether  a  given  dispute  falls  under  one  of  the 
articulated  categories  of  the  respective  national 
codes  of  honor  bears  no  relation  at  all  to  the  ques- 
tion of  arbitrating  these  disputes.  When  Con- 
gress passes  an  Anti-Trust  Law  defining  a  trust 
as  a  monopoly  in  restraint  of  trade  and  the  Su- 
preme Court  is  called  in  to  decide  whether  or  not 
a  certain  practice  or  combination  is  in  restraint 
of  trade,  we  have  not  delegated  to  the  Supreme 
Court  the  power  to  pass  Anti-Trust  legislation. 

The  effect  of  articulating  and  codifying  the  re- 
spective codes  of  honor  would  be  twofold.     A 


A  COURT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  HONOR      169 

frank  analysis  of  the  whole  problem  in  the  task  of 
defining  and  collating,  would  bring  to  the  surface 
all  sorts  of  hidden  and  obscure  sources  of  conflict 
which  would  not  bear  up  under  reason  and  the 
moral  pressure  of  an  organized  Court.  Definite 
codification  in  the  international  court  of 
HONOR  would  have  the  effect  of  stripping  the 
honor  sentiment  of  its  pettiness,  its  foolishness, 
and  its  morbid  "touchiness."  The  vague  concept 
in  the  case  of  each  nation  would  be  rationalized 
into  a  definite  body  of  honor  demands  which  could 
not  be  generalized,  emotionalized,  or  stretched  in 
their  meaning  and  application.  The  existence  of 
a  definite  code  and  a  Court  of  Honor  would  be  a 
verj^  effective  "restraining  influence"  on  the  ex- 
cesses of  the  honor  justification. 

A  similar  court  of  honor  was  instituted  in  the 
days  of  chivalry  and  dueling,  and  its  effect  was 
to  rationalize  the  whole  conception  on  generally 
accepted  ideals.  The  air  was  cleared  of  emotion 
and  passion  and  definite  rational  standards  re- 
placed nondescript  moral  emotions,  which,  just 
as  they  had  no  definite  character  in  themselves, 
needed  no  definite  stimuli  to  arouse  them.  A 
codification  of  national  honors  done  in  the  light 
of  an  international  public  opinion  would  result 
in  establishing  the  sentiment  upon  a  universal  in- 
terpretation  of   right   and   justice,    and   would 


170        WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

create  an  atmosphere  which  would  make  adjust- 
ment and  moralization  possible.  Without  know- 
ing very  accurately  the  data  which  we  wish  to  ra- 
tionalize and  adjust  to  broader  principles  of  hu- 
manity, it  would  indeed  be  difficult  to  make  any 
progress.  Our  first  step  in  moralization  is  to 
know  the  raw  material,  the  things  to  be  moralized ; 
and  here  codification  of  clearly  articulated  policies 
would  be  imperative. 

In  addition  to  paving  the  way  for  moralization, 
a  codification  of  national  honors  would  bring  to 
light  all  the  potential  honor  conflicts.  Such  a 
process  would  not  be  anticipating  wars  which 
might  otherwise  rest,  potentially  smoldering,  be- 
cause there  would  arise  altogether  too  many  con- 
flicts involving  one  nation  after  another,  for  war 
to  appear  in  any  way  attractive  or  sensible  for 
the  settling  of  these  disputes.  The  United 
States  for  example  might  clash  with  nearly  the 
whole  world  on  the  JNIonroe  Doctrine,  with  Japan 
on  the  question  of  immigration,  with  Canada  on 
tariff  arrangements,  with  Japan  again  with  re- 
gard to  the  Philippines,  involving  perhaps  every 
other  nation  on  the  globe.  With  such  an  array  of 
possible  honor  disputes  for  the  United  States  to 
settle,  we  would  refrain  from  declaring  war 
against  the  entire  world.  When  the  enemy  is  a 
single  nation  and  when  the  offense  is  a  single 


A  COURT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  HONOR      171 

offense  clearly  perceived,  the  chance  for  war 
is  great;  but  when  the  offenses  are  only  poten- 
tial, when  they  are  numerous,  and  when  they 
involve  almost  every  other  nation,  the  situa- 
tion is  quite  different.  Since  disagreements 
would  all  of  them  be  merely  academic,  and 
brought  about  not  in  the  course  of  an  actual 
clash,  but  simply  as  a  result  of  an  honest  de- 
sire to  remove  and  adjust  the  potential  causes 
of  friction,  it  is  very  likely  that  a  certain  amount 
of  judicial  calm  would  envelop  the  disputes.  To 
say  that  there  would  be  a  great  world  conflagra- 
tion anticipated,  is  to  overlook  the  scale  upon 
which  such  a  war  would  have  to  be  repeated  and 
repeated.  The  alignment  of  enemy  and  friend 
would  be  so  complicated  that  war  would  be  im- 
possible and  highly  unreasonable.  With  the  in- 
terplay, and  overlapping  of  economic,  political 
and  social  interests,  generally,  no  nation  would 
be  a  clear-cut  and  absolute  enemy  to  any  other 
nation,  and  every  nation  would  probably  be 
in  some  measure  an  enemy  to  all  other  nations. 
With  a  clear  declaration  of  honor  policies  and 
their  resulting  conflicts j,  there  would  be  such  com- 
plicated disagreements,  oppositions  and  align- 
ments, each  nation  being  the  center  of  a  rapid 
fire  of  criticism  of  its  articulated  honor  policies 
that  there  would  be  engendered  as  the  only  alter- 


17«        WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

native  to  perpetual  world  war,  a  candid  desire 
to  adjust  these  manifold  disagreements.  All 
phases  of  the  diplomatic  negotiations,  it  is  safe 
to  say,  as  a  result  of  the  present  war,  will  be  fol- 
lowed by  an  intelligent  and  enlightened  public  in- 
terest wliich  will  help  to  clear  the  atmosphere  of 
greed  and  unreasonableness.  In  the  fii'e  of  an 
international  pubhc  opinion  working  on  the  whole 
honor  problem,  national  honor  will  be  divorced 
from  national  advantage. 

In  the  great  kaleidoscopic  jumble  of  potential 
honor  conflicts  which  the  codification  would  give 
rise  to  in  the  International  Court,  the  ahgnments 
of  national  interests  would  criss-cross  in  so  many 
ways  that  where  with  respect  to  the  Bagdad  rail- 
way, for  example,  England  would  be  an  enemy 
to  Germany,  she  would  be  a  friend  to  her  with 
respect  to  their  common  opposition  to  the  INIonroe 
Doctrine.  It  is  not  reasonable  to  suppose  that 
England,  in  view  of  this  paradoxical  relation  of 
friendship  and  emnity,  would  first  fight  against 
Germany  on  account  of  her  ambition  for  an  open- 
ing into  the  East,  then  turn  around  and  ally  her- 
self with  Germany  to  fight  America  because  of 
common  antagonism  to  the  INIonroe  Doctrine. 
France  would  be  with  Belgium  in  the  matter  of 
her  inviolable  neutrality  but  against  her  with  re- 


A  COURT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  HONOR      173 

spect  to  the  Belgian  Congo.  This  does  not  mean 
that  she  would  both  fight  and  protect  Belgium. 
And  so  we  would  find  if  all  policies  were  clearly 
enunciated,  that  each  nation  would  in  one  or 
more  respects  be  a  friend  as  well  as  a  potential 
enemy  to  every  other  nation. 

This  great  confusion  would  of  itself  convince 
rulers  and  diplomats  of  the  sheer  madness  of 
casting  their  choice  for  war  as  a  means  of  settle- 
ment. It  would  place  each  nation  in  the  impos- 
sible condition  of  expecting  the  support  of  a  coun- 
try with  respect  to  an  honor  policy  with  which 
that  country  sympathized,  on  the  one  hand,  and 
on  the  other  hand,  seeking  to  defeat  by  war  the 
same  country  because  of  its  opposition  to  another 
honor  policy.  But  perhaps  the  greatest  effect  of 
the  Court  of  International  Honor  would  be  felt 
in  the  public  education  which  would  follow  as  a 
result  of  the  destruction  of  secret  diplomacy 
and  the  consequent  exposure  of  the  unworthi- 
ness  of  many  national  honor  policies  of  every 
country,  followed  by  the  awakening  realization 
of  the  utter  stupidity  of  resorting  to  war  as  a 
means  of  settling  these  bewilderingly  numerous 
and  totally  unreasonable  diplomatic  claims. 
When  this  clearing  process  begins,  when  peo- 
ple  are   ready   to    abandon   the   ideal   of    "my 


174,        WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

country  right  or  wrong,"  we  will  have  made  the 
greatest  step  in  internationalization  that  has  yet 
been  achieved. 

The  codes  that  are  compiled  will  of  course 
have  to  be  painfully  specific  and  definite.  As 
time  goes  on  each  nation  will  want  to  modify  and 
amend  its  honor  policies.  However  difficult  this 
may  be,  the  situation  will  have  to  be  accepted, 
for  the  code  must  not  be  allowed  to  fall  behind 
the  time,  become  indefinite  or  obscure,  general  or 
ambiguous.  Uncompromising  rigidity  and  ex- 
acting definiteness  would  be  its  only  excuse  for 
being. 

The  effect  of  clear  declaration  of  policy  can 
not  be  overestimated.  Let  us  suppose  that  Eng- 
land had  definitely  stated  in  unequivocal  terms 
and  had  registered  its  attitude  with  the  Court,  to 
wit :  "That  England  will  regard  it  as  a  matter  of 
national  honor  to  use  all  its  military  and  economic 
forces  to  prevent  and  to  repel  an  invasion  of 
Belgium."  Let  us  further  suppose  that  all  the 
signatories  to  the  treaty  which  guaranteed  Bel- 
gian neutrality  had  stated  just  as  clearly  their 
position  and  recorded  these  honor  obligations 
with  the  Court.  Is  it  likely  that  in  the  face  of 
bringing  down  upon  herself  universal  condemna- 
tion through  a  violation  of  the  honor  obligations 
of  the  civilized  world,  Germany  would  have  dared 


A  COURT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  HONOR      175 

to  invade  Belgium?  It  is  said  that  if  England's 
attitude  alone  had  been  clearly  perceived,  if  Ger- 
many had  been  sure  that  England's  honor  was 
genuinely  bound  up  with  Belgian  neutrality,  it  is 
very  doubtful  whether  she  would  have  gone  to 
war. 

Declaration  of  honor  policies  would  clear  the 
international  skies  from  all  the  overhanging 
clouds  of  suspicion  and  fear,  and  would  eliminate 
secret  diplomacy  and  national  subterfuge,  hidden 
undercurrents  of  policy,  and  all  the  other  ma- 
terial out  of  which  wars  arise. 

Who  can  say  how  many  wars  have  been  averted 
through  the  clear  and  definite  articulation  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  for  example?  The  very  clar- 
ity with  which  the  doctrine  is  couched,  has  served 
to  ward  off  possible  opposition  to  it  which  nations 
might  have  felt  in  the  dim  regions  of  subconscious 
antagonism.  Our  position  is  so  clearly  under- 
stood that  an  offense  to  our  honor  in  that  par- 
ticular could  not  hide  behind  any  veil  of  misun- 
derstanding, fear  or  suspicion.  It  would  be 
clearly  an  insult  to  our  honor  not  unconsciously, 
but  because  of  the  definiteness  of  the  Doctrine, 
deliberately  inflicted.  Nations  rarely  oppose  a 
clearly  enunciated  policy,  but  fight  more  ef- 
fectively when  the  purpose  of  a  war  is  vague, 
elastic  and  indefinite,     It  is  something  of  the  psy- 


176        WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

cholog}^  of  wonder  which  makes  wars  successful. 
If  the  real  causes  of  wars  which  usually  come  out 
specifically  in  the  terms  of  peace,  were  blazoned 
before  the  people  before  the  wars,  it  is  doubtful 
whether  such  an  atmosphere  of  candor  would  add 
zest  to  the  patriot.  Confusion,  vagueness,  gen- 
eralities, and  the  indefinite  irresistible  slogan  of 
national  honor,  are  the  very  air  which  the  war 
spirit  breathes. 

The  value  of  definiteness  and  codification  of 
honor  principles  and  policies  lies  of  course  chiefly 
in  that  they  would  remove  the  temptation  to 
emotionalize  the  issue.  Stripped  of  its  vague 
emotional  accretions  and  boldly  defined,  a  dispute 
of  honor  will  lose  its  irresistible  glamor  which  in- 
heres more  than  in  anything  else  in  its  very  in- 
definiteness,  and  it  will  become  a  legal  or  ju- 
dicial question  relatively  easy  to  settle.  Wolff, 
in  his  suggestive  work  on  "International  Govern- 
ment," cites  an  interesting  example  of  the  effect 
of  rational  preventives  on  the  matter  of  devitaliz- 
ing the  emotional  possiblities  of  an  honor  dispute. 

"There  will  never  be  a  case  in  which  national 
honor  is  more  dangerously  and  vitally  affected 
than  it  was  in  the  Dogger  Bank  incident.  The 
danger  lay  in  the  fact  that  the  honor  of  the  Rus- 
sian fleet  was  in  question  when  Lord  Lansdowne 
demanded  apologj^  .  .  .  War  as  usual  in  such 


A  COURT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  HONOR      177 

cases  appeared  inevitable.  .  .  .  But  it  so  hap- 
pened that  there  had  been  invented  at  the  first 
Hague  Conference  a  Procedure  of  International 
Inquiry  which  enabled  the  Dogger  Bank  ques- 
tion to  be  put  to  a  Tribunal  in  a  judicial  form. 
A  difference  involving  honor  was  therefore  re- 
duced to  the  common  legal  and  judicial  question 
of  fact  and  of  the  degree  of  responsibility  and 
blame  attaching  to  the  different  persons  for  the 
results  of  certain  actions.  And  so  the  inevitable 
war  was  avoided." 

Another  very  important  constructive  thing 
could  be  done  with  the  welter  of  conflicting  na- 
tional honor  demands  which  the  Court  would 
have  at  its  disposal.  The  Court  of  International 
Honor  would  be  a  Clearing  House  which  would 
deal  in  national  honor  securities  and  consequently 
be  in  a  fair  position  to  pass  on  the  solvency, 
the  moral  validity  of  the  separate  securities 
in  the  light  of  broader  principles  of  justice 
and  humanity.  Out  of  this  great  mass  of  honor 
policies  some  will  recommend  themselves  as  gen- 
uine while  others  will  condemn  themselves  as 
spurious.  The  Court  might  not  have  the  power 
to  compel  a  nation  to  withdraw  its  insistence  upon 
some  policy  which  it  did  not  approve.  But  it  is 
not  overoptimistic  to  hope  that  such  a  Court  might 
be  invested  with  the  power  of  recommendation. 


178        WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

The  constructive  work  of  the  Court  of  Inter- 
national Honor,  then,  would  he  to  calamine  and 
collate  certain  honor  policies  of  the  separate  na- 
tions, which  it  approved;  to  incorporate  them 
into  a  Code  of  International  Honor;  to  put 
the  moral  force  and  if  possible  the  military  force 
of  a  League  to  Enforce  Peace,  behind  these  ac- 
cepted policies.  Such  a  code  would  be  the 
only  sustaining  sentiment  for  any  international 
police  force  that  might  be  created  after  the 
war,  and  the  advantage  of  the  codification  of 
this  sentiment  of  honor  in  its  various  aspects, 
would  be  to  make  the  function  of  the  international 
force  clear  and  definite.  The  result  would 
be  not  only  that  it  would  know  exactly  what 
to  do,  but  that  the  separate  nations  would  know 
clearly  and  in  advance  what  not  to  do,  which 
so  far  as  securing  peace  is  concerned  is  a  great 
deal  more  important. 

Of  course  what  would  be  incorporated  into  this 
international  code  of  honor  would  be  only  the 
generous  national  honor  policies,  to  which  would 
be  added  generally  accepted  practices  of  interna- 
tional law.  For  example,  America's  protectorate 
over  Cuba  might  very  probably  be  approved  by 
a  majority  vote  of  the  Court,  and  be  incorporated 
into  the  new  international  code  behind  which 
would  be  placed  all  the  military  and  moral  power 


A  COURT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  HONOR      179 

of  the  nations.  England's  policy  in  New  Zea- 
land, America's  attitude  toward  the  Panama 
Canal,  France  in  Morocco,  and  other  definite  and 
more  or  less  approved  policies  would  be  specific- 
ally embodied  with  the  result  that  it  would  not 
only  strengthen  these  accepted  policies,  but  by 
contrast  would  lend  a  moral  weakness  and  naked- 
ness to  these  excluded  policies,  even  though  the 
court  did  not  have  the  power  to  condemn  and 
eliminate  the  more  selfish  practices  of  individual 
national  honors.  The  silent  condemnation  which 
in  effect  exclusion  from  an  international  code  of 
honor  would  mean,  might  work  wonders. 

The  plan  of  codification  together  with  an  or- 
ganized force  behind  the  code  is  not  Utopian. 
Such  a  staunch  nationalist  as  Ex-President 
Roosevelt  endorses  some  such  scheme. 

"My  proposal  is  that  the  efficient  civilized  na- 
tions— those  that  are  efficient  in  war  as  well  as 
in  peace — shall  join  in  a  world  League  for  the 
peace  of  righteousness. —  This  means  that  they 
shall  by  solemn  covenant  agree  as  to  their  re- 
spective rights  which  shall  not  be  questioned; 
that  they  shall  agree  that  all  other  questions  aris- 
ing between  them  shall  be  submitted  to  a  Court 
of  Arbitration." 

But  the  new  world  League  to  Enforce  Peace 
will  not  be  able  to  proceed  on  the  basis  of  a  mere 


180        WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

pooling  of  selfish  national  aims.  Each  one  of 
these  aims  will  have  to  stand  the  test  of  interna- 
tional validity.  Such  validity  will  he  determined 
by  an  international  public  opinion  influencing  the 
Court  and  its  work.  The  trouble  with  interna- 
tional public  opinion  heretofore  has  been  that  it 
was  not  organized ;  that  there  was  no  official  body 
through  which  it  could  express  itself,  so  that  any 
moral  pressure  which  it  would  unquestionably 
have  been  able  to  exert  if  it  had  been  organized 
and  articulated,  has  been  lost.  Wells  correctly 
says,  that  "the  trouble  with  the  peace  movement 
is  that  there  is  no  authoritative  body  whose  busi- 
ness it  is  to  see  that  peace  is  maintained." 
Nor  is  it  any  one's  business  to  crystallize  inter- 
national public  opinion  for  a  nation  about  to 
enter  war.  Of  course  a  nation  can  get  snatches 
of  foreign  sentiment  from  the  press  of  foreign 
countries,  and  from  other  public  utterances ;  but 
it  does  not  really  know  the  attitude  that  other 
nations  as  a  whole  feel  toward  it  in  a  dispute 
in  which  it  is  about  to  engage.  The  situation 
is  aggravated  by  the  desire  which  nations  feel 
to  be  neutral,  as  a  result  of  which  that  spon- 
taneous judgment  is  crushed,  which  if  it  were 
enunciated  would  help  to  create  the  strongest 
possible  instrument  for  fair  play  and  humanity. 
A  dignified  expression  of  world  opinion  upon 


A  COURT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  HONOR      181 

every  dispute  that  arose  between  nations,  would 
compel  the  nation  in  the  wrong  to  withdraw, 
or  if  not  to  withdraw  at  least  to  lose  heart, 
while  it  would  strengthen  the  side  that  was 
declared  to  be  right.  No  nation  in  its  senses 
would  willingly  disregard  the  officially  articu- 
lated judgment  of  the  nations,  to  stand  con- 
demned by  a  world  court  of  honor,  and  to  re- 
veal itself  in  the  moral  nakedness  of  an  outlaw 
among  nations.  When  the  stakes  were  large  it 
might  be  that  moral  pressure  would  be  ineffec- 
tive ;  but  when  the  issues  involved  were  less  vital, 
a  sense  of  national  humor  would  supplant  an 
unreasoning  sense  of  national  honor  and  peace- 
able adjustment  would  result.  MacFarland  has 
this  to  say  of  the  power  of  moral  pressure — 

"At  once  and  in  a  word  I  am  still  one  of  those 
who  believe  that  international  public  opinion  is 
the  power  and  the  only  power  which  can  produce 
compliance  with  the  award  of  an  international 
tribunal,  whether  that  be  an  international  arbi- 
tration tribunal  or  a  judicial  tribunal  as  a  world 
court." 

Whatever  means  are  used  to  enforce  a  judg- 
ment of  the  court,  whether  it  be  the  military 
power  of  a  society  of  nations,  economic  pressure, 
isolation,  or  the  combined  moral  pressure  of  inter- 
national public  opinion  alone,  the  important  thing 


182        WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

is  to  have  the  judgment  articulated  in  every  great 
crisis  which  might  be  seen  to  be  leading  to  war. 
The  Court  will  not  be  able  to  control  national 
honor  policies  directly,  but  its  indirect  effect 
would  be  tremendous,  and  in  so  far  as  policies  of 
aggression  were  concerned,  no  nation  would  dare 
to  violate  international  honor  in  such  a  flagrant 
way.     Elihu  Root  says  in  this  connection: 

"Law  cannot  control  national  policy,  and  it  is 
through  the  working  of  long  continued  and  per- 
sistent national  policies  that  the  present  war  has 
come.  Against  such  policies  all  attempts  at  con- 
ciliation and  understanding  and  good  will  among 
nations  of  Europe  have  been  powerless.  But 
law  if  enforced  can  control  the  external  steps  by 
which  a  nation  seeks  to  follow  a  policy,  and  rules 
may  be  so  framed  that  a  policy  of  aggression 
cannot  be  worked  out  except  through  open  viola- 
tions of  law  which  will  meet  the  protest  and  con- 
demnation of  the  world  at  large  backed  by  what- 
ever means  shall  have  been  devised  for  law  en- 
forcement." 

The  fear  that  the  moral  pressure  of  a  well- 
defined  international  judgment  will  not  be  ade- 
quate, is  unfounded.  It  is  said  that  since  the  re- 
entry of  arbitration  into  the  world  with  the  Jay 
Treaty,  there  has  not  been  a  single  important 
case  of  a  refusal  to  abide  by  a  judgment.     Na- 


A  COURT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  HONOR      183 

tions  have  often  refused  to  submit  disputes  to 
arbitration,  but  when  they  have  actually  agreed 
to  arbitrate,  "they  have  invariably  abided  by  the 
tribunal  of  their  own  choice."  In  1891  judg- 
ment had  been  given  against  Venezuela  in  favor 
of  Peru  which  the  former  refused  to  abide  by. 
But  such  cases  are  rare. 

The  proposed  International  Court  of  Honor 
then,  would  formulate  an  international  morality 
of  casus  belli,  adopted  and  sanctioned  hy  a  Con- 
gress of  powers  as  ''honorable"  policies,  upheld  by 
an  international  sentiment  of  honor,  and,  if  possi- 
ble, defended  by  the  physical  power  of  a  League 
to  Enforce  Peace.  Enough  time  has  been  de- 
voted to  giving  an  international  sanction  to  the 
rules  of  war.  After  all  it  is  not  such  a  vital  thing 
in  the  interests  of  peace  to  have  a  body  of  conven- 
tions which  recognize  certain  methods  of  killing  as 
preferable  and  more  civilized  than  others.  A 
genuine  peace  tribunal  would  consider  the  means 
of  securing  peace  rather  than  a  method  of  hu- 
manizing war.  What  would  we  think  of  a  state 
where  there  were  no  laws  against  murder,  but 
very  explicit  and  detailed  laws  governing  proper 
methods  of  murder?  The  psychological  effect 
of  such  laws  would  be  to  encourage  murder  and 
crime  by  the  very  recognition  of  them  in  law, 
even  if  that  recognition  consisted  only  in  a  most 


184.        WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

vigorous  disapproval.  A  description  of  legiti- 
mate and  approved  violence  has  no  ethical  pro- 
hibition per  se. 

In  the  place  of  the  international  honor  and 
morality  which  the  two  Hague  Conferences  codi- 
fied, and  in  which  war  was  taken  for  granted  and 
merely  humanized,  our  Court  of  International 
Honor  would  establish  an  international  morality 
of  peace,  a  clearly  enunciated  and  codified  senti- 
ment of  international  honor,  which  woidd  recog- 
nize peace  as  the  normal  and  projjer  relation 
among  states.  Aside  from  the  profound  moral 
and  ps3^chological  effect  which  this  shift  of 
emphasis  would  have,  its  practical  constructive 
influence  on  maintaining  peace  would  be  tre- 
mendous. 

The  first  chapter  in  the  code  of  international 
honor  of  course  would  be  to  recognize  the  Court's 
authority,  to  respect  its  recommendations,  and  to 
abide  by  its  judgments.  It  will  do  little  good  to 
have  a  police  force  to  enforce  judgments  if  our 
new  INTERNATIONAL  HONOR  docs  uot  acccpt  as  its 
first  obligation,  the  principle  of  abiding  and  ac- 
cepting the  Court's  judgments.  Each  nation 
must  not  be  allowed  further  to  build  up  its  own 
military  strength,  or  we  might  easily  have  an- 
other war  like  the  present,  in  which  the  forces 


A  COURT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  HONOR      185 

of  the  world  were  arraigned  against  the  military- 
power  of  a  recalcitrant  group. 

Too  much  time  must  not  be  spent  as  was  true 
at  the  second  Hague  Conference,  in  defining  the 
rights  of  neutrals.  The  "rights  of  neutrals"  im- 
portant though  they  are,  presuppose  war  and 
hence  cannot  be  said  to  be  a  step  in  the  direction 
of  peace.  The  lack  of  enthusiasm  with  which  na- 
tions have  backed  such  conventions  shows  its  ap- 
peal as  an  instrument  of  peace.  It  is  no  wonder 
that  an  international  honor  which  merely  recog- 
nized certain  approved  methods  of  war  did  not 
rouse  the  enthusiasm  of  nations.  If  Russia  and 
Japan  should  happen  to  be  at  war  and  Japan 
should  violate  the  neutrality  of  French  Indo- 
China,  it  is  not  likely  that  the  world  would  throw 
itself  into  a  paroxysm  of  offended  honor.  There 
is  nothing  in  such  an  abstract  violation  to  stir  the 
emotions,  and  without  emotions  the  psychic  recog- 
nition of  an  offense,  as  I  have  shown  elsewhere, 
is  cold  and  colorless.  A  great  deal  more  enthusi- 
asm could  be  aroused  for  constructive  ideals  of 
peace,  justice  and  humanity,  if  these  things  were 
codified  into  international  honor,  than  has 
been  aroused  by  violations  of  abstract  principles 
of  international  law  defining  the  rules  of  civilized 
barbarity. 


186        WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

There  is  little  question  that  with  regard  to  the 
rules  that  the  two  Hague  Conferences  laid  doAMi 
as  the  laws  of  war,  no  real  sense  of  ixtekxa- 
TiONAL  HONOR  exists.  This  is  not  because  na- 
tions do  not  intellectually  approve  of  the  Hague 
Conventions.  In  times  of  peace  no  nation  ever 
questions  them.  It  is  only  in  time  of  war  when 
the  intellectual  approval  finds  it  difficult  to  hold 
its  own  against  the  battering  force  of  emotional 
necessity,  that  compromise  is  inevitable  even  with 
the  most  enlightened  nations.  How  can  we  talk 
of  the  existence  to-day  of  a  sense  of  international 
honor  with  regard  to  the  rights  of  neutrals  for 
example  to  which  at  the  second  Hague  Confer- 
ence all  the  nations  were  signatories,  when  we 
have  such  a  contradiction  as  this:  "On  the  one 
hand  we  have  a  treaty  most  solemnly  guaran- 
teeing the  inviolability  or  the  permanent  neutral- 
ity of  a  country  like  Belgium  let  us  say,  and  on 
the  other  hand  the  conviction  on  the  part  of  the 
government  of  that  country  that  it  would  not  be 
justified  in  diminishing  its  army  by  one  single  sol- 
dier on  the  strenofth  of  this  guarantee." 

The  'problem  of  the  future  will  he  to  create  a 
sense  of  international  honor  that  is  not  pale  and 
divorced  from  emotion,  hut  fervent  and  militant; 
a  sense  of  international  honor  which  will  not 
merely  feel  offended  at  open  violations  of  peace 


A  COURT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  HONOR      187 

and  the  laws  of  peace,  and  the  refusal  of  a  na- 
tion to  abide  by  the  judgment  of  the  Court,  but 
an  emotional  sense  of  international  honor  that 
will  be  just  as  passionate,  just  as  virile  and  just 
as  genuine  as  national  honor  is  to-day.  Pas- 
sionate nationalism  must  be  enlarged  not  to  aca- 
demic internationalism,  but  to  a  real  throbbing 
sense  of  emotional  international  honor. 

"Only  when  the  great  nations  of  the  world 
have  reached  some  sort  of  an  agreement,"  says 
President  Wilson,  "as  to  what  they  hold  to  be 
fundamental  to  their  common  interests,  and  to 
some  feasible  method  of  acting  in  concert  when 
any  nation  or  group  of  nations  seeks  to  disturb 
those  fundamental  things,  can  we  feel  that  civili- 
zation is  at  last  in  a  way  of  justifying  its  exist- 
ence." 

The  ways  and  means  of  fusing  the  vital  human 
force  of  emotion  with  the  cold  abstraction  of 
international  honor,  which  is  to  be  the  slogan  of 
the  new  era,  will  be  considered  in  the  next  chap- 
ter. 


CHAPTER  XI 

AN    EMOTIONAL   EQUIVALENT   FOR    NATIONAL 
HONOR. 

A   PROBLEM    IN    PSYCHOLOGY 

The  emotional  values  which  are  inseparably  as- 
sociated with  national  honor  are  for  the  most  part 
not  only  aesthetic  but  indispensable  to  a  normal 
expression  of  human  nature.  It  would  be  im- 
possible to  crush  the  perfectly  natural  love  for 
these  values  without  destroying  the  source  of 
much  that  is  good  and  beautiful  in  men's  char- 
acter. Our  problem  is  either  to  change  the  im- 
pulses, or  re-shape  the  end  which  they  serve. 
Human  nature  in  its  basic  instincts  is  unchang- 
ing; national  honor  which  has  hitherto  been  the 
medium  through  which  all  the  dramatic  impulses 
have  found  collective  expression,  is  not  on  the 
other  hand,  an  absolute  unalterable  ideal.  Of  the 
two  human  nature  then  must  be  accepted  as  it  is ; 
the  dramatic  impulses  however  may  be  directed 
along  lines  of  constructive  good  toward  some- 
thing broader  and  deeper  than  merely  "national" 

188 


AN  EMOTIONAL  EQUIVALENT  189 

honor.  In  other  words  we  must  find  for  national 
honor,  which  has  up  to  the  present  been  the  sole 
incentive  for  the  dramatic  mass  tendencies  of 
men,  an  emotional  equivalent. 

It  is  altogether  human  for  every  man  occa- 
sionally to  indulge  in  violent  disHke.  It  makes 
little  difference  whether  the  object  of  the  ani- 
mosity happens  to  be  Mexico,  or  capital  or  woman 
suffrage,  or  the  Oshkosh  Gazette,  provided  only 
our  natural  disposition  to  rant,  is  satisfied.  Vehe- 
ment hatred  is  an  intense  dramatic  value  espe- 
cially when  it  carries  with  it  all  the  mass  momen- 
tum of  a  great  and  powerful  nation.  Now  then, 
we  can  either  condemn  the  human  trait  which 
seeks  an  emotional  joy  in  hatred,  or  we  can  find 
some  other  more  desirable  objective  for  this 
passion. 

In  a  similar  way  men  love  a  good  fight  with  all 
the  dramatic  possibilities  of  success  and  failure. 
The  spectacle  of  nations  in  battle  is  the  arch 
drama  of  civilization,  shot  through  with  almost 
every  possible  human  emotional  appeal.  Here 
too  we  can  either  check  pugnacity,  or  change  the 
end,  by  resetting  the  scenes  of  international  poli- 
tics; we  can  either  suppress  the  impulse  to  fight, 
or  again,  find  a  more  reasonable  objective  for  its 
activity.  Other  emotional  values  can  be  cited. 
Our  problem  then  is  to  provide  for  all  the  emo- 


190        WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

tional  values  which  inhere  in  an  expression  of 
national  honor,  a  composite  emotional  equivalent. 
The  basic  cause  for  war  is  the  impulses  which 
find  to-day  in  national  honor  alone  a  field  for 
expression.  Our  object  should  he  to  direct  these 
impulses  into  a  sentiment  of  international  honor 
which  offers  a  dramatic  and  cesthetic  setting 
within  which  they  could  express  just  as  effec- 
tively, and  provides  that  emotional  equivalent 
that  not  only  does  no  violence  to  human  nature, 
hut  ministers  to  it  as  perfectly  as  does  the  ideal  of 
national  honor.  The  dramatic  tendencies  would 
find  in  international  honor  not  only  an  en- 
larged stage  for  creative  activity,  but  a  very  much 
enlarged,  audience,  unanimously  sympathetic, 
which  circumstance  would  lend  additional  dra- 
matic force  to  any  emotion  that  might  be  felt. 
By  creating  a  sentiment  of  international  honor  in 
a  world  federation,  national  honor  would  gradu- 
ally disappear,  just  as  aggressive  state  honor 
ceased  to  exist  when  the  United  States  was  con- 
federated, even  though  state  loyalties  had  been 
passionately  strong,  and  interstate  hatreds  and 
antagonisms  equally  violent.  Every  step  in  fed- 
eration, and  federation  has  been  the  history  of 
progress,  has  involved  a  sacrifice  of  the  smaller 
honor  to  the  more  comprehensive  one.  We  are 
now  ready  to  take  the  last  step  in  increasing  the 


AN  EMOTIONAL  EQUIVALENT  191 

moral  area  of  honor,  and,  in  fact,  integrating  it, 
so  that  its  ethical  inhibitions  will  no  longer  stop 
at  the  frontier.  And  in  order  to  do  this  we  must 
bring  into  being  a  new  arena  of  conflict,  similar 
to  that  of  national  honor  in  dramatic  possibilities, 
yet  broader  in  its  basic  loyalties,  and  operating 
under  more  comprehensive  principles  of  justice 
and  right.  This  would  supply  an  emotional 
equivalent  for  the  emotions  underlying  national 
honor  which  so  long  as  human  nature  remains  as 
it  is,  must  be  retained,  while  it  would  obviate  the 
moral  shortcomings  and  the  destructive  quality 
of  national  honor.  Such  an  equivalent  would  do 
away  with  war,  at  least  in  the  intensely  national 
spirit  in  which  it  exists  to-day.  It  would  fur- 
thermore internationalize  military  power  in  the 
best  interests  of  humanity.  To  hope  for  a  world 
without  some  use  of  force  is  to  indulge  in  a  Uto- 
pian dream.  To  think  of  a  world  without  some 
ideal  of  honor  likewise,  for  which  men,  when  they 
are  roused  to  a  passionately  unselfish  idealism, 
can  lay  down  their  lives,  is  to  overlook  what  may 
be  called  the  emotional  imperative  of  human 
nature. 

If  we  are  to  retain  an  emotional  balance  in  our 
transition  from  national  to  international  honor, 
we  must  keep  all  the  dramatic  and  aesthetic  stage 
setting  and  associations  of  national  honor.     Un- 


192        WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

less  we  make  the  international  sentiment  a  real 
emotional  equivalent,  this  new  sentiment  will  not 
be  imbued  with  the  same  actuating  power  as  the 
thing  out  of  which  it  must  evolve.  We  must  be 
careful  to  preserve  all  the  outward  forms  which 
have  supplied  so  many  vital  emotional  stimuli  in 
the  complex  of  national  honor,  and  attain  the  new 
sentiment  by  changing  only  the  substance.  The 
dramatic  figure  of  the  soldier  whose  daring  and 
strength  have  become  emotionally  intrenched  in 
human  nature  through  untold  expressions  of  eu- 
logy in  song,  verse,  novels,  drama,  sculpture  and 
oratory  through  the  ages,  the  soldier's  part  must 
continue  to  be  the  title  role  in  our  new  interna- 
tional drama.  But  the  horizon  of  his  purpose 
must  be  broadened.  The  gun  with  its  tragic 
power  of  life  and  death  cannot  be  discarded  in 
our  new  setting;  but  its  thunder  must  proclaim 
a  new  note  of  high  resolve.  The  flag  must  con- 
tinue to  stream  in  the  breeze  against  the  pictur- 
esque dawn,  but  this  time  a  flag  of  new  design. 
And  if  any  international  symbol  is  to  be  inspir- 
ing, it  will  have  to  be  as  Percy  Mackaye  suggests, 
something  more  dramatic  "than  the  meek  symbol 
of  a  dove  which  the  artless  disciples  of  peace 
present."  To  destroy  the  emotional  and  moral 
ideal  of  loyalty  would  be  to  kill  the  root  of  the 
moral  life;  we  must  however  "broaden  its  basis," 


AN  EMOTIONAL  EQUIVALENT  193 

Force  must  not  be  eliminated  but  international- 
ized; valor  not  condemned  but  sensibly  applied. 
In  other  words  honor,  the  slogan  which  opens  up 
an  arena  of  passionate  conflict,  with  its  spectac- 
ular display  of  aesthetic  emotions  in  mass  setting 
must  be  preserved ;  but  the  ob j  ective  of  honor  can 
be  changed  from  national  to  international.  The 
basis  for  the  activity  of  honor  can  be  enlarged  but 
the  honor  instinct  can  not  be  stamped  out.  We 
can  increase  the  area  of  moral  obligation  but  we 
cannot  rule  the  ideal  of  obligation  out  of  men's 
consciences  by  any  impractical  scheme  of  re- 
form. 

To  say  that  the  basis  of  the  honor  obligation 
cannot  be  broadened  without  doing  violence  to 
the  dramatic  side,  and  the  emotional  value  of 
its  expression,  is  to  contradict  the  testimony 
of  history.  Honor  is  a  class  ideal,  the  ideal  of  a 
fragment  of  humanity,  the  object  of  its  loyalty 
always  being  a  group,  a  professional  class,  a  na- 
tional unit.  As  these  units  increased  and  became 
more  comprehensive,  the  honor  obligation  nat- 
urally kept  pace  to  coincide  always  with  the  new 
grouping,  for  obviously  conflicting  honor  loyal- 
ties were  never  countenanced  by  any  unit.  And 
the  history  of  federation  proves  one  thing  very 
clearly,  namely,  that  the  social  and  political  basis 
of  honor  is  not  a  constant  factor,  and  that  while 


194        WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

its  essential  nature  is  unchanging,  the  objects  of 
its  loyalty  change  with  the  vicissitudes  of  politics 
and  social  organization.  During  the  middle  ages, 
for  example,  national  honor  in  the  sense  of  loy- 
alty to  a  political  group  was  submerged  by  what 
might  be  termed  religious  honor,  the  latter  loy- 
alty crossing  political  frontiers  and  disintegrat- 
ing political  units.  On  the  other  hand  appar- 
ently incompatible  social  and  religious  units  have 
made  common  national  honor,  as,  for  example, 
the  cases  of  Austria  and  Switzerland.  In  other 
words,  the  form  of  honor,  that  is  loyalty  to  some 
definite  class,  whether  the  cohesive  bond  be  a  po- 
litical, rehgious  or  social  ideal,  has  always  been  a 
constant,  while  the  content,  that  is  the  size  or 
character  of  the  groups,  admits  readily  of  varia- 
tion. Honor  being  a  class  ideal,  it  follows  that 
the  moment  such  a  class  is  embraced  by  a  more 
comprehensive  group  the  particular  class  honor 
disappears.  When  the  separate  states  of  Amer- 
ica federated  into  the  American  Union,  the  class 
"states"  ceased  to  be  a  moral  absolute,  and  conse- 
quently the  code  of  honor  that  characterized  states 
as  distinct  moral  entities  became  an  anachronism. 
In  the  same  way  the  creation  of  a  federated 
league  of  nations,  if  the  proper  emotional  asso- 
ciations were  established  around  the  honor  ex- 
pression of  such  a  league,  would  destroy  the  class 


AN  EMOTIONAL  EQUIVALENT  195 

"nation"  as  an  aggressive  political  unit,  and 
national  honor  which  rests  upon  the  theory  that 
the  nation  is  a  moral  absolute,  would  be  modified, 
and  gradually  disappear  as  its  place  was  taken 
by  the  larger  honor  loyalty. 

Now  the  problem  for  pacifists  is  to  create 
inductively  this  new  sentiment  of  international 
honor.  A  world  federation  of  course  would  be 
imperative  as  the  first  step  in  this  direction;  but 
federation,  mechanical  and  impersonal,  would  not 
give  rise  automatically  to  a  genuine  sentiment. 
It  is  quite  possible  to  think  of  a  very  effective 
political  federation  of  nations  which  would  break 
up  into  national  states  again  in  time  of  stress  if 
the  sentiment  to  sustain  federation  were  lacking. 
On  the  other  hand  if  the  sentiment  really  existed, 
the  external  political  machinery  of  federation 
would  be  but  a  mere  form.  We  have  many  laws 
on  the  statute  books,  our  "blue  laws"  for  exam- 
ple, which  are  not  real  or  effective  because  public 
opinion  is  not  back  of  them.  The  spirit  of  law 
may  easily  have  a  very  real  existence  without 
the  letter,  but  it  does  not  work  so  easily  the  other 
way.  And  so  no  objective  political  arrange- 
ment of  nations  per  se  will  attain  our  purpose, 
without  the  sustaining  emotional  equivalent. 
An  academic  international  honor  might  be  said  to 
exist  to-day  in  the  so-called  family  of  nations,  but 


196        WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

it  is  not  a  dynamic  force  in  world  politics. 
World  organization  cannot  be  depended  upon  to 
provide  anything  but  a  very  fragile  outline;  for 
the  real  substance  of  the  new  honor  we  must  look 
elsewhere. 

We  will  not  find  the  substance  for  our  new  sen- 
timent in  "education"  and  intellectual  propa- 
ganda along  the  lines  of  internationalism.  If 
there  is  one  thing  the  present  war  eminently 
proves,  it  is  that  education  toward  world  peace 
has  not  been  effective.  Intellectual  appeals  for 
peace  do  not  seem  to  register.  ]Men  go  to  war 
fully  conscious  of  its  stupidity,  of  its  horror,  of 
its  economic  illusions,  of  its  moral  degradation. 
To  stop  war  we  must  substitute  for  the  emo- 
tions that  sustain  it,  counter  emotions  that  are 
stronger,  not  intellectual  subtleties  about  the 
legal,  political,  or  economic  advantages  of  inter- 
nationalism. We  must  administer  the  psycho- 
logical treatment  of  creating  opposite  and 
stronger  sentiments  for  the  ones  we  ^vish  to  elim- 
inate. Emotional  habits  like  physical  habits  are 
influenced  less  by  reasoning  than  by  a  sort  of 
counter  irritation. 

Instead  of  creating  an  ^'international  mindf' 
we  will  have  to  mold  the  international  heart, 
if  we  wish  to  make  real  the  dream  of  a  sentiment 
of  INTERNATIONAL  HONOR.     Instead  of  learning 


AN  EMOTIONAL  EQUIVALENT  197 

to  THINK  internationally  we  must  learn  to  feel 
internationally.  Rationally  in  time  of  peace 
most  men  "distrust  profoundly  the  common 
meaning  of  the  term  national  honor''  and  ap- 
prove some  sort  of  morality  which  does  not  stop 
at  the  border  line,  hut  in  time  of  war  the  situa- 
tion reverts  again  to  a  sort  of  emotional  determin- 
ism. National  honor  is  again  invested  with  emo- 
tional validity  that  with  respect  to  its  dynamic 
power  to  determine  action  surpasses  all  conceiv- 
able rational  incentives.  We  cannot  afford  to 
discount  this  experience  which  has  been  only  too 
often  driven  home  to  us  when  we  have  felt  intel- 
lectually so  ready  for  the  dawn  of  that  new  era 
of  permanent  peace.  We  must  recognize  the 
simple  truth  that  our  intellectual  honor  will  never 
be  THOUGHT,  but  "felt"  into  existence. 

The  fact  that  we  recognize  national  honor  to 
be  an  emotional  structure  does  not  mean  that  the 
objective  of  it  may  not  and  should  not  admit  of 
rationalization.  Such  a  process  would  be  espe- 
cially imperative  in  the  creation  of  our  new  senti- 
ment of  international  honor.  In  fact  the  more 
exacting  and  definite  that  rationalization,  the 
more  steady  would  be  the  frame-work  of  the 
whole  new  sentiment.  But  things  could  not  stop 
at  that  point.  While  the  objective  must  be  ra- 
tionalized and  broadened  from  national  to  inter- 


198        WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

national,  the  honor  complex  proper  must  be  car- 
ried over.  Into  the  new  rational  frame-work 
must  be  poured  the  emotional  content  which  is  the 
dynamic  power  of  the  whole  in  the  case  of  na- 
tional honor.  Statesmen  and  intellectuals  may 
think  international  honor  with  a  fine  discrimina- 
tion and  clarity,  but  if  we  wish  to  insure  the  sup- 
port of  nations  as  mass  units,  it  is  necessary  that 
"the  man  in  the  streets"  be  made  to  feel  the  senti- 
ment with  the  same  heart  glow  with  which  he 
senses  the  national  honor  sentiment  at  present. 
Unless  the  emotional  content  is  preserved  intact 
and  is  merely  transferred  to  the  newer  ideal  of 
international  honor,  it  is  useless  to  hope  that  it 
may  ever  become  an  effective  and  vital  equivalent. 
We  know  that  martyrs  who  will  die  for  a  convic- 
tion are  rare,  but  soldiers  and  patriots  who  will 
give  their  lives  for  a  series  of  emotional  satisfac- 
tions, are  the  most  common  thing  in  the  world. 
In  organizing  a  clientele  for  the  sentiment  of  in- 
ternational honor  therefore,  we  must  enlist  every 
device  of  psychology  to  catch  and  appeal  to  this 
side  of  human  nature.  We  must  recognize  the 
fact  that  there  are  millions  of  men  who  would 
gladly  go  to  war  even  for  peace,  because  the  ir- 
refutable argument  that  peace  can  be  secured  in 
that  way,  has  entered  them  via  the  emotions,  but 
they  would  be  slow  to  give  a  dollar  to  the  Car- 


AN  EMOTIONAL  EQUIVALENT  199 

negie  Endowment  for  International  Peace  when 
their  persuasion  that  the  Association  is  serving 
the  same  end  has  merely  been  intellectual. 

I  maintain  therefore  that  in  persuading  the 
man  in  the  streets  of  the  validity  and  idealism  of 
a  sentiment  of  international  honor,  our  public 
forum  7nust  he  the  heart  rather  than  the  mind, 
and  hy  changi^ig  our  pacifist  tactics  in  this  essen- 
tial alone  can  we  hope  to  succeed  in  the  creation 

of    the    GREAT    INTERNATIONAL    EMOTION     wMch 

would  be  the  only  abiding  and  unfaltering  guar- 
antee for  the  peace  of  the  future. 

This  change  in  our  modus  operandi  means  that 
we  will  have  to  abandon  the  profound  academic 
discussions  and  expositions  of  the  merits  of  inter- 
nationalism, all  that  abstract  argument  for  peace 
which  persuades,  and  perhaps  only  temporarily, 
only  those  who  are  already  persuaded,  and  does 
not  reach  the  great  "voiceless  masses"  who  do  the 
fighting.  I  do  not  mean  that  the  average  man 
does  not  agree  that  peace  is  to  be  preferred  to 
war,  but  of  what  avail  is  a  mild  intellectual  oppo- 
sition to  war,  when  the  heart  cries  "come."  In- 
tellectual appeals  do  not  reach  the  mass,  and  per- 
suade even  "intellectuals"  only  until  the  next  war 
approaches,  when  all  the  mental  checks  are  swept 
to  one  side. 

Pacifists,  more  than  any  group  of  reformers, 


200        WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

have  committed  what  psychologists  call  the  "in- 
tellectualist  fallacy."  Every  pacifist  argues  the 
merits  of  peace.  The  American  Association  for 
International  Conciliation  is  a  representative 
peace  society,  and  its  tactics  are  those  of  the  peace 
organizations  the  world  over.  For  more  than 
ten  years  it  has  been  rationally  educating  the 
world  for  peace  by  putting  the  leading  "jurists 
and  economists  of  the  world  at  work  in  the  service 
of  humanity  to  ascertain  just  what  have  been  and 
are  the  legal  and  economic  incidents  of  wae, 

AND  JUST  WHAT  ARE  THE  LEGAL  AND  ECONOMIC 
ADVANTAGES  TO  FOLLOW  UPON  THE  ORGANIZATION 
OF  THE  WORLD  INTO  A  SINGLE  GROUP  OF  FRIENDLY 
AND  COOPERATING  NATIONS  BOUND  TOGETHER  BY 
THE  TIE  OF  A  JUDICIAL  SYSTEM  RESTING  UPON  THE 
MORAL  CONSCIOUSNESS  OF  MANKIND." 

This  has  been  the  program  in  general  of  all 
pacifist  propaganda.  It  is  based  upon  the  erro- 
neous assumption  that  the  underlying  reason  for 
war,  in  fact  the  "only  remaining  obstacle  to 
peace!'  is  that  men  believe  in  the  economic  and 
other  advantages  of  the  military  system,  and  that 
once  this  intellectual  prop  has  been  removed, 
men  will  no  longer  see  any  sense  in  fighting. 
This  false  view  that  men  fight  out  of  a  finely  cal- 
culated economic  hedonism,  out  of  intellectual 
persuasion  of  the  advantages  of  war,  has  been  the 


AN  EMOTIONAL  EQUIVALENT  201 

Achilles  tendon  of  all  pacifist  technique.  As  I 
tried  to  show  in  my  first  chapter,  the  remote  and 
vaguely  perceived  causes  of  war  may  he  economic, 
or  the  ex-post-facto  justification  for  it,  may  he 
that  certain  henefits  are  incidental  to  war;  hut 
the  great  underlying  current  upon  which  these  in- 
tellectual perceptions  float  as  mere  huhhles  which 
burst  in  their  impotence  to  modify  the  current 
into  spray  that  is  swept  along,  the  underlying 
motives  which  actuate  nations  as  nations  to  fight, 
is  that  structure  of  emotional  imperatives  in  hu- 
man nature  which  finds  in  war  its  most  satisfying 
ohjectives.  If  then  peace  advocates  are  to  de- 
stroy the  fundamental  cause  of  war  they  must 
direct  their  efforts  to  emotional  persuasion,  to  the 
task  of  providing  an  emotional  equivalent  for  the 
buoyant  emotions  upon  which  war  rests. 

I  do  not  mean  to  say  that  leading  pacifists  do 
not  themselves  admit  the  weakness  of  intellectual 
persuasion  for  peace,  but  they  have  not  acted 
absolutely  upon  their  recognition  of  this.  Dr. 
Nicholas  Murray  Butler,  for  example,  admits 
that  "it  is  astonishing  how  even  men  of  the 
highest  intelligence  and  the  largest  responsibility 
will  be  swept  off  their  feet  in  regard  to  inter- 
national matters  at  some  moment  of  strong  na- 
tional feeling  or  on  the  occasion  of  some  incident 
which  appeals  powerfully  to  the  sentiments  or 


WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

the  passions  of  the  people.  At  the  very  moment 
when  the  nation  most  needs  the  guidance  of  its 
sober-minded  leaders  of  opinion,  that  guidance 
is  likely  to  be  found  wanting.  .  .  .  One  who 
wishes  to  know  how  difficult  it  is  to  acquire  the 
international  mind  in  the  presence  of  a  great 
wave  of  national  feeling  has  only  to  read  this  im- 
portant paper  by  Mr.  Adams"  (on  the  Trent 
Affair). 

An  interesting  illustration  of  the  failure  of  the 
"intellectualist  pacifism"  appeared  in  one  of  our 
foremost  magazines.  Several  years  ago  Norman 
Angell  wrote  his  epoch  making  work — "The 
Great  Illusion,"  which  was  generally  accepted  by 
economists  all  over  the  world.  In  speaking  of 
Alsace-Lorraine  ]Mr.  Angell  maintained  that, 
"the  whole  notion  of  national  possession  benefit- 
ing the  individual  is  founded  upon  mystification, 
upon  an  illusion.  Germanj^  conquered  France 
and  annexed  Alsace-Lorraine.  The  "Germans" 
consequently  "own"  it  and  enrich  themselves  with 
the  newly  acquired  wealth.  That  is  my  critic's 
view  as  it  is  the  view  of  most  European  states- 
men;   and    it   is    all   false.     Alsace-Lorraine   is 

OWNED    BY   ITS    INHABITANTS   AND   NOBODY   ELSE; 

AND  Germany  with  all  her  ruthlessness  has 
NOT  BEEN  able  TO  DISPOSSESS  THEM.  .  .  .  Prus- 
sia the  conqueror  pays  just  as  much  and  no  less 


AN  EMOTIONAL  EQUIVALENT  203 

than  Alsace  the  conquered  who,  if  she  were  not 
paying  this  $5,600,000  (taxes)  to  Germany, 
would  be  paying  it,  or  according  to  my  critic  a 
much  larger  sum  to  France ;  and  if  Germany  did 
not  own  Alsace-Lorraine  she  would  be  relieved  of 
charges  that  amount  not  to  five  but  many  more 
millions.  The  change  of  ownership  does  not 
therefore  of  itself  change  the  money  position  of 
either  owner  or  owned.  .  .  .  Thus  we  realize 
that  when  Germany  has  'captured'  Alsace-Lor- 
raine she  has  captured  a  province  worth  'cash 
value'  in  my  critic's  phrase,  $330,000,000. 
What  we  overlook  is  that  Germany  has  also  cap- 
tured the  people  who  own  the  property  and  who 
continue  to  own  it.  We  have  multiplied  by  X 
but  we  have  overlooked  the  fact  that  we  have  had 
to  divide  by  X." 

This  economic  truism  seemed  so  obvious  that 
political  economists  were  literally  ashamed  of 
themselves  for  not  having  seen  it  before.  And 
yet  to-day  such  an  eminent  publicist  as  Stephen 
Brooks  propounds  the  illusion  all  over  again.  In 
an  article  in  the  North  American  Review  he 
insists — 

"The  soil  of  the  lost  provinces  has  made  Ger- 
many's fortunes.  She  has  derived  from  it  her 
metallurgical  ascendancy,  the  motive  power  for 
her  industries,   her  wealth,  and  as  a  conse- 


204j        what  is  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

quence  her  moral,  military  and  political  power." 
.  .  .  "In  the  fate  of  Alsace-Lorraine  there  is  in- 
volved nothing  less  than  the  industrial  primacy 
of  Europe." 

This  position  is  the  more  absurd  when  we  real- 
ize that  in  the  last  40  years  while  the  ore  deposits 
were  in  the  "possession"  of  Germany,  it  was  a 
protective  tariff  imposed  upon  the  importation  of 
iron  from  Alsace  by  the  French  government  it- 
self, which  kept  the  ore  from  flowing  into  France 
which  it  would  have  done  to  the  extent  that 
Frenchmen  were  willing  to  pay  as  much  or  more 
for  the  ore  than  Germans. 

The  plan  of  abstract  education  as  to  the  ad- 
vantages of  peace  and  the  illusion  of  war,  has 
evidently  proved  ineffective.  By  persuading  our 
minds  for  peace  we  are  rolling  the  stone  of 
Sisyphus  which,  after  we  have  painfully  rolled  it 
almost  to  the  summit  of  the  hill,  suddenly  breaks 
from  our  grasp  as  we  become  aware  of  a  great 
emotional  upheaval;  we  turn  about  heart-broken 
only  to  follow  the  rock  as  it  tears  down  and 
crashes  to  the  bottom  again. 

The  future  of  the  peace  problem  rests  in  the 
creation  of  the  international  heart.  This  is 
not  a  plea  for  emotionalism  in  our  much  vaunted 
rational  twentieth  century,  but  a  candid  recogni- 
tion of  human  nature  as  it  is,  and  of  the  fact  that 


AN  EMOTIONAL  EQUIVALENT         «06 

the  cause  of  internationalism  therefore  will  never 
be  realized  until  this  simple  truth  has  been  taken 
into  account  in  shaping  our  peace  propaganda. 
What  good  is  it  to  know  that  "sober-minded" 
men  are  always  swept  off  their  feet  by  emotion  in 
time  of  crisis,  if  we  dismiss  this  phenomenon  and 
proceed  to  pile  up  more  arguments  to  "educate" 
more  thoroughly  these  sober  minds?  Is  it  that 
they  may  surprise  us  even  more  at  the  next  crisis  ? 
Knowing  this  it  seems  that  we  might  sensibly 
change  our  modus  operandi  instead  of  persisting 
in  propaganda  which,  we  are  continually  being 
reminded,  is  useless. 

We  must  utilize  the  wonderfully  powerful 
emotional  force  that  at  present  exists  for  war,  in 
the  interests  of  peace  by  re-setting  the  emotional 
associations  in  connection  with  which  this  un- 
reasoning force  evolves.  When  we  have  accom- 
plished this,  then  all  the  argument  in  the  world 
will  not  avail  to  persuade  us  of  the  benefits  of 
war.  When  this  change  of  heart  takes  place  we 
can  then  imagine  the  reverse  situation  becoming 
common,  namely,  a  nation  although  persuaded 
intellectually  of  the  economic  or  other  disadvan- 
tages of  a  certain  military  course  being  suddenly 
swept  off  its  feet  for  peace  by  the  compelling 
force  of  the  emotional  complex  of  international 
honor. 


206        WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

Now  the  technique  by  which  a  sentiment  of  in- 
ternational honor  can  be  created  must  be  the 
same  as  that  which  created  the  sentiment  of 
national  honor.  All  of  its  characteristics  will  be 
the  same  except  that  the  geographical  basis  of 
it  will  be  enlarged  to  include  humanity  instead  of 
mere  fragments  of  it.  We  have  seen  that  na- 
tional honor  consists  in  a  series  of  potentially 
dramatic  impulses  consecrated  by  ideal  symbols 
and  associations.  Knowing  the  inductive  steps 
by  which  national  honor  came  to  be,  our  psycho- 
logical experts  can  deductively  work  back  from 
a  hypothetical  sentiment  of  international  honor  to 
supply  a  similar  series  of  dramatic  symbols  and 
associations  for  its  sustenance. 

To  begin  with  we  are  taking  over  the  term 
honor  which  in  itself  has  a  great  deal  of  psycho- 
logic "good-will,"  and  in  creating  the  term  inter- 
national honor  we  cannot  help  transferring  much 
of  the  sacrosanct  emotional  associations  which  at- 
tach to  all  other  codes  of  honor.  As  we  have 
seen,  national  honor  acquires  most  of  its  unrea- 
soning intensity  from  the  word  "honor"  rather 
than  from  the  prefix  "national."  This  glamor 
is  given  to  us  gratis,  as  it  were,  in  laying  the  basis 
for  the  new  sentiment. 

Our  first  real  task,  of  course,  is  to  provide  the 
political  and  physical  basis  for  the  "international" 


AN  EMOTIONAL  EQUIVALENT  207 

part  of  international  honor,  that  is  some  sort  of 
working  federation  of  the  family  of  nations.  It 
is  for  statesmen  to  supply  the  political  machinery 
for  a  federation  which  will  not  take  away  from 
the  separate  states  any  more  "sovereignty"  than 
is  absolutely  necessary  for  the  creation  of  a  work- 
ing world  federation.  Without  the  physical 
basis  for  a  politically  integrated  humanity  and  an 
outward  internationalism,  a  sentiment  of  inter- 
nationalism would  hang  in  the  air.  Some  out- 
ward expression  of  international  honor  there  must 
be  to  which  the  new  sentiment  can  attach  itself 
and  begin  to  build  up  its  emotional  associative 
ramifications. 

A  definite  code  of  international  law  together 
with  a  code  of  accepted  principles  of  international 
honor  gleaned  from  the  national  codes,  and  ap- 
proved by  the  international  parliament,  will  pro- 
vide a  definite  legal  machinery  around  which  still 
further  associations  can  build  themselves.  An 
international  police  force  will  help  to  bring  into 
existence  the  "center"  for  our  sentiment.  The 
more  numerous  the  concrete  reahties  onto  which 
the  sentiment  can  be  grafted,  the  more  abiding 
will  it  be.  An  international  postal  system  with 
international  stamps,  an  international  unit  of  ex- 
change, an  international  flag,  symbols  and  songs, 
all  these  would  have  an  emotional  value.     The 


208        WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

more  frequently  the  man  in  the  streets  is  made  to 
come  into  contact  with  the  physical  machinery 
around  which  it  is  expected  that  he  mold  his  sen- 
timent of  international  honor,  the  more  spon- 
taneously will  it  arise. 

After  the  present  war  the  time  will  be  ripe 
for  the  shaping  of  this  yet  nebulous  idea  into 
a  comprehensive  policy.  And  without  question 
this  task  seems  to  belong  first  to  America.  As 
a  matter  of  fact,  she  has  already  embarked  on 
this  mission.  In  her  resolve  to  "make  the  world 
safe  for  democracy"  she  is  consecrating  her  blood 
and  treasure  not  to  an  outworn  ideal  of  national 
selfishness,  but  to  international  honor.  This  is 
her  great  justification.  It  has  not  as  yet  been 
emphasized  in  just  these  terms,  for  the  ideal  al- 
ways runs  ahead  of  its  conventional  expression. 
It  will  be  for  us,  with  our  man  of  great  heart  and 
great  vision  as  America's  spokesman,  to  give  to 
the  world  this  new  slogan,  to  make  real,  vital,  and 
emotionally  valid  by  repeated  utterances,  and  by 
every  device  of  reason,  imagination  and  art,  this 
thing  for  which  we  are  giving  our  lives.  The 
time  is  potent  with  spiritual  vitality  and  emo- 
tional glamor,  which  if  rightly  directed  by  states- 
men throughout  the  world,  may  be  made  to  em- 
body itself  in  this  international  ideal.  The  high 
task  is  already  sanctified  by  the  sufferings,  the 


AN  EMOTIONAL  EQUIVALENT  209 

sacrifices,  the  lives  of  millions  of  human  beings. 
It  is  but  for  leaders  to  turn  to  account  this  bap- 
tism of  life  which  is  being  poured  upon  humanity, 
that  the  new  birth  to  a  greater  humanity  may 
come  into  being;  that  this  ideal  of  international 
honor  may  be  born  to  a  conscious  existence. 

To  expedite  the  process  by  which  this  new  ir- 
resistible slogan  may  come  to  be  adopted  in  the 
hearts  of  men,  the  idea  of  "advertising"  seems  out 
of  place.  And  yet  if  we  wish  to  be  practical,  if 
we  wish  to  obtain  results,  we  must  recognize  the 
wisdom  of  "efficiency"  as  applied  to  the  task  of 
popularizing  an  ideal  yet  new,  just  as  we  recog- 
nize it  in  our  efforts  to  place  a  new  article  on  the 
market.  As  I  have  said  before  we  must  take  ad- 
vantage of  our  knowledge  of  mass  psychology. 
Advertising  seems  a  crude  word  and  yet  it  was 
by  this  means  albeit  unconscious,  that  our  present 
national  honor  sentiment  became  an  irresistible 
slogan  against  which  reason  stands  helpless.  So 
it  is  for  us  to  engage  after  the  war  in  a  mammoth 
advertising  campaign  to  put  before  the  people  of 
the  world  the  commodity  of  international  honor, 
to  utilize  every  psychological  device  to  appeal  to 
the  sentiments,  and  to  create  inseparable  ramify- 
ing emotional  associations  around  the  ideal. 

The  possibilities  for  starting  this  ball  of  a 
rational  sentiment  along  a  path  in  which  it  will 


210        WHAT  IS  "NATIONAL  HONOR"? 

be  able  to  attract  to  itself  emotional  accretions, 
are  fertile  and  varied.  The  public  school  has  its 
opportunity  to  present  to  impressionable  minds 
the  pictures  of  heroes  of  the  present  war  with 
some  accompanying  recognition  of  their  heroism 
not  in  defense  of  some  country,  but  in  defense  of 
international  honor.  To  the  artist  who  paints 
the  battlefield  of  the  Marne,  there  is  presented 
another  channel,  for  did  not  international 
HONOR  struggle  for  justification  on  that  ground? 
The  interpretative  privilege  of  the  historian 
should  here  be  enlisted  for  the  cause.  A  mu- 
seum of  INTERNATIONAL  HONOR,  Or  a  hall  of  IN- 
TERNATIONAL HONOR  wherein  would  be  placed 
figures  of  those  men  who  have  given  their  services 
or  their  hves  for  things  greater  than  national 
honor,  would  serve  a  valuable  purpose  here. 
Drama  and  moving  pictures  could  strike  new 
emotional  chords  in  response  to  this  appeal  of  en- 
lightened honor.  Here  would  we  beg  the  genius 
of  the  magic  pageant  maker,  Percy  Mackaye,  for 
aid  in  the  creation  of  a  thing  greater  than  com- 
munity spirit,  the  international  spmt.  What 
healing  of  the  nations  we  might  hope  for  if  art, 
music,  drama  and  literature  combined  to  work  for 
this  end,  that  the  new  sentiment  might  be  imbued 
with  dramatic  and  emotional  associations,  with 
the  emotional  imperatives  which,  as  I  have  shown, 


AN  EMOTIONAL  EQUIVALENT  211 

inhere  in  human  nature  and  have  hitherto  found 
in  national  honor  alone,  consummate  expression. 
By  emotional  appeals  only  will  the  "interna- 
tional heart"  grow  into  being  upon  which  in- 
ternational honor  will  rest  as  upon  the  rock  of 
Gibraltar;  for  it  is  the  heart,  not  the  mind, 
whence  all  honor  impulses  flow. 


'HE  following  pages  contain  advertisements  of  a  few 
of  the  Macmillan  books  on  kindred  subjects 


The  Foreign  Policy  of 
WooclrowWilson-1913-1917 

By  Edgar  E.  Robinson  and  Victor  J.  West 

$1-75 

"One  of  the  best  books  on  such  a  subject  that  has  re- 
cently come  to  hand  ...  a  truthful  presentation  of  one 
of  the  greatest  eras  the  United  States  has  ever  reaHzed 
.  .  .  carries  with  it  the  intense  interest  that  one  would 
expect  of  such  a  book. — The  New  York  Evening  Mail. 

The  authors  have  recognized  that  there  has  been  a 
great  deal  of  unmerited  criticism  directed  towards  Presi- 
dent Wilson  for  his  handling  of  the  diplomatic  crises  in 
which  the  United  States  has  been  involved.  They  believe 
that  this  criticism  is  due  to  a  lack  of  real  knowledge,  not 
only  of  facts  but  of  the  farseeing  and  consistent  policy 
which  President  Wilson  has  pursued  since  1913. 

No  attempt  has  been  made  to  write  a  history  of  the 
diplomacy  of  the  period  or  to  discuss  with  any  thought  of 
finality  the  multitude  of  questions  that  fill  it.  The  par- 
amount problems,  the  fundamental  principles,  the  great 
decisions, — these  only  have  been  given  extended  treat- 
ment. 

Added  value  is  given  the  book  by  the  inclusion  of  the 
President's  addresses  and  proclamations. 


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America  Among  the  Nations 

By  H.  H.  Powers, 
Author  of  "The  Things  Men  Fight  For,"  etc. 

Cloth,  ismo,  $1.50 

To  arrive  at  an  estimate  of  national  character  from  the 
homely  facts  of  our  national  history,  is  the  purpose  of 
this  volume,  as  expressed  by  the  author.  He  would,  too, 
discard  the  time-honored  prepossessions  and  epithets 
which  have  too  long  done  duty  with  us  as  estimates  of 
foreign  nations,  and  arrive  at  a  juster  conclusion  based  on 
their  actions.  In  short,  he  says,  this  book  is  an  attempt 
at  an  historic  interpretation  of  our  national  character  and 
of  our  relation  to  other  nations.  With  this  purpose  in 
mind  he  devotes  the  first  part  of  his  text  to  a  considera- 
tion of  America  at  home,  taking  up  such  topics  as,  The 
First  Americans ;  The  Logic  of  Isolation ;  The  Great  Ex- 
pansion; The  Break  with  Tradition;  The  Aftermath  of 
Panama;  Pan- Americanism  and  The  Dependence  of  the 
Tropics.  The  second  division  is  entitled  America  Among 
the  World  Powers,  and  considers  among  other  things : 
The  Greater  Powers ;  The  Mongolian  Menace ;  Greater 
Japan ;  Germany,  The  Storm  Center ;  The  Greatest  Em- 
pire ;  and  The  Greatest  Fellowship. 


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Where  Do  You  Stand? 

AN  APPEAL  TO  AMERICANS  OF  GERMAN 
ORIGIN 

By  Hermann  Hagedorn, 
Author  of  "You  Are  the  Hope  of  the  World,"  etc. 

Boards,  i2mo. 

This  is  a  fervent  appeal  to  German- Americans  to  come 
out  squarely  and  enthusiastically  in  support  of  the  United 
States  against  Germany.  Mr.  Hagedorn  thinks  that  the 
question  which  he  makes  the  title  of  his  book  is  a  fair 
question  for  Americans  to  ask  and  he  urges  that  it  is  not 
enough  for  German-Americans  merely  to  be  loyal  to  the 
United  States  ;  they  must  make  their  loyalty  whole-hearted 
and  enthusiastic.  Mr.  Hagedorn  reviews  the  course  of 
German-American  opinion  in  this  country  and  marshals 
the  attitude  of  the  typical  German-American  who  felt  that 
this  country  was  pro-British  and  unfair  to  Germany, 
against  the  attitude  of  the  typical  American  who  felt  that 
the  German-American  was  unreservedly  taking  the  Ger- 
man and  not  the  American  point  of  view.  Further,  Mr. 
Hagedorn  condemns  intellectual  leaders  among  the  Ger- 
man-Americans because  they  have  "sulked  in  their  tents" 
and  have  left  the  expression  of  German-American  opinion 
to  irresponsible  newspapers  and  propagandists. 


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The  World  War  and 
the  Road  to  Peace 

By  T.  B.  McLeod 
With  an  Introduction  by  Dr.  S.  Parkes  Cadman. 

Boards,  ismo. 

This  volume  contains  a  judicial  consideration  of  the 
pacifist  positions  and  some  sound  advice  to  the  men  hold- 
ing them.  Many  of  the  supporters  of  pacifism  Dr. 
McLeod  treats  in  short  order,  but  he  discusses  at  consid- 
erable length  and  with  sympathy  what  may  be  called  the 
humanitarian  basis  for  the  pacifist.  One  of  the  marked 
features  of  the  volume  is  the  clearness  with  which  the 
author  shows  that  Americans  are  all  essentially  pacifists 
— they  hate  war  and  are  afraid  of  it,  but  they  are  under- 
taking this  war  because  as  Americans  they  feel  that  all 
that  this  country  believes  in  is  threatened  by  German 
aggression. 


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AA    001019  399    3 


